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Abstract: 
 
In the recent literature in the philosophy of science there is much discussion of 
scientific knowledge, but rarely an explicit account of such knowledge.  Employing the 
Pyrrhonist skeptics modes, I examine the implicit ‘justified true belief’ analysis of 
scientific knowledge presented by Stathis Psillos, the primitivist account offered by 
Alexander Bird, and Bas van Fraassen’s voluntarist epistemology.  I conclude that all of 
these positions appear to fail.  Psillos’ account relies on a theory of reference that cannot 
block skeptical challenges to scientific realism, nor can it identify natural kinds in a non-
ad hoc manner.  Bird’s account also cannot refute skeptical challenges to it, nor can it 
adequately show how the full truth necessary for knowledge is acquired.  Van Fraassen’s 
voluntarist epistemology attempts to avoid skepticism at the cost of inconsistency.  From 
this representative sample of accounts I argue that there is seemingly no account of 
scientific knowledge that can as yet withstand Pyrrhonist skeptical scrutiny.   
In the first chapter of my dissertation, I give an overview of Pyrrhonist skepticism 
and the neo-Pyrrhonism of Robert Fogelin and Otavio Bueno, respectively.  In the second 
chapter, I exposit Psillos’ semantic realist position, and argue that he gives an implicit 
justified true belief analysis of scientific knowledge.  Moreover, I examine Bird’s 
primitivist account of knowledge.  In chapter three, I discuss van Fraassen’s philosophy 
of science as stated in constructive empiricism and empiricist structuralism, and his 
voluntarist epistemology.  In chapter four, I argue that all of these different views fail to 
provide a compelling theory of scientific knowledge.  In the fifth chapter, I consider how 
the traditional Pyrrhonist take on the relation of theory to practice, and the positive 
 iii 
epistemic additions of Fogelin and Bueno’s neo-Pyrrhonisms.  I conclude that the 
traditional Pyrrhonists were acting inconsistently when they sought out new theories to 
influence their practice, and that the positive epistemic additions to the skeptical modes 
of Pyrrhonism fall prey to the modes themselves.    
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Chapter 1. 
 
Introduction 
 
1. 
 Knowledge comes in many forms.  For example, there is know-how, such as 
knowing how to ride a bicycle, or bake a cake.  In the case of perceptual knowledge, one 
knows something immediately merely by perceiving something, such as knowing the sky 
is blue by looking at it, or knowing sugar is sweet by tasting it.  Moreover, one can know-
that something is the case, such as knowing that Toronto is the largest city in Canada, or 
knowing that Earl Grey is a type of black tea.  This last form of knowledge is called 
propositional knowledge because it is expressed in the form of propositions, which are 
statements that are either true or false.  The form of knowledge that has most interested 
philosophers is propositional knowledge.  The standard analysis of knowledge is that it 
consistent of three components: justification, truth, and belief.  Thus, according to the 
standard analysis, knowledge is justified true belief.1   
Presumably, we want beliefs that are true of the world so that we can better reach 
whatever goals we have, or we may even want true beliefs for their own sake.  For 
example, we want to know what the weather is like outside before we venture outside so 
that we can dress appropriately.  Moreover, many people want to know what the chemical 
composition of the Moon is, though this may have no effect on their daily lives.  We 
                                                 
1 As Edmund Gettier (1963) notes this analysis of knowledge can be traced back to Plato’s Meno 98 and 
Theaetetus 201.  Gettier also mentions Roderick Chisholm and A.J. Ayer as proponents of this analysis.  
However, since Gettier’s attack on the standard analysis of knowledge launched a search for a new analysis 
that incorporated the original components of knowledge with a fourth component to block Gettier style 
counterexamples. For an examination of these new analyses of knowledge see Shope (1983). 
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could make a guess as to what the weather is like, or what the Moon is made out of, but 
we would have no way of knowing if we were wrong or right without acquiring some 
reason for believing that we were wrong or right.  Furthermore, if we do not have any 
reason to support our belief, then we could be led astray by someone giving us false 
information.  Thus, we need reasons for our beliefs, or justification, in order to have 
knowledge.  
In the Western world at least, science is regarded as one of humanity’s greatest 
cognitive achievements, but in the philosophy of science there is rarely any explicit 
discussion of scientific knowledge.  There is explicit discussion of truth, justification, and 
belief, but these topics are rarely combined to form an analysis of scientific knowledge.  
Rather, there is much explicit inquiry into what constitutes scientific progress.  The 
notion of scientific progress is often formulated in epistemic terms as the acquisition of 
true beliefs about the world as expressed in scientific theories and models.  Taken 
literally, scientific theories and models purport to describe entities and processes, such as 
genes and chemical bonding, that are unseen by the naked eye.  How much progress 
science supplies us in terms of true beliefs is a matter of debate.  On one side of the 
debate are the scientific realists who claim that scientific theories and models give true 
descriptions of an unobservable world that causes observable phenomena.  For example, 
according to scientific realists, the term “atom” refers to an entity which exists in the 
same way that observable material objects exist, such as tables and trees, though an atom 
cannot be seen.  On the other side of the debate are the anti-realists who do not hold that 
scientific theories give a true description of an unseen world.  Some anti-realists deny 
that the unobservable entities and processes posited by scientific theories exist.  
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According to this type of an anti-realist, the term “electron” refers only to various 
observable phenomena, such as the white streak in a cloud chamber.  Other anti-realists 
claim that scientific theories and models may give true descriptions of unseen entities and 
processes, but that the truth value of these descriptions is unknown.   
As noted earlier, there is much attention given to defining knowledge in general 
epistemology, but there is little attention given to defining scientific knowledge in the 
philosophy of science though the term “scientific knowledge” is often used.  Rather, in 
the philosophy of science epistemic topics such as truth, justification, and belief are 
discussed in relation to scientific progress.  For instance, scientific realists argue that their 
belief in the existence of unseen entities posited by a given theory is justified by the 
successful experimental outcomes of the theory in question.  Whether or not successful 
experiments can be used as justification for the belief in unseen entities is a matter of 
controversy in the philosophy of science.  This debate about whether or not one is 
justified in believing that a given scientific claim is true parallels debates about 
justification in relation to true belief in discussions about knowledge in general 
epistemology.  In this dissertation, I shall attempt to show that the scientific realism 
debate seems to be a debate about scientific knowledge.  I will endeavor to examine a 
representative sample of three philosophers of science and their different accounts of 
scientific knowledge.              
 To date the most comprehensive account of scientific realism comes from Stathis 
Psillos.  He defends scientific realism from semantic, metaphysical, and epistemological 
attacks on the notion of scientific progress as the accumulation of nearly true beliefs 
about an unseen world.  As I shall attempt to show in Chapter Two, Psillos contends that 
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we do not often acquire fully true beliefs about the world, but we often acquire beliefs 
that come successively closer to the full truth.  The notions of near truth and full truth 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two.  Psillos explicitly defends this notion of 
scientific progress as the accumulation of true beliefs but, he emphasizes the importance 
of justification.  Justification serves both to lead us to true beliefs and show that the 
beliefs accumulated are true, or nearly so.  Thus, while Psillos explicitly discusses 
scientific progress, he does so in terms of general epistemology’s standard justified true 
belief analysis of knowledge.  Moreover, he often discusses scientific knowledge going 
so far as to entitle one of his books Knowing the Structure of Nature (2009).  However, 
he does not combine these three epistemic features into a definition of scientific 
knowledge.  Nowhere in his writings does he give an account of scientific knowledge 
explaining what epistemic features comprise scientific knowledge.  However, in Chapter 
Two, I shall try to show how Psillos can be interpreted as giving either an implicit true 
belief or a justified true belief analysis of scientific knowledge.   
Alexander Bird (2007), also a scientific realist, notes the lacuna in the philosophy 
of science concerning scientific knowledge and seeks to fill this gap with his own account 
of scientific knowledge.  He bases his account on Timothy Williamson’s (2000) notion of 
knowledge as a primitive and unanalyzable concept.  Williamson’s epistemology is 
motivated by Gettier counter-examples to the justified true belief analysis of knowledge.  
These counter-examples are known as Gettier cases after Edmund Gettier’s (1963) 
counter-examples to the standard analysis of knowledge.  Gettier cases show that 
justification, truth, and belief are not jointly sufficient for an analysis of knowledge.  In a 
Gettier case, the justification used to arrive at the true belief does not actually do so.  One 
 5 
instance of a Gettier case is the following scenario Gettier gave to show that justification, 
truth and belief were not jointly sufficient for knowledge: Smith, has a justified belief in 
the false proposition that Jones owns a Ford.  On the basis of this proposition, Smith 
infers, and therefore is justified in believing, that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in 
Barcelona.  Brown just so happens to be in Barcelona.  Thus, the proposition is true.  
Though Smith is justified in believing this true proposition, Smith does not know this 
proposition.2  Thus, a person can have a justified, true belief, but still not have 
knowledge.   
The typical response to Gettier’s challenge is to find a fourth condition to 
knowledge in addition to the standard three that will block Gettier cases.  To date there is 
no consensus in epistemology as to which of these responses successfully blocks Gettier 
cases.  Williamson accepts that there is no new definition of knowledge that can block 
Gettier cases, thus he claims that knowledge should be treated as unanalyzable.  Rather 
than discuss knowledge in terms of justification, truth, and belief (and some Gettier 
blocking fourth element), Williamson discusses justification, truth, and belief in terms of 
knowledge.  Since knowledge is not composed of these three (or more) elements, there 
are no Gettier cases to undermine a subject’s acquiring knowledge.  By following 
Williamson, Bird gives an account of scientific knowledge that is radically different from 
the standard analysis of ordinary knowledge.  For this reason, and for his explicit 
discussion of scientific knowledge, I have included Bird’s account in the sample of 
accounts of scientific knowledge to be examined.  His account of scientific knowledge 
shall be described in Chapter Two.   
                                                 
2 My summary is borrowed from Paul K. Moser and Arnold vander Nat’s (eds) introduction to Gettier cases 
in their Human Knowledge: Classic and Contemporary Approaches (2003), p.305. 
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 Bas van Fraassen is the foremost anti-realist philosopher of science.  He holds that 
the unseen entities and processes posited by scientific theories and models do not exist, or 
at least not in the way described by scientific theories and models.  Rather, he sees 
himself as working within the broader epistemological tradition of empiricism, hence he 
maintains that knowledge of the world is gathered solely through our senses.  In his 
(1989), he gives an explicit account of knowledge, but does not give an explicit account 
of scientific knowledge.  If his general account of knowledge is meant to apply to 
scientific knowledge, he does not clearly say so.  Van Fraassen’s account of knowledge 
differs radically from traditional accounts of knowledge in that he rejects justification.  
Rather, his account of knowledge takes prior opinion as the starting point for inquiry.  
One’s prior opinion does not need to be justified to be held.  A principal concern for van 
Fraassen’s epistemology is the rationality of opinion change given prior opinion as the 
starting point of inquiry.  In the philosophy of science, there is much controversy 
surrounding the rationality of theory change during scientific revolutions.  In his (2002), 
van Fraassen applies his general epistemology and theory of rationality to the problem of 
theory change in the philosophy of science.  Chapter Three shall be devoted entirely to 
giving a sketch of van Fraassen’s epistemology, theory of rationality, and account of 
scientific knowledge.   
In Chapter Four, I attempt to show that the accounts of scientific knowledge 
examined in this dissertation all seem to fail.  However, I am not arguing that an account 
of scientific knowledge, or a plurality of accounts, is impossible in principle.  Rather, 
following Catherine Elgin (2006), I note that the truth condition for the acquisition of 
knowledge appears to be a problem that plagues all of the accounts of scientific 
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knowledge examined.  It is important to note, that while she criticizes philosophers of 
science for adopting a position called veritism3, I shall challenge Psillos, Bird, and van 
Fraassen on their commitment to facticity.  The latter notion only requires that an item of 
scientific knowledge have at least approximate truth and not full truth.  In her critique of 
scientific knowledge, Elgin does not mention any particular philosophers of science as 
proponents supporting the position that knowledge is the proper goal of science.  I have 
chosen to examine the accounts of scientific knowledge advanced by Psillos, Bird, and 
van Fraassen because they are representative of various attempts in epistemology and the 
philosophy of science to stipulate certain epistemic norms.  Psillos follows analytic 
epistemology’s justified true belief analysis of knowledge.  Bird, following Williamson, 
endeavors to break from this analysis.  Van Fraassen goes further than Williamson and 
Bird by eschewing talk of justification and privileging perceptual knowledge over 
inferential knowledge.  However, all of these philosophers’ accounts of scientific 
knowledge feature truth as an essential feature of knowledge.  Because all three 
philosophers regard truth as being a property of facts, or how the world actually is, I shall 
call their view that knowledge requires truth facticity.  I shall call the commitment to the 
view that facticity is necessary for knowledge the facticity criterion.  Therefore, in this 
dissertation, I hope to show from this small but representative sample that accounts of 
scientific knowledge committed to facticity are unable to meet this commitment.  
Moreover, if I have succeeded in the former task, then I hope this will lead to 
equipollence4in the reader, not only regarding the accounts examined, but over whether 
or not a successful account of scientific exists.  Since I have not examined all accounts of 
                                                 
3 The definition of veritism is given on page 26. 
4 The notion of equipollence will be discussed in the section below on page 10. 
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scientific knowledge, particularly all those committed to facticity, I cannot conclude that 
there is no acceptable account of scientific knowledge.  However, any account of 
scientific knowledge committed to facticity will seemingly have to overcome the 
challenges presented against the philosophical positions examined in this dissertation.  
Thus far, there does not appear to be such an account of scientific knowledge.  Beyond 
this dissertation, I shall examine whether or not alternative approaches to the 
epistemology of science, such as Elgin’s notion of understanding, succeed.5   
 
 
2. 
 In my attempt to show how the accounts of scientific knowledge examined in this 
dissertation are undermined by the truth requirement I shall be using a variety of methods 
that are intended to induce doubt.  These methods were collected and systematized by 
Sextus Empiricus in his Outlines of Scepticism [1994].  Sextus was a Pyrrhonist skeptic 
who lived in the second and third centuries CE somewhere in the Roman Empire.  In this 
section, I shall attempt to give a brief sketch of how Pyrrhonism fit into the philosophical 
climate of its time to show why it saw peace of mind as the ultimate goal of inquiry (PH 
1: 26-30).  Then, I shall give a short overview of the methods employed by Pyrrhonists 
for inducing doubt.  While I shall be employing the various methods collected by Sextus, 
I will endeavor to explain why I do not use these methods for attaining peace of mind, but 
only for their apparent ability to test truth claims.  I will conclude this section by 
examining two contemporary versions of Pyrrhonism and how my version of Pyrrhonism 
differs from them. 
                                                 
5 Her views on knowledge and scientific knowledge will be discussed in detail in section three below. 
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Philosophy in Ancient Greece and Rome sought to give a true description of the 
world so as to guide us toward the good life.  What counts as a good life is a subject of 
controversy.  For the Epicureans the good life is a life of pleasure (Gosling 1996, 239), 
for the Cynics it is a life in accord with nature (Clark 1996, 173), for the Stoics it is to be 
indifferent to the pleasures and pains of life (Sharples 1996, 852).  These various schools 
of thought each have their own views on what we can know and how we come to know 
anything.  Every philosophical school of thought argues that knowledge of what exists in 
the world and of human nature is necessary to know how to live the good life.  For 
example, the Epicureans think that it is our nature to desire pleasure and avoid pain, and 
that we have free will.  Thus, the good life is one where we choose to seek pleasure and 
avoid pain.  The Stoics argue that the universe is rational and governed by fate.  They 
claim that the good life is a life of reason and calm acceptance of our immutable fate.  
Therefore, for all of these schools, knowledge seems to be a key factor in living the good 
life.   
Against the view that knowledge was necessary for the good life arose 
Pyrrhonism, named after Pyrrho of Elis who refused to assent to any belief (PH 1: 7).  
Unlike their opponents, the Pyrrhonists did not claim to have arrived at any truths about 
human nature, the nature of the world, or the good life.  Moreover, it is important to note 
that the Pyrrhonist does not claim that reality is inapprehensible, only that there seems to 
be no doctrine that has clearly shown that it has apprehended reality.  Sextus Empiricus, 
in his [1994], takes pains to distance Pyrrhonism from the Academic skepticism of 
Plato’s Academy (PH 1: 226).  The Academic skeptics claimed that they knew that did 
not know anything, and that knowledge was impossible to acquire.  The Pyrrhonists 
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doubt that they have knowledge, but do not believe that they do not have knowledge.  
Perhaps knowledge can be obtained, and perhaps the Pyrrhonists have attained it without 
knowing that they have.  Therefore, the Pyrrhonist does not claim that knowledge cannot 
be obtained.  Perhaps it can, only that they do not know if knowledge has ever been 
acquired.  Both those who claim to have found the truth and those who claim that the 
truth cannot be attained the Pyrrhonists called dogmatists (PH 1: 3).  The Pyrrhonists 
claim to be continually searching for the truth by investigating the various views of the 
dogmatists. 
In the course of searching for the truth a life of tranquility seems to be attained.  
The Pyrrhonists did not claim that tranquility was the proper goal of life, only that if one 
desired this goal for their life, then the Pyrrhonist style of investigation could lead to this 
goal (PH 1: 4-6).  The modes that the Pyrrhonist uses are methods for inducing the 
suspension of judgment.  The reason the Pyrrhonist seeks to induce the suspension of 
judgment is to reach equanimity, the ultimate goal of Pyrrhonism.  This goal shall be 
discussed below, but, since the Pyrrhonist endeavors to suspend judgment, they are not 
concerned with the soundness of the modes they use.  Hence, the Pyrrhonist does not 
claim that the mode that has apparently undermined an argument really has undermined 
the argument in question.   
 Pyrrhonist skepticism is the ability to use these, and perhaps other modes yet to 
be discovered, to evaluate claims to the truth (PH 1: 8).  Thus, Pyrrhonism is not a 
doctrine, but a skill developed to examine truth claims.  Since all philosophical doctrines 
purport to give a true description of reality, the Pyrrhonist, having not yet found a 
doctrine that can withstand the modes, suspends judgment on all doctrines (PH 1: 16-17).  
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Instead of putting forward their own description of reality to be tested, the skeptic keeps 
searching, testing whatever doctrines they come across.   
The most general mode employed by the Pyrrhonist is equipollence, or opposing 
apparently equally strong conflicting accounts against each other (PH 1: 10).  For 
example, if an Epicurean states that health is a necessary condition for happiness, then a 
Pyrrhonist will note that the Stoics argue that health is not a necessary condition for 
happiness. The Pyrrhonist will seem to adopt the arguments of the Stoic, but they do not.  
Likewise, against a Stoic arguing that health is not a necessary condition for happiness 
the Pyrrhonist may use the Epicurean argument against them.  The Pyrrhonist will use 
whatever argument is necessary to suspend judgment on the argument in question without 
believing in the soundness of the argument being used.   
Pyrrhonists employ many modes, but some of these can be generalized into one 
larger mode.  For instance, the Ten Modes (PH 1: 35-163) are instances of how 
perception of the same object seems to be relative among animals and humans, among 
the five senses, among various ethnic groups, and so on.  These ten modes can be 
generalized into a mode of relativity (PH 1: 166).  For instance, honey tastes sweet to a 
healthy person and bitter to a jaundiced person.  Since the taste of honey changes under 
different circumstances, it is unclear what the real taste of honey is.   
Other than equipollence and relativity, the other modes I shall be using are the 
modes or hypothesis, circularity, and infinite regress.  The mode of hypothesis occurs 
when a dogmatist states a particular claim about the world without any justification (PH 
1: 168).  Doing so is problematic since another dogmatist can make a contradictory claim 
without support.  Believing in the existence of God merely on faith is an example of this 
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mode.  The mode of circularity occurs when the dogmatist uses the doctrine in question 
to argue for the truth of the same doctrine (PH 1: 169).  For example, concluding that 
induction is a reliable method for uncovering truth by pointing to the past success of 
induction for uncovering truths is circular.  The mode of infinite regress occurs when the 
reasons brought up to justify belief in a certain claim themselves need to be justified by 
other reasons and so on to infinity (PH 1: 166).  For instance, to believe in the existence 
of a world independent of our sensations of it requires reasons to believe that our senses 
perceive a world external to our minds.  However, the justification for believing that our 
senses perceive a world independent of our minds needs justification as well.  For 
instance, if a dogmatist were to rely on induction to justify the mind-independence of the 
world, then belief in the truth of induction needs to be justified too, and whatever is used 
to justify induction requires a justification of its own, and so on.  As we shall see in 
Chapter Two, Psillos justifies belief in induction through the mode of hypothesis when he 
claims that we need a particular intuition as our starting point for accepting the logic that 
supports the belief in induction.  Thus, the regress can be stopped, but seemingly only 
through the modes of hypothesis and circularity, which appear to be fallacious.   
The Pyrrhonist’s purpose in suspending judgment through the use of these modes 
is the attainment of ataraxia, or “tranquility” which Sextus describes as “freedom from 
disturbance or calmness of the soul” (PH 1: 10).  The Pyrrhonist assumes that those who 
hold opinions on the true state of the world, particularly on what really is good and bad, 
are disturbed.  Their disturbances arise because they sometimes find themselves in 
situations they see as bad and they feel badly as a result.  Or they disturb themselves by 
pursuing what they see as good.  When they attain what they see as good they are 
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immoderately happy, but are also in perpetual fear of losing the supposed good they have 
acquired.  However, the Pyrrhonist who has attained ataraxia suspends judgment on what 
is what is truly good or bad, and hence does not crave or avoid anything intensely.  
Rather, the Pyrrhonist who has attained ataraxia is moderately tempered since they are 
capable of being disturbed only by what is forced upon them.  For instance, a Pyrrhonist 
will still shiver when cold, but will not be as disturbed by the cold as the dogmatist who 
is bothered both by the appearance of cold and the thought that feeling cold is bad.  By 
not taking on the opinion that being cold really is bad, the Pyrrhonist does not take on an 
extra disturbance.  The Pyrrhonist does not actively try to remain calm through all 
circumstances until they have formed the habit of being calm.  Rather, if the modes 
produce genuine suspension of judgment often enough, then ataraxia suddenly just 
appears. 
While I employ the Pyrrhonist’s modes to examine three different accounts of 
scientific knowledge, my goal is not to bring about ataraxia in the reader or in me.  If we 
learn how to suspend judgment on all matters concerning reality and attain ataraxia as a 
result, so much the better.  Rather, I am interested in employing the modes as a means for 
testing the soundness of arguments.  Many, if not all, of these modes come from the 
dogmatists themselves.  The dogmatists seek to undermine their opponents’ doctrines 
using the same methods applied by Pyrrhonists against all doctrines.  However, the 
dogmatists do not fully employ these same modes to test the truth of their own doctrines.  
As shall be shown in Chapter Four, all three philosophers of science examined in this 
dissertation rely on dogmatic assumptions and circular reasoning in the assertion and 
defense of their accounts of scientific knowledge.  If these modes are an acceptable 
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means to demolish a doctrine incompatible with one’s own, then these modes may be 
used against all doctrines.  If none of the positions under examination can withstand the 
scrutiny of these modes, then we should suspend judgment on them, not to attain ataraxia 
but because they are epistemically unacceptable.  Hence, my interest in Pyrrhonism is 
purely epistemological.  I call this purely epistemic version of Pyrrhonism Epistemic 
Pyrrhonism, as it employs the Pyrrhonist modes only for the purposes of evaluating truth 
claims.  In this dissertation, I intend to use Epistemic Pyrrhonism to induce a state of 
equipollence in the reader regarding the accounts of scientific knowledge under 
examination.  
 Epistemic Pyrrhonism differs not only from traditional Pyrrhonism, but from neo-
Pyrrhonism as well.  Neo-Pyrrhonists also abandon the attainment of ataraxia as the goal 
of their inquiries while employing the modes against all doctrines, but they attempt to 
show that some form of cognitive success is possible that does not fall victim to the 
modes.  Robert Fogelin (1994) and Otávio Bueno (forthcoming) also are two neo-
Pyrrhonists who are only interested in the epistemological aspect of Pyrrhonism and not 
the attainment of ataraxia.  Fogelin focuses on applying the modes to theories of 
justification in general epistemology, but gives a neo-Pyrrhonist account of knowledge.  
Bueno applies the modes to the epistemology of science, yet he argues that we can 
acquire understanding of the world through science.  While I join Fogelin and Bueno in 
dismissing the practical dimension of Pyrrhonism, I do not agree with the search for 
cognitive success in their neo-Pyrhhonist projects.  In the paragraphs below, I shall give a 
brief description and criticism of Fogelin first, and then I shall turn my attention to 
Bueno’s neo-Pyrrhonist philosophy of science.   
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Fogelin follows Michael Frede’s (1998) interpretation of Pyrrhonism as a tool 
against claims of theoretical knowledge and not common knowledge claims.  What 
separates the two types of claims are the levels of scrutiny applied to each type of claim.  
Levels of scrutiny are the levels of justification required for a person to be said to know 
something within that framework (95).  Fogelin’s interpretation seems to be contextualist, 
but he denies this claiming that different levels of justification support different levels of 
knowledge.  For instance, the level of justification needed for an ordinary knowledge 
claim, such as, “I know it is sunny today”, is low.  All that is required to justify this claim 
is that one has looked outside to see if the weather is sunny or not.  For the purposes of 
everyday life this particular justificatory procedure will suffice to support this knowledge 
claim.  This context is the ordinary context.  However, if one requires apodictic certainty, 
then one has arrived at the philosophical context.  In this context, one has to show that 
one is not dreaming that it is a sunny day, or that one is not a disembodied brain in a vat 
deceived by evil scientists.  Rather, Fogelin argues that he has not made knowledge 
relative to a justificatory framework as the contextualists do.  For Fogelin, one can be 
said to know within a particular framework, but there seems to be no privileged 
framework, or plurality of frameworks, that can show there is a fact of the matter as to 
whether an epistemic claim is ultimately true or false (98).  His version of Pyrrhonism 
allows for a Pyrrhonist to make knowledge claims as long as the level of scrutiny they are 
working within would allow them to say that they know.  If the cost of error goes up, then 
so do the levels of scrutiny and the Pyrhhonist withdraws their claim to know if the 
requirements for justification cannot be obtained.  For instance, Fogelin argues that, in 
the ordinary justificatory framework, he knows many important things, such as the 
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location of the fire escape.  However, in a framework that requires certainty he withdraws 
his claim to know since he may be a brain in a vat.   
 Fogelin contends that traditional Pyrrhonism operated under levels of scrutiny, 
where in everyday life the Pyrrhonist claimed to know many things, but withdrew 
knowledge claims when asked to reflect on them at a high level of scrutiny.  In a higher 
level of scrutiny one may be required to show that they know they are not dreaming, not 
insane, not in a computer simulation, and so on.  To support this claim, Fogelin cites 
Michael Frede’s arguments to the same effect.  Frede, in “The Skeptic’s Beliefs” (1998), 
claims the Pyrrhonist is only interested in undermining claims to knowledge about things 
that are not evident, that are arrived at through the use of reason.  However, everyday 
knowledge claims were acceptable.  To support this conclusion Fogelin cites Sextus’ 
comment on skeptical phrases employed when using the modes to affect a suspension of 
judgment: “We must…remember that we do not employ them universally about all 
things, but about those which are non-evident and are objects of dogmatic inquiry” (PH 
1:208 in Fogelin 1994).   
 Against the Frede/Fogelin interpretation of Pyrrhonism it appears to me that the 
Pyrrhonist does not recognize differing levels of scrutiny from which to make knowledge 
claims.  Instead, all claims to knowledge are equally suspect.  The only claims that are 
not suspect are claims about appearances, and it is in this sense that the modes are not 
universally applied.  As mentioned earlier in this section, the Pyrrhonist suspends 
judgment on such mundane matters as the sweetness of honey.  The Pyrrhonist makes 
manifest their constant doubt through the skeptical phrases when their interlocutor 
explicitly makes a claim about reality.  Until then the Pyrrhonist follows the customs and 
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conventions of the society they find themselves in, and Greek and Roman societies speak 
in terms of how things are, not in terms of how they appear.  For example, Sextus notes 
(PH 1: 135) that the skeptic uses the word “is” to mean “appears”, as when they say that 
‘everything is relative’ to mean ‘everything appears relative’.  Hence, when the 
Pyrrhonist seems to be making a claim that the world is a particular way by using the 
word “is” they are using that word instead of “appears” because that is how the society 
around them speaks.  Thus, the Pyrrhonist speaks loosely when they say, for example, 
that “honey is sweet”.  For the Pyrrhonist this statement is only shorthand for the 
observation that “this apparent honey appears sweet to me”.  Therefore, when the 
Pyrrhonist says that something is the case they are not making a claim to knowledge at a 
lower level of scrutiny, instead they are speaking as others do around them in the context 
of daily life.  But, the Pyrrhonists are always suspending judgment on all knowledge 
claims, no matter the level of scrutiny.6 
 Frede and Fogelin argue that the Pyrrhonist could not live their skepticism if they 
did suspend judgment on all matters, mundane or philosophical.  While I disagree with 
their interpretation, I shall not discuss my view on the matter here, but in Chapter Five 
where I shall examine whether or not there can be any kind of positive cognitive aspect 
that can be realized within Pyrrhonism, new or old.  Regardless if the Pyrrhonist could 
live their skepticism or not, the epistemological challenges put forth by Pyrrhonism are 
still a serious threat to all philosophical doctrines and thus should be taken seriously in 
epistemology.   
                                                 
6 It is important to note that I will be following the same convention as the traditional Pyrrhonists so that 
when I have written that something is the case (e.g. “Psillos argues that…”) this is just shorthand for saying 
that something appears to be the case (e.g. “Psillos appears to argue that…”). 
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 Turning now to Bueno (forthcoming), he does not explicitly endorse or criticize 
Fogelin’s neo-Pyrrhonism, nor does he reflect on how pervasive and livable Pyrrhonism 
may or may not be.  What does interest Bueno is showing how Pyrrhonism is compatible 
with many aspects of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism and with scientific practice.  
Moreover, Bueno contends that there is a positive epistemological contribution that can 
be made within the constraints of Pyrrhonism which he calls understanding.  Bueno’s 
understanding follows van Fraassen’s, and not (as shall be shown in section four of this 
chapter) Catherine Elgin’s characterization of understanding.  I shall discuss van 
Fraassen’s notion of understanding later in this section when I examine Bueno’s positive 
addition to Pyrrhonism.  Below, I will describe Bueno’s argument that Pyrrhonism shares 
many features with constructive empiricism and with scientific practice. 
 I shall give a brief sketch of van Fraassen’s epistemology to better exposit 
Bueno’s project of making the former compatible with neo-Pyrrhonism.  Through his 
criticism of scientific realism van Fraassen puts forth his own view, constructive 
empiricism.  Constructive empiricism holds that the proper aim of science is to construct 
empirically adequate theories.  A theory is empirically adequate if everything the theory 
says about what is observable is true.  The constructive aspect of constructive empiricism 
is in the practice of building models in science that, van Fraassen contends, need only 
have true descriptions of the observable phenomena, while the truth value of the 
description of unobservable phenomena is false since only observable entities exist.  
What is observable is what can be perceived with the unaided senses.  For instance, 
Newton’s model of the motions of the planets was empirically adequate because (with the 
exception of Mercury and the Moon) it was predictively accurate and thus true.  
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However, the hidden force of gravity that was posited to account for this predictive 
accuracy is not real.   
The empiricism in constructive empiricism refers to van Fraassen’s antagonistic 
stance towards explanation and analytic metaphysics, and his admiration for the scientific 
attitude of keeping an open mind.  According to van Fraassen, analytic metaphysics is a 
sub-division of western philosophy that seeks to uncover the one true nature of reality.7  
Different metaphysical theories posit different accounts of how reality is constituted.  For 
instance, materialists claim that all reality is composed of matter in space and time, while 
subjective idealists hold that reality is made up of nothing more than sensations and the 
minds that perceive them.  Van Fraassen sees himself as carrying on the nominalist 
tradition in philosophy against the Aristotelian practice of positing unobservable causes, 
dispositions, qualities, universals and so forth to account for why the observable 
phenomena behaved as they do. For example, the Aristotelian will account for causation 
by positing unseen necessary connections between objects while the nominalist claims 
the observable phenomena do not show a clear causal connection with any unobservable 
entities or processes.  Van Fraassen mentions Molière’s ridiculing of virtus dormitiva as 
an example of the superfluity of metaphysical explanations (1980: 2).   
 Returning to Bueno, he begins his argument by pointing out that Pyrrhonism is 
not a skeptical doctrine, like Cartesian skepticism, stating that knowledge is impossible.  
Such a position as Cartesian skepticism is a self-refuting claim about the reality of 
                                                 
7 As I shall attempt to describe below in Chapter Three, van Fraassen holds that analytic metaphysics seeks 
to give an explanation for what we observe by endeavoring to give a true description of reality.  Van 
Fraassen rejects the need for such explanations.  He contends that we do not need an explanation for why 
the world is independent of our minds, nor do we need an account of what the world is ultimately 
composed of.  Rather, we accept that the world is external to us because we have no reason to think 
otherwise, hence no explanation is needed.  Moreover, we muse over the ultimate composition of the 
universe because it gives us understanding.  This particular notion of understanding is discussed below on 
page 20. 
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knowledge.  Rather, the Pyrrhonist is not in the business of developing a doctrine about 
reality, but in using the modes to test claims about reality.  After giving a brief sketch of 
the Pyrrhonist modes, Bueno shows how the mode of relativity in particular is very 
similar to underdetermination arguments employed against scientific realism.  The 
former purport to show that the same object can create different appearances under 
different circumstances.  Therefore, the real nature of the object is unclear.  Bueno uses 
the different tastes honey can produce in healthy people and those suffering from 
jaundice as an example of underdetermination among appearances.  Underdetermination 
arguments claim to show that the same phenomena can lead to different accounts of the 
unobservable causes for the phenomena in question.   
An instance of underdetermination in science comes from quantum physics.  In 
the ontology of non-relativistic quantum mechanics the world is ultimately composed of 
particles, but in the ontology of quantum field theory the world is fundamentally 
composed of fields.  The predictive accuracy of both theories is equal, so a choice 
between which of the two theories to accept cannot be made on empirical grounds.  Both 
the mode of relativity and the underdetermination argument are used to create suspension 
of judgment.  The mode of relativity produces suspension of judgment about the true 
nature of observable objects, while underdetermination arguments create suspension of 
judgment about unobservable objects.   
 Bueno goes a step further than traditional Pyrrhonism to claim that 
underdetermination arguments should not just lead to the suspension of judgment, but to 
understanding.  For Bueno, following van Fraassen, understanding is the ability to see a 
particular interpretation of phenomena as a way in which the world could be without 
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accepting that interpretation as being true.  Bueno uses van Fraassen’s attitude toward the 
conflicting interpretations of quantum mechanics given in the paragraph above to 
illustrate how this notion of understanding operates.  As noted above, a choice between 
which of the two theories to accept cannot be made on empirical grounds.  Other 
considerations, such as simplicity and explanatory power, could also be taken into 
account in theory choice, but they cannot tell us which theory is true.  These other 
considerations will be discussed later in this section.  The important point here for Bueno 
is that both theories provide understanding, that is, they show us how the world could be.   
 Besides the use of underdetermination arguments and the adoption of 
understanding, Bueno’s neo-Pyrrhonism shares many features with constructive 
empiricism.  However, as noted above in the section on van Fraassen, he claims not to 
employ the underdetermination or pessimistic meta-induction arguments against scientific 
realism.  The latter arguments states that because many past empirically successful 
scientific theories are now seen as false it is likely that current scientific theories will be 
falsified in the future.  Bueno remarks that both constructive empiricism and neo-
Pyrrhonism recognize that a belief in unobservable entities is not necessary to investigate 
the empirical world.  But, there is a difference here between the constructive empiricist 
and the neo-Pyrrhonist.  The former believe that observable objects exist, while the latter 
suspend judgment about the existence of observable objects as well.  Moreover, truth is 
not the goal of inquiry for the constructive empiricist or the neo-Pyrrhonist.  The 
constructive empiricist seeks empirical adequacy while the neo-Pyrrhonist seeks 
understanding.  While both goals do not require truth to be attained, understanding can 
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explicitly be acquired through works of fiction too.  Bueno notes how works of fiction 
often provide understanding about human behavior.8   
Since both Neo-Pyrrhonism and constructive empiricism do not pursue truth both 
are critical of analytic metaphysics.  A central concern of metaphysics is ontology, or the 
categorization of what does and not exist.  Empiricism accepts as existent only those 
entities that can be directly experienced and metaphysics posits entities beyond 
perceptual experience.  Hence, empiricism claims to eschew analytic metaphysics, 
though its commitment to the mind-independent reality of what is perceptible is 
metaphysical.  Neo-Pyrrhonism employs the modes leading to the suspension of 
judgment about particular metaphysical theories, and the entities they posit, rather than 
dismissing the field of metaphysics altogether.  Moreover, the neo-Pyrrhonist is not 
committed to the direct realism as understood by constructive empiricism.  Direct realism 
states that our perceptions of the world are immediate and not mediated through our 
minds.  For instance, if we see a smoke colored cat, then the coloring of the cat is a part 
of her that we directly perceive.  This position is opposed to representationalist theories 
of perception which state that our perceptions, such as color, are produced by our minds 
and not in the world.  Thus, the smoke coloring of the cat is a mental representation of 
something perceived in the world and not of a feature of the world that exists 
independently of our minds.   
Since direct realism is another doctrine purporting to be true of reality the neo-
Pyrrhonist suspends judgment on it.  Although the neo-Pyrrhonist follows the 
                                                 
8 Catherine Elgin makes the same claim in support of her version of understanding. She uses Shakespeare’s 
Othello as an example of how we can gain understanding about how the cluster of apparently admirable 
traits exemplified by Othello are capable of being manipulated to self-destruction by a character like Iago 
(2006: 212).   
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appearances, unlike the empiricist, they do not assert anything about the real nature of 
those appearances.  The disparities between van Fraassen’s empiricist stances (both his 
constructive empiricism and empiricist structuralism) shall be discussed in detail in 
Chapter Four.  Bueno concludes that if empiricists seek to have fewer commitments than 
scientific realists, then neo-Pyrrhonism involves the fewest commitments.  Thus, the 
empiricist would be more consistent by becoming a neo-Pyrrhonist.  Bueno does not 
mention this, but neo-Pyrrhonism may also be an acceptable position under van 
Fraassen’s conception of skepticism.  According to van Fraassen, skepticism makes a 
dual claim that even if there is objective truth, it is impossible to attain, and/or rational 
opinion is impossible.  Since neo-Pyrrhonism withholds judgment on both of these 
claims, and is not self-refuting, then neo-Pyrrhonism is rationally acceptable within van 
Fraassen’s conception of rationality. 
 With regards to scientific practice, Bueno shows how neo-Pyrrhonism is applied 
to the methods used by the scientific community to test theories for acceptability.  As 
with philosophical doctrines, scientific theories postulate entities that are not directly 
observable.  Disagreement arises as to which (if any) of the theories is true.  Returning to 
the example of non-relativistic mechanics and quantum field theory, as noted above the 
two theories have incompatible ontologies, but are equally empirically successful.  One 
may choose to accept one theory over the other as true according to methodological 
criteria, such as explanatory power or simplicity.  However, there is disagreement as to 
how these criteria are to be understood.  For example, the simplest theory may be 
understood as the one with the fewest equations, or the fewest postulated entities.  
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Depending on which notion of simplicity is adopted, one may appear simpler or more 
complex than the other.   
Similar problems arise for the notion of explanatory power.  There is no 
agreement as to what explanatory power consists in.  On some accounts explanatory 
power is successful identification of the causal processes engaged in the events under 
investigation.  Other accounts of explanatory power focus on the connections between 
explanation and unification.  Still other accounts see explanation in pragmatic terms, as 
how certain items of information are employed (on these accounts the information need 
not be true to be useful).  Depending on which of these significantly different accounts is 
adopted, one theory may be viewed as having more explanatory power than its rival.  It is 
unclear how these methodological disagreements can be settled.  Thus, the neo-
Pyrrhonist suspends judgment on the theories in question and on the methodological 
disagreements. 
 While Bueno starts with a disagreement in the foundation of physics, he shows 
how the neo-Pyrrhonist modes can lead to the suspension of judgment regarding other 
areas of science.  Specifically, he considers how disagreement about the shape of the 
atom in experimental physics cannot be resolved, nor can the dispute between 
nominalists and Platonists9 on the nature of mathematical objects.  On both these matters 
the neo-Pyrrhonist suspends judgment. 
 Now Bueno addresses the question of whether there is a neo-Pyrrhonist account 
of scientific knowledge.  He notes that the neo-Pyrrhonist account of knowledge would 
be one that does not make a claim about the actual nature of knowledge.  Neo-Pyrrhonist 
                                                 
9 Platonists in the philosophy of mathematics hold that numbers and other mathematical objects are entities 
that exist mind-independently.   
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knowledge is not a thing that is attained, but a process of investigation.  The neo-
Pyrrhonist is not only concerned with the practical applications of this knowledge, such 
as making accurate predictions and developing technology, but also in expanding their 
understanding of the world.  As mentioned above, understanding consists in the many 
incompatible answers given in response to a particular question (such as the nature of the 
ultimate constituents of world, of atoms, of mathematical objects).  By suspending 
judgment on the truth of these answers we open ourselves to the insights offered by each 
account into the phenomena in question. Furthermore, the neo-Pyrrhonist’s inability to 
decide on a particular issue shows how the suspension of judgment arises, and why, in 
such a situation, this state is to be expected.10  Bueno’s application of van Fraassen’s 
notion of understanding to neo-Pyrrhonism cannot withstand the scrutiny of the 
Pyrrhonist modes.  I shall leave this criticism of Bueno’s neo-Pyrrhonism to Chapter Five 
where I contend that there is as yet no version of neo-Pyrrhonism that has successful 
shown how a positive cognitive goal can escape the corrosive force of the skeptical 
modes.    
 
 
3. 
Having discussed in section one the three accounts of scientific knowledge that 
will be examined in this dissertation and Pyrrhonism, I shall now give a sketch of 
Catherine Elgin’s criticisms to any account of scientific knowledge.  She provides 
                                                 
10 However, Bueno’s application of van Fraassen’s notion of understanding to neo-Pyrrhonism cannot 
survive the scrutiny of the Pyrrhonist modes.  I shall leave this criticism of Bueno’s neo-Pyrrhonism to 
Chapter Five where I attempt to argue that there thus far seems to be no version of neo-Pyrrhonism that 
successfully shown how a positive cognitive goal can withstand the corrosive force of the skeptical modes. 
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sophisticated objections to this project in her (1996, 2004, 2006).  In her (2006), Elgin 
notes that knowledge is factive.  If a putative knowledge claim turns out not to be true, 
then it is not a claim of knowledge at all.  Since knowledge needs truth, there is much 
concern in epistemology with obtaining the truth.  Alvin Goldman calls this overriding 
concern for truth in epistemology “veritism”.  The features of veritism are that, “we 
should accept only what we consider true, take pains to insure that the claims we accept 
are in fact true, and promptly repudiate any previously accepted claims upon learning that 
they are false” (2004, 113).  Thus, a veritist is committed to the view that: (1) truth is 
necessary for knowledge, and (2) knowledge is the goal of epistemology.  However, 
Elgin argues that such high standards of verity do not reflect how we actually cognize.  
Moreover, such a narrow focus cannot do justice to our cognitive successes since these 
achievements are dependent on falsehoods.11 
 Elgin examines how well science would fare from a veritist viewpoint.  She 
chooses science as her test case because it is “undeniably a major cognitive achievement” 
and its methodology is “self-reflective” which allows its epistemically valuable factors to 
be more readily ascertainable (2006, 199).  Furthermore, epistemology should be able to 
give an account for the success of good science, or “science that affords epistemic access 
to its subject matter” (199).  She surmises that science, because of its cognitive successes 
and self-reflexive methodology, would be an illuminating starting point for a revamping 
of general epistemology.    
                                                 
11 Cf. page 32.  While I use facticity, and not veritism, to judge the success of accounts of scientific 
knowledge, I mention Elgin’s criticisms here since they apply to accounts which allow for approximate 
truth to be a component of knowledge.  Moreover, Psillos, Bird, and van Fraassen seem to strive for full 
truth in their respective accounts of scientific knowledge, but they do not explicitly claim that full truth is a 
necessary condition for scientific knowledge.  Hence, Elgin’s claim that philosophers of science are 
committed to veritism may be too strong.   
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Veritism, Elgin contends, cannot provide an account of why good science is good.  
According to veritism, even good science is epistemically bad.  Our best science is beset 
by anomalies and other salient problems, and where science is successful it is false.  
Good science relies on models which idealize, abstract and approximate from the 
phenomena to achieve its successes.  A favorite example employed by Elgin is the ideal 
gas law.  This law assumes that molecules are perfectly elastic spheres that do not exhibit 
mutual attraction and occupy negligible space.  Yet, no such molecules are purported to 
exist, they are imagined only for the purposes of making certain thermodynamic features 
of observed gases more apparent.  According to veritism, any account that represents 
molecules in this fashion is false and thus epistemically unacceptable.  However, if the 
behavior of, e.g helium, digresses from the ideal gas law to a negligible degree (where the 
temperature is high and pressure is low), then scientists will use the law to calculate the 
thermodynamic properties of the gas.  Thus, though the ideal gas law is false, it is still 
provides illuminating insights into the behavior of observed gases. 
Elgin provides other practices that diverge from the observations that are an 
integral part of scientific practice, such as: curve smoothing, ceteris paribus claims, 
stylized facts, and a fortiori arguments from limiting cases (2004, 116-119).  
Furthermore, observations are messy, by simply observing one does not immediately 
know what is of importance and what is not.  Hence, scientists must select what features 
to concentrate on when choosing the scale of their research and when categorizing their 
findings.  For example, what we call “water” often comes from a variety of sources (the 
sky, the tap, the pond) and the substances are mixed in various ways.  The liquid from the 
tap will have higher concentrations of chlorine and fluoride than the liquid from the sky 
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which has higher concentrations of sulfate and nitrate, while the liquid from the pond has 
a higher mineral content than both of the former examples.  Yet, all of these liquids are 
called “water” because H2O is stipulated as the common denominator for all of these 
liquids, and the other substances are considered “impurities”.  Oftentimes the impurities 
are slight, and so the water can be used towards some scientific purpose.  Sometimes the 
impurities are more salient and must be filtered out.  By having H2O as a common 
denominator we can measure the purity of each sample against it.  
However, if scientists followed veritism, then science would become too 
cognitively costly to practice.  Each sample of liquid would require a breakdown of its 
component chemical, biological, and mineral parts, and such a profile would conceal 
what every sample had in common.  Instead, by treating the three samples as a single 
substance with various impurities emphasizes the characteristic they all share.  Only after 
stipulating a common denominator can we begin to examine what makes them different.  
For example, we can now investigate why the impurities of the rain water differ from the 
impurities of the tap water (2006, 205).   
Veritism would not be able to countenance the scientific practice of 
experimentation.  Experiments are blatantly artificial.  Arguably, a laboratory can be 
interpreted as a fictional setting where the conclusions of the experiments performed 
there are, “projections from fiction to fact” (2004, 125).  For instance, to determine 
whether a particular substance is carcinogenic scientists put genetically identical mice 
into similar environs and expose half of them to the large doses of the substance while 
leaving the other half unexposed.  The shared genetic makeup and the similar 
environment are intended to screen off the possibility that a genetic or environmental 
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factor may be the cause of any cancer appearing in the mice.  This screening off 
procedure exemplifies the effects (if any) of the substance in question.  An assumption is 
made that, since mice and humans are both mammals, if humans were similarly exposed 
they too would (or would not) develop cancer.  Another assumption is that exposure to 
large amounts of the substance in small mammals over a short period of time will mirror 
the effects of exposure to small amounts of the substance over long periods of time.  To 
succeed at imparting understanding the experiment has to be interpreted in the correct 
way.  The experiment is not meant to be representative of mice in their natural 
environment; rather it is designed to highlight one particular aspect of the mice and of 
mammals in general (in this case, the effect of a certain substance on mammals). 
The experiment diverges from nature considerably for the express purpose of 
emphasizing the effect of the substance in question on the mice.  For instance, the mice 
are bred to have a particular genetic structure, they are protected from predators, their 
exposure to the substance is far more than they would encounter in the wild.  Yet, the 
experiment is informative precisely because it is so artificial.  The artificiality of the 
experiment is meant to emphasize certain features of the mice and downplay others for 
the express purpose of revealing an aspect of nature that would be overshadowed in their 
natural environment.   
Thought experiments, as Elgin characterizes them, are “imaginative 
representations designed to reveal what would happen if certain conditions were met” 
(1996, 210).  The conditions imagined are such that the thought experiments often cannot 
be physically performed, and possibly never will be.  Nevertheless, they supply an 
understanding of the phenomena they purport to be about.  For instance, Einstein’s 
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thought experiment concerning equivalence of gravitational and inertial mass involves 
what one would see if one could ride a wave of light.  Einstein did not claim that his 
thought experiment was true, clearly if one were shrunk to such a size that one could ride 
a wave of light, one would not see anything since their retina would be smaller than a 
photon, and so on.  Hence, a suspension of disbelief is necessary for the thought 
experiment to work.  The problems one would have riding a wave of light are irrelevant 
to the purpose of pointing out the implications of the finitude of the speed of light (212). 
While thought experiments are fictional, not just any fiction will enhance 
understanding.  A thought experiment will only work if the assumptions that can be 
properly ignored are correct, or it will mislead.  But, as we have already seen above, this 
is the case for all experiments.  Models too are fictions characterized “as a symbolic 
construct that exemplifies features it shares with the phenomena it models but diverges 
from those phenomena in other, unexemplified, respects” (213).  She uses a toy model of 
a protein as an example of how the model differs from an actual protein.  The model does 
not accurately represent the shape, size, or color of the protein, but these representational 
failures do not make the model defective.  The important features the model does 
exemplify are the structural similarities it shares with the protein.  The divergences from 
the actual protein are important as well since the larger sized, color-coded, and durable 
model allows the features it exemplifies to become apparent so that they can be identified 
with less difficulty when the proteins are directly observed.  
The reason Elgin gives for why fictions are capable of making cognitive 
contributions is that the divergences from the phenomena are negligible in recognizable 
ways.  This same negligible divergence accounts for why good theories continue being 
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good despite anomalies.  The theories are good up to a certain threshold, and that 
threshold is where the divergences become non-negligible.  Two examples Elgin gives of 
negligible divergences are the ideal gas law and Newton’s laws of motion.  In the first 
instance, a collection of gas molecules nearly complies with the ideal gas law.  In the 
second instance, a nearby slowly moving object’s motion nearly complies with Newton’s 
laws.  In both of these examples, the laws provide a context in which to formulate and 
answer the where, how, why, and with what repercussions divergences occur.     
Thus, Elgin seems to have shown that falsity permeates every aspect of science, 
from its theoretical aspects (models and laws) to its practice (experimentation, both 
physical and thought).  If the whole truth is needed for knowledge, then there can be no 
scientific knowledge.  Verisimilitude too is not to be widely found in science.  But, there 
are more difficulties for an account of scientific knowledge.  Even if science was wholly 
true, knowledge comes in “discrete bits” (2006: 200) and science is holistic.  As Quine 
appears to have shown, sentences are not tested in isolation.  They cannot be since the 
sentences are mutually supporting and hence do not have separately testable 
consequences.12  To illustrate her point, Elgin notes that without an evolutionary theory 
nothing could count as evidence for or against the claim that a behavior instantiates 
reciprocal altruism.  These claims can only be true within the context of a theory, not 
independently of it since the theory provides the individuation of the items they 
putatively refer to, such as gene, or phylum.  Therefore, since science is false and holistic, 
knowledge cannot be the goal of science. 
                                                 
12 As shall be shown in Chapter Two, Psillos argues against holism as part of his argument for the stability 
of reference through theory change.  The stability of reference through theory change supports his view that 
science acquires truth about the world.  However, in Chapter Four, Hasok Chang (2003) and P Kyle 
Stanford (2003) show how holism is not necessary to argue against the stability of reference through theory 
change. 
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One may object that philosophers of science are not committed to veritism since 
they speak of approximate truth rather than full truth, and they do not explicitly state that 
full truth is a necessary condition for the scientific knowledge.  While this may be true, 
Elgin’s criticism can be applied to accounts of scientific knowledge that countenance 
approximate truth.  As shall be shown in Chapter Four, the concept of truth falls prey to 
the mode of relativity since there is no agreement as to what constitutes approximate 
truth.  Psillos argues that formal accounts of this notion fail, hence he develops an 
intuitive account of approximate truth.  However, I shall attempt to contend that it is 
unclear why we should accept his intuitions as to what is and is not approximately true.  
Thus, Elgin’s criticisms may encourage equipollence is those readers for whom a formal 
account of approximate knowledge is needed for the notion to be acceptable, or for those 
whose intuitions compel them toward a less tolerant concept of approximate truth, or for 
those who are committed to veritism. 
Furthermore, one may counter that knowledge does not have to be abandoned as 
the goal of epistemology and science; rather we can just change the notion of knowledge 
in such a way as to exclude its shortcomings.  Elgin disagrees since, even purged of its 
objectionable elements, the notion will likely keep some connections to its old faults.  
Hence, a new goal for epistemology, free of past negative associations, is necessary.  
Elgin argues that understanding should be this new goal.  Understanding shall be 
discussed in the following section.  In the section on neo-Pyrrhonism earlier in this 
chapter, I examine Otávio Bueno’s argument that van Fraassen should adopt a neo-
Pyrrhonian stance.  Bueno accepts van Fraassen’s notion of understanding.  As shall be 
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shown in the section below, Elgin’s take on understanding differs greatly from van 
Fraassen’s account.    
 
 
4. 
 In her (2004), Elgin notes, that if we take veritism as our standard, then most of 
our best science is epistemically unacceptable because it is false.  Furthermore, the falsity 
of science is responsible for much of its cognitive achievements.  As she states, “The 
problem comes with the laws models, idealizations, and approximations which are 
acknowledged not to be true, but which are nonetheless critical to, indeed constitutive of, 
the understanding that science delivers” (2004, 113-114).  This state of affairs leads to a 
dilemma: if we accept veritism, then science should be taken as “either cognitively 
defective or as non-cognitive” or we can reject veritism and abandon, modify, or relax the 
truth requirement and “remain cognitivists about, and fans of science” (2004, 114).  The 
character successful cognition provides cannot be knowledge, since this relies on truth.  
Rather, cognitive success for Elgin resides in understanding.  According to Elgin,to 
understand a theory “is to properly interpret its symbols” (2006, 215).  This skill requires 
one to be able to recognize the difference between factual and fictional sentences, hold 
tacit presuppositions, and accurately interpret the scope and selectivity of exemplars, and 
so on.  The reasoning involved can be non-propositional.  The understanding of a 
theory’s domain “is to be in a position to recognize, reason about, anticipate, explain, and 
act on what occurs in the domain on the basis of the resources the theory supplies” (215).  
Understanding is not all or nothing, but has a range.  A basic understanding allows us to 
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recognize unrefined features, to provide sketchy explanations, to reason in broad terms, 
to develop rudimentary anticipations.  As understanding improves, “our recognition, 
reasoning, representations, and explanations become better focused and more refined” 
(215).   
 As an illustration of how understanding works Elgin (2009) uses the example of 
an 8-year-old’s conception of evolutionary theory.  One of the 8-year-old’s core beliefs 
about evolution may be that humans evolved from apes.  A more refined understanding 
of evolution is that humans and apes evolved from a common ancestor who was not an 
ape.  The child’s claim shows some understanding of evolution.  Although her claim is 
strictly false it is cognitively more valuable than if she claimed that we evolved from 
spiders, or that we did not evolve at all.  According to Elgin, such crude formulations are 
widespread in science education.  Children are given a gross characterization that points 
in the direction of the more sophisticated understanding of the phenomena, successively 
refining the crude characterizations until the sophisticated understanding is reached.  As 
Elgin states, “Think of the trajectory from naïve folk physics through Newtonian 
Mechanics to relativity and quantum mechanics” (2009: 325). 
 The deeper understanding one has does not necessarily mean that the 
understanding has more true propositions in its coherent, unified, and integrated web of 
propositions.  As noted in the last section much of good science relies on various forms 
of falsification and fiction.  However, understanding is not indifferent to truth and, while 
she argues (2009) that understanding is not factive, some part of one’s understanding 
must still answer to facts.  In her (2004), Elgin contends that, even though scientific 
theories employ falsehoods, these falsehoods help to make sense of the facts, but the 
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theory itself must be testable against certain epistemically accessible facts to be 
considered a candidate for understanding.  If the theory does not have a testable relation 
with some constellation of facts, then the theory is discredited.  What counts as 
epistemically accessible is decided by considerations of simplicity, scope, evidence, and 
so on.  Where the sentences in a theory diverge from the observed phenomena, “the way 
the world is” decides whether or not the theory in which these sentences appear is 
acceptable or not.  For instance, if evidence arose that friction is a major factor in 
collisions between gas molecules, then unless modifications elsewhere can be made, 
theories that represent collisions as perfectly elastic spheres will be unacceptable.  The 
requirement that a theory be testable and defeasible shows that the theory preserves some 
fidelity to truth. 
 Elgin accepts the conclusions of the pessimistic meta-induction and the 
underdetermination thesis.  The acceptance of these skeptical challenges leads her to 
adopt ontological pluralism where, in different contexts, different ontologies may be 
adopted depending on one’s goals.  For instance, the ontology of Newton’s physics works 
well when applied to medium-sized objects, such as cars, but not for the very small such 
as, sub-atomic particles.  Yet, even when one theory seems to supersede an incompatible 
alternative, Elgin recognizes that such a victory may not be permanent.  For example, 
Newton’s notion of absolute space was thought to refute Leibniz’ concept of relative 
space, but now Einstein seems to vindicate Leibniz’ relative space and to have 
overthrown Newton’s absolute space.  However, Elgin claims that there are cases where 
we can know what does not exist, as when she mentions phlogiston as an exemplar of 
misunderstanding since it does not exist.  She notes that the non-existence of phlogiston 
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“decisively discredits the laws of phlogiston theory” (1996, 183).  Moreover, Elgin states 
that “Since phlogistic laws purport to be factual, their falsity is their undoing” (1996, 
183).  However, as shall attempt to argue below, phlogiston theory was an advance in 
understanding according to Elgin’s own criteria. 
Thus, in at least four works (1996, 2004, 2006, and 2009) Catherine Elgin argues 
against the primacy of knowledge in epistemology and champions the centrality of 
understanding instead.  As shown above, the central reason for her abandonment of 
knowledge as the ultimate concern of epistemology is that knowledge requires truth, but 
truth can be hard to obtain, or once obtained, not useful or even a hindrance to cognition.  
However, I shall endeavor to show that, even with a relaxed truth requirement, Elgin’s 
notion of understanding falls prey to objections similar to those she raises against 
knowledge. 
A major weakness in Elgin’s characterization of understanding is that she leaves 
the notion of misunderstanding extremely vague.  She mentions that the theory of 
phlogiston is an instance of misunderstanding since phlogiston does not exist (1996: 
183).  However, by her own standards, phlogiston is an instance of understanding, just 
not full understanding.  According to James Conant (1948), phlogiston theory could 
account for most of the chemical phenomena of the mid-eighteenth century.  Specifically, 
it explained the preparation of metals from ores.  However, the theory ultimately could 
not account for the increase in weight in metals that had been heated since the theory 
predicted that the metals should lose weight as phlogiston was expelled from the metal 
during heating.  This anomaly and Antoine Lavoisier’s discovery of oxygen led to the 
demise of phlogiston theory.  Yet, phlogiston was an advance over alchemy.  As Conant 
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notes in his (1951), alchemists and metal makers amassed a collection of apparently 
unrelated facts about the four elements (earth, wind, fire, water).   
Among the facts that collected were that the heating of certain materials (earths) 
with charcoal would produce metals, and metals seemed to be the same superficial 
properties.  Other solids were called earths, or what we know as oxides.  Still other solids, 
such as charcoal and sulfur, were called combustible principles.  The process of heating 
metals with charcoal could be reversed since often the same heated metal (for instance, 
tin) produced an earthlike substance.  Such artificial earthlike substances (oxides in 
today’s language) could regain the metal if the earthlike substance was treated with 
charcoal.  A pure earth of this sort was called a calx.  The process of forming it by 
heating a metal was called calcination.  These disparate facts were united by the 
introduction of a principle called “phlogiston”. 
Phlogiston was intimately related to Aristotle’s element “fire” though how was 
not clear.  To clarify the relationship between calxes and metals, a common principle, 
phlogiston, was posited.  This principle seemed evident in the process of making various 
metals from their calxes and reversing the process.  When phlogiston was added to a calx 
you had a metal, when removed from a metal a calx was formed.  Thus, phlogiston was a 
metalizing principle.  From these phenomena phlogiston theorists inferred that, with the 
exception of gold and a small number of other metals, the calxes were naturally formed 
and not the metals.  Hence, the calxes seem to be simpler materials.  It seemed evident 
that something had to be added to calxes to make them metals.  Because the metals were 
so similar in appearance, the “something” (phlogiston) that was added was clear in all 
cases.   
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The seemingly disparate facts collected by the alchemists and metal makers were 
elegantly united by this common metalizing principle, and it was immediately accepted.  
Phlogiston provided a pattern within which a mound of apparently unrelated phenomena 
could be fitted together.  Establishing whether substances were plentiful or scarce in 
phlogiston seemed easy to establish.  Substances abundant in phlogiston were easily 
combustible, and fire was likely an instantiation of phlogiston or at least worked with it.  
Charcoal was a phlogiston abundant material, and upon heating with a metallic calx 
surrendered its phlogiston to the calx, thus creating a metal.  By itself charcoal burned, 
the phlogiston manifesting itself as fire or combining with air. Sulfur was readily found 
in nature, it burned when heated and generated an acid (sulfuric acid by contemporary 
lights).  In the age of phlogiston, it was evident that sulfur was only vitriolic acid highly 
“phlogisticated”; the burning liberated the phlogiston and produced the acid.  Because of 
these seeming explanatory successes, phlogiston theory was nearly universally accepted 
at the time of the American Revolution.  Furthermore, it was the foundation of the 
chemistry then taught to college students as part of the natural philosophy curriculum.   
However, there was a flaw, known for 150 years before the overthrow of 
phlogiston theory, discovered by Jean Rey in 1630: there was an increase in the weight of 
the calx from the tin from which the calx was formed.  This flaw was phlogiston theory’s 
eventual undoing as the phlogiston theorists could not account for how a substance would 
gain weight when it putatively lost phlogiston.  Some phlogiston theorists, notably Joseph 
Priestly, claimed that phlogiston had negative weight.  However, once Antoine-Laurent 
Lavoisier showed that combustion can only occur with a gas that has weight, namely 
oxygen, phlogiston theory was overthrown.  
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 Elgin’s choice of phlogiston as an example of misunderstanding is curious since 
there are parallels with it and Newton’s gravity; the latter she sees as a case of 
understanding.  If Thomas Kuhn (1970) is correct, then Newton’s gravity was the innate 
attraction-at-a-distance between particles in space and time, while Einstein’s gravity is a 
curvature in space-time.  Clearly, these two characterizations of gravity are incompatible, 
just as the characteristics of phlogiston are incompatible with oxygen.  Elgin seems to 
think that Newton had a good understanding of gravity since his calculations were 
accurate and are still used today in a limited domain.   
However, the chemical and metallurgical techniques developed during the 
dominance of phlogiston are still in use today as well.  For example, the transformation 
of ores to metal is still carried out by smelting charcoal with the ores.  The traditional 
story told of why phlogiston was replaced with oxygen is that burnt objects were 
supposed to lose phlogiston, and thus a certain amount of weight, when burned.  Yet, 
Newton’s theory of gravity failed to predict the perihelion of Mercury.  Despite this 
predictive failure, Elgin does not claim Newton misunderstood gravity, rather she claims 
that he understood gravity “very well” (1996:124).  Although there were clear advances 
in chemistry due to phlogiston theory, Elgin does not count these advances as at least 
being a case of crude understanding in chemistry and metallurgy.  Thus, it is not evident 
why phlogiston is counted by Elgin as a clear case of misunderstanding while Newton’s 
gravity is considered a case of understanding, and at a sophisticated level.  The mere 
claim that phlogiston does not exist is not enough to be a case of misunderstanding as the 
gravity Newton spoke of does not appear to exist either.  Moreover, as shown above 
phlogiston was a clear advance in understanding according to Elgin’s own criteria.   
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Therefore, a major flaw in Elgin’s characterization of understanding is that she 
does not have a well developed account of what a misunderstanding is.  Without such an 
account the term “understanding” threatens to become meaningless as almost anything 
could count as understanding.  As shown in this section, the one case of 
misunderstanding she cites seems to be a case of understanding by her own criteria.  
Furthermore, as shall be shown in future research, since Elgin’s notion of understanding 
ultimately rests on at least some true statements and representations, her epistemology 
falls prey to some of the same objections she leveled against accounts of scientific 
knowledge.   
For example, she notes that any word or statement in a language is a 
representation of the world, and that any representation is false since it simplifies and 
abstracts from the world.  Thus, any item of knowledge that a case of understanding rests 
on cannot also rest on truth according Elgin’s own criticisms against veritism.  Thus far, 
the prospects for understanding replacing knowledge as the cognitive goal of 
epistemology and science do not look promising.        
 
 
5. 
 I conclude my dissertation by showing how there is no account of scientific 
knowledge to date that can withstand the scrutiny of the Pyrrhonist modes.  Bueno’s 
notion of understanding as a cognitive goal for a neo-Pyrrhonist philosophy of science is 
examined.  He argues that a neo-Pyrrhonist can create new theories to gain more 
understanding of how the world could be and for the practical pay-off the new theory 
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may have.  I attempt to show that his notion of understanding is undermined by the 
modes.  In my examination of Bueno’s notion of understanding I consider the claim made 
by Frede (1983) that Pyrrhonists who became doctors followed the practices of the 
Methodical school of medicine.  The Methodists were agnostic regarding the existence of 
unobservable entities, including those posited in theories of medicine.  However, they 
would study theories to see if taking the theory as if it were true would improve their 
medical practice.  Frede argued that the Pyrrhonists adopted this Methodical practice of 
using theories to improve practice while not taking the theory to be representative of 
reality.   
I attempt to show that, if the Pyrrhonists did examine theories as a way to improve 
their practice, then they were seemingly inconsistent.  In order to do so consistently, the 
Pyrrhonist has to show that there is a link between theory and practice.  I endeavor to 
argue that there does not seem to be a way for the Pyrrhonist to make the connection 
between theory and practice.  This argument works a fortiori against Bueno’s claim that a 
neo-Pyrrhonist scientist can create new theories, not only to achieve understanding, but 
for practical results in terms of new technology.  The modes appear to undermine the 
connection of theory to practice, thus it seems that the Pyrrhonists were inconsistent and 
Bueno’s neo-Pyrrhonism seemingly cannot allow for theories to be created for their 
practical pay-off.  Thus, I shall ultimately conclude that there seems to be no way to 
advance epistemic goals or practical goals in science. 
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Chapter 2.  
 
 
Stathis Psillos and Alexander Bird: Two Scientific Realist Accounts of Scientific 
Knowledge 
 
Until Edmund Gettier’s (1963), analytic epistemologists often defined knowledge 
as justified true belief.  Gettier argues that this definition was insufficient since 
justification and truth could come apart in certain scenarios.  However, epistemologists 
since Gettier have continued to analyze knowledge in terms of justification, truth, and 
belief, but with an additional fourth condition that is intended to block Gettier counter-
examples.  Stathis Psillos seems implicitly committed to a definition of scientific 
knowledge as justified true belief together with a fourth condition that has been 
developed by John Pollock.13  In this chapter, I shall attempt to show that Psillos does 
seem to hold to the definition of scientific knowledge mentioned above.  I have chosen to 
examine Psillos’ account of scientific knowledge because it is an exemplar of a justified 
true belief account of scientific knowledge.  Since I am focusing on the facticity of 
scientific knowledge, I shall not discuss how Gettier cases may be used against this 
account of scientific knowledge.  Rather, I shall be focusing on Psillos’ arguments in 
favor of science being able to acquire truth about the world.14   
I will also discuss Alexander Bird’s account of scientific knowledge.  It is an 
exemplar of an account of knowledge that takes a radical departure from the justified true 
belief account of knowledge.  Motivated by a continuing failure to overcome Gettier 
                                                 
13 Cf. pages 100-104. 
14 In Chapter Four, I will contend that, while I may be mistaken that Psillos has an account of scientific 
knowledge, my arguments against commitment to facticity can be used mutatis mutandis against his 
account of scientific progress as the accumulation of true beliefs. 
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counter-examples, Timothy Williamson (2000) proposes to treat knowledge as a 
primitive, unanalyzable concept.  Following Williamson’s take on knowledge, Bird seeks 
to develop a detailed account of scientific knowledge.  I shall argue that Bird’s account is 
committed to facticity despite his contention that truth is not a necessary condition of 
knowledge.15   
In this chapter, I will begin by giving a sketch of the “no miracles argument” 
since it is widely accepted among scientific realist to be the meta-argument from all 
forms of scientific realism are derived.  Then, I shall describe Psillos’ semantic realism 
starting with the three intuitions Psillos holds to be foundational of scientific realism.  
While the focus of my dissertation is the facticity of scientific knowledge, I will discuss 
these three intuitions of scientific realism since they are the bases for Psillos’ facticity 
arguments in favor of scientific realism.16  Subsequently, I shall discuss his responses to 
three challenges for his form of scientific realism: (1) the charge that the “no miracles 
argument” is viciously circular, (2) the challenge posed by the underdetermination thesis, 
and (3) the challenge posed by the pessimistic meta-induction.  Moreover, I will examine 
the objection that the “no miracles argument” is viciously circular because this argument 
is the primary meta-argument for scientific realism.  If the “no miracles argument” fails, 
then scientific realism fails.  Establishing the non-circularity of the “no miracles 
argument” is necessary to the test the soundness of the argument.  A circular argument 
cannot be tested.  In particular, if the “no miracles argument” is found to be viciously 
circular, then Psillos’ and Bird’s respective accounts of scientific knowledge have no 
                                                 
15 I n Chapter Four, I will then show how his account seems to fail to meet the facticity criterion for the 
acquisition of truth as a necessary condition for knowledge.   
16 In Chapter Four, I shall argue that since these intuitions are foundational they are not argued for and thus 
fall prey to the Pyrrhonist mode of hypothesis (Cf. Chapter One, page 11).  Hence, Psillos’ scientific realist 
position fails from the beginning. 
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basis.  However, the rest of the arguments described in this chapter will cover Psillos’ 
and Bird’s responses to arguments against the ability of science to uncover truth (e.g. the 
pessimistic meta-induction) and their respective arguments for how science does acquire 
truth.   
A key feature of both Psillos’ defense of scientific realism against the 
underdetermination thesis and the pessimistic meta-induction is the causal-descriptive 
theory of reference, thus I shall discuss this component of his theory in detail.  In the 
course of his defending scientific realism Psillos presents his theory of justification.  
While criticizing constructive empiricism, Psillos states his position on the superiority of 
belief in the truth of a theory over acceptance17, hence I will more closely examine this 
element of his view in Chapter Four in the section on van Fraassen.  However, since 
Psillos explicitly claims that the measure of scientific progress is the accumulation of true 
beliefs, the notion of truth is crucial to his view and, thus I shall devote three sections to 
this component of his theory.  Having described Psillos’ positions on justification and 
truth, I will show the development of his implicit account of scientific knowledge from 
(1999) to (2009).  It is important to note that if Psillos equates scientific knowledge with 
scientific progress, then it appears that the criticisms aimed at his views on truth will still 
undermine his account of scientific knowledge. 
Alexander Bird explicitly contends that we can gain scientific knowledge, and 
that the accumulation of such knowledge is the mark of scientific progress, “I shall argue 
for the epistemic approach, the simple-minded cumulative knowledge account of 
progress” (2007: 65, emphasis mine).  His arguments criticize the semantic realism of 
                                                 
17 The notion of acceptance will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
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Psillos and Illka Niiniluoto, and non-realists, such as van Fraassen and Thomas Kuhn18.  
Bird challenges the former because they hold that science can only give us approximately 
true beliefs.  He attacks the latter for denying science can achieve knowledge of the 
unobservable world and that the proper goal of science is to solve puzzles, respectively.  
As shall be shown in the section on Bird below, he contends that the semantic realists’ 
goal is too easy to achieve, that the scientific realists and non-realists do not reflect actual 
scientific practice, and that knowledge should be the goal of science.  In the final section 
of this chapter, I shall describe Alexander Bird’s epistemic approach to scientific 
progress which is based on the epistemology of Timothy Williamson (2000).  I will 
attempt to argue that Bird’s account of scientific knowledge is committed to facticity. 19   
 
 
2.1 The “No Miracles Argument” 
 
 
During the first half of the twentieth century empiricism dominated the 
epistemology of science.  In particular, logical empiricism was the received view in the 
philosophy of science until the 1960’s.  One of the main tenets of logical empiricism is 
that there is a clear linguistic distinction between theoretical terms and observational 
terms in a scientific theory.  The former terms putatively refer to entities and processes 
                                                 
18 While Kuhn did not himself as taking a stand between scientific realism and anti-realism, Bird sees him 
as a kind of instrumentalist.  Bird argues that Kuhn claimed scientific theories are neither true nor false, 
rather their value lies in their ability to solve puzzles.  Instrumentalism will be discussed in this chapter in 
the section on Bird. 
19 In Chapter Four, I will show that Bird’s reliance on facticity seems to undermine his account of scientific 
knowledge. 
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(such as, “electron” and “gene”) that cannot be perceived by the unaided senses, while 
the latter terms refer to entities and processes (such as “red” and “solid”) that can be 
perceived by the unaided senses.  Logical empiricists, such as Rudolf Carnap, claim that 
one could eliminate the language describing unobservable entities from a scientific theory 
and interpret the theoretical language in terms of the observation language.  The laws of 
nature that describe the connections between unobservable entities and processes could 
be reinterpreted as connections between observable entities and processes.  For example, 
the hidden force of gravity could be reinterpreted as a generalization of the repeated 
observation of falling objects.  Thus, logical empiricists assert any theoretical language is 
dispensable.  However, this claim does not mean that logical empiricists denied the 
existence of unobservables.  The dispensability of theoretical language only showed that 
it could be reinterpreted into an observation language, not that it was untrue.  If one 
believes that scientific theories uncover a hidden realm of invisible entities and processes, 
then one is free to do so.  Therefore, logical empiricists can be found to include scientific 
realists and anti-realists among them. 
Hilary Putnam (1975) challenges the logical empiricists’ theoretical/observable 
language dichotomy.  He argues that the dichotomy between an observation language and 
theoretical language is untenable.  Observation terms can be used to refer to unobservable 
entities without a change in meaning, hence putative “observation terms” may refer to 
unobservable entities (Psillos 1999: 24).  Putnam uses the following instance to illustrate 
his point, “‘Red’, for example, was so used by Newton when he postulated that red light 
consists of red corpuscles” (Putnam 1962: 218).20  What we see are red things, but not 
                                                 
20 This is Putnam’s interpretation of Newton’s explanation for how we see red things.  It is an open 
question as to what Newton said about corpuscles.   
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the red corpuscles that make what we are seeing the color red.  Furthermore, many 
theoretical terms seem to refer to observable phenomena, as when radioactive material 
poisons someone.  The conclusion here is not that observation statements and theoretical 
statements cannot be distinguished, only that there is no clear cut dichotomy between 
such statements.  Since such an absolute distinction is impossible to make then there is no 
way to create languages solely comprised of theoretical or observation statements.  The 
upshot for logical empiricists is that without the theoretical/observation language 
dichotomy, they cannot show that theoretical language is superfluous because it is 
translatable into an observation language. 
The failure of logical empiricism to create an absolute distinction between 
observational and theoretical terms seemed to show that reference to theoretical terms 
were necessary to explain the empirical success of science.  If theoretical terms were not 
superfluous, then it seems they are necessary to account for the empirical success of 
science.  As Putnam puts it, the inability to account for the success of science would 
make the success of science a “miracle”.  Thus, the argument he formulated in support of 
scientific realism is called the “no miracles argument”.  This argument gives a sketch of 
how the empirical success of science can be explained on semantic and metaphysical 
grounds:     
The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that 
 does not make the success of science a miracle.  That terms in mature  
 scientific theories typically refer (this formulation is due to Richard 
 Boyd), that the theories accepted in a mature science are typically  
 approximately true, that the same terms can refer to the same even  
 when they occur in different theories – these statements are viewed 
 not as necessary truths but as part of the only scientific explanation of 
 the success of science, and hence as part of any adequate description  
 of science and its relations to its objects. 
                                (Putnam 1975 as quoted in Psillos 1999, 71)  
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The “no miracles argument” is the inspiration for Psillos’ and Bird’s scientific 
realism.  It is important to note that the “no miracles argument” does not claim that all 
successful scientific theories are true, but only those that are part of a “mature” science.  
The concept of a mature science shall be discussed in the section below on Psillos. 
 Psillos (1999) unpacks the “no miracles argument” to show explicitly what kind 
of semantic, metaphysical, and epistemological assumptions are necessary to reveal what 
parts of successful scientific theories account for their success.  While Psillos claims that 
these assumptions are the intuitive bases for scientific realism in general, his semantic 
view is particular to a specific kind of scientific realism called “semantic realism”.  This 
scientific realist view will be discussed in detail below.  Bird accepts the conclusion of 
the argument, but does not give a detailed account of what kind of semantics would be 
necessary to show that the success of scientific theories is not miraculous.  However, 
while the “no miracles argument” only argues for the truth of scientific theories, both 
Psillos and Bird regard this argument as supporting the notion of scientific knowledge. 
The “no miracles argument”, and scientific realism in general, have come under skeptical 
attack from scientific anti-realists.  Both Stathis Psillos (1999, 2009) and Alexander Bird 
(2007, 2010) seek to defend scientific realism from the challenges posed by scientific 
anti-realists, such as the pessimistic meta-induction and the underdetermination thesis.  In 
the course of answering these objections to scientific realism, both Psillos and Bird offer 
a positive account of scientific knowledge, respectively.   
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2.2 Psillos’ Semantic Realism 
 
 
2.2.1 A Summary of Psillos’ Scientific Realism 
 
 
As described in Chapter Two, Psillos begins his exposition of his scientific 
realism by stating three theses as the basis for scientific realism: the semantic thesis, the 
epistemological thesis, and the metaphysical thesis.  Following these three theses, he 
constructs a version of scientific realism that claims to be consistent between its 
semantic, epistemic, and metaphysical views.  These theses and the positions that follow 
from them are in turn based on the “no miracles argument”.  The semantic aspect of 
scientific realism is covered by the causal-descriptive theory of reference which purports 
to show how it is that terms in scientific theories refer to unperceived entities.  The 
causal-descriptive theory putatively undermines the challenge posed by the pessimistic 
meta-induction.  The causal-descriptive theory of reference also reveals how it is that 
natural kinds can be differentiated from mere posits, and thus follows from the 
metaphysical thesis as well.  Scientific theories can justify their claims about the world 
because they employ ampliative-abductive techniques, such as the inference to the best 
explanation.  The inference to the best explanation and (in particular) the claim that 
theoretical virtues are epistemic, putatively block the challenge posed by the 
underdetermination thesis.  I have attempted to argue that these three theses and the 
arguments that follow from them seem to implicitly support a justified true belief analysis 
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of scientific knowledge.  Moreover, I have tried to show that Psillos’ account of scientific 
knowledge appears to be committed to facticity.  In the sections below, I shall endeavor 
to show that his version of scientific realism seemingly does not meet the facticity 
criterion, and hence that his account of scientific knowledge appears to fail.   
 
 
2.2.2 Psillos’ Three Stances of Scientific Realism 
 
 
Psillos argues that scientific realism is a philosophical package that is the 
incorporation of three theses: a metaphysical thesis, a semantic thesis, and an epistemic 
thesis.  The metaphysics employed by Psillos is analytic metaphysics, which seeks to 
show the structure of reality.21  The metaphysical thesis is that the world has he calls a 
“natural kind structure” (1999, xix).  A natural kind structure is a structure that exists 
independently of humans, is not created by humans, and is mind-independent. Opposed 
to this view are nominalist accounts, such as Berkeley’s subjective idealism which claims 
that material objects do not exist, rather so called “material objects” (such as trees and 
buildings) are only ideas, or thoughts.  These ideas are dependent on a mind to perceive 
them or they will cease to exist.  A different form of idealism maintains that there is a 
world that is independent of the mind, but that is not directly knowable.  Instead, the 
mind must organize the sensory data it receives from the world to make sense of the 
world.  Thus, humans do not discover the structure of the world, instead they structure the 
world in various ways according to their interests.  For instance, For instance, Norwood 
                                                 
21 Cf. Chapter  One, page 18. 
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Hanson (1958) imagines Johannes Kepler and Tycho Brahe watching the sun at dawn.  
The former sees the Earth moving around the stationary sun, while the latter sees the sun 
moving around the stationary earth.  Both astronomers have the same physiological 
process of sight occurring within their bodies, but they see the same phenomena in 
different ways because they are committed to helio-centrism and geo-centrism, 
respectively.  Hence, theoretical presuppositions condition how one interprets the 
phenomena one perceives.  The affect of theoretical presuppositions on observation is 
called the theory-ladeness of observation.  Psillos accepts that theories do determine how 
one sees the world, but not to the extent of philosophers such as Hanson.  As shall be 
shown in the section on underdetermination, Psillos contends that one theory can be 
shown to be the true, or truer, interpretation of the world.  He would say that helio-
centrism is truer than geo-centrism.  Therefore, rather than imposing a structure upon the 
world, scientific theories uncover and delineate an already structured and mind-
independent world. 
The semantic thesis states that scientific theories take the literal descriptions of 
their intended domain, both observable and unobservable, as truth-conditioned.  Thus, the 
sentences in them are either true or false.  The view in the philosophy of science that is 
committed to the semantic thesis is semantic realism.  Psillos claims that the semantic 
thesis is the “essence” of semantic realism (1999, xx).  Thus, the observational statement 
“snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white, and the theoretical statement 
“neutrinos are massless” is true if and only if neutrinos do not have mass.  The semantic 
realist, by taking such theoretical statements at face value establishes the truth conditions 
for an assertion.  An anti-realist way of taking theoretical statements is to see them as 
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shorthand for observable phenomena.  For example, as shall be discussed in detail in 
Chapter Three, van Fraassen holds that the term “electron” refers, not to a particle or a 
cloud surrounding the nucleus of an atom, but only to the measurement of electrical 
charge in certain experimental settings.  When “electron” refers to the measurement of 
electrical charge in certain experimental settings then the term is true.  Hence, according 
to this anti-realist view, terms that purport to refer to unobservable entities are false at 
face value.   
The epistemic thesis takes successful scientific theories as those that, as Karl 
Popper has claimed, have survived repeated testing and are approximately true of the 
world.22  The notion of approximate truth will be discussed in detail in this chapter.  
Because the theories are well-confirmed the entities posited by them, or at least entities 
very similar to those posited, must exist in the world to explain the empirical success of 
the theories.  The point of the epistemic thesis is that science can and does capture 
theoretical truth as much as it can and does capture observational truth.  Psillos 
characterizes this view as epistemic optimism in opposition to the skepticism of scientific 
anti-realism.  Theoretical truth is the truth of what scientific theories assert about 
unobservable entities and processes, and observational truth is the truth of what theories 
assert about observable processes and entities.  Scientists arrive at the theoretical beliefs 
because the methods of inference and experimentation they employ are reliable: they are 
apt to generate approximately true beliefs and theories.  The methods of experimentation 
scientists use to test their theories are ampliative, that is, they generalize to a conclusion 
from repeated observations.  For instance, after repeatedly observing countless numbers 
of black ravens one is justified in concluding that all ravens are black though not all 
                                                 
22 Cf. Ch. 10 of Conjectures and Refutations. 
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ravens (past, present, and future) have been observed.  If a non-black raven is observed 
(say, an albino raven is discovered), then this additional premise undermines the 
conclusion that “all ravens are black”. 
Ampliative arguments are one of two major argument forms, the other being 
deductive.  Deductive arguments generate conclusions that are certain because the 
premises deal with concepts and not observations, thus deductive arguments can be 
shown to be true using letters in place of terms or statements.  The letters could stand for 
anything or nothing since the structure of the argument will always demonstrate that if the 
premises were true, then the conclusion would always be true too.  Take, for instance, 
modus ponens: 
If A, then B 
A 
Therefore, B. 
A could stand for something that has been observed, or for something fictional.  For 
example, A could stand for H.G. Wells’ morlocks.  No morlocks have been observed, but 
if morlocks existed, then they would necessarily have certain features because H.G. Wells 
stipulated these features: subterranean dwelling, ape-like characteristics, and no melanin 
in their skin.  The definition of the concept “morlock” makes these features necessary.  
According to scientific realism, scientific practice is concerned with uncovering truth 
about the world.  Truth about the world is gained through observation, not through 
reasoning about concepts.  The generalization that “all ravens are black” was formed after 
observing a number of ravens, while the generalization “all swans are white” were 
falsified by the discovery of black swans in Australia.  In neither of these cases was a 
conclusion reached or shown to be false merely through the ruminating on the definitions 
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of “raven” and “swan”, but through observing these animals and noting their 
characteristics.  Hence, scientific methods are ampliative rather than deductive.   
Psillos interprets van Fraassen’s empiricism as being agnostic towards 
unobservable entities.  Psillos stresses that empiricists need not deny that science may 
arrive at theoretical truth because this may happen accidentally.  However, empiricists 
should deny that we can know that science has captured theoretical truth.  Therefore, 
justification is necessary to show that it is sometimes reasonable to believe that science 
has captured theoretical truth (or near truth).  The truth of the theory is justified by 
assuming that the best explanation for why the theory in question would be successful is 
that the unseen world it describes exists as the theory describes it (or nearly so).  This 
form of justification is by inference to the best explanation.  Inference to the best 
explanation is an example of what Charles Sanders Peirce (1931-35) called abduction, 
where a hypothesis is posited to explain an event.  As Gilbert Harman (1965) argues, 
there are many explanations that can be given to a particular set of phenomena.  For 
example, if we see someone pull their hand away from a hot stove, we can assume that 
the heat of the stove caused them to feel pain and, hence, to remove their hand from the 
stove.  Clearly, to explain these phenomena, we infer the existence of an unobservable 
pain state in the person being observed.  A competing explanation is that the person is an 
automaton with no consciousness and merely acting in such a way that suggests being in 
pain.  Or, the person is a character in a dream and merely a mental projection of some 
subconscious insecurity or fear.   
According to Harman, we make an inference to the best explanation of the 
phenomena we observe, whether in daily life or in science.  In the case of the person 
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pulling their hand back from the hot stove, the simplest explanation and most likely 
explanation is that the person is in pain.  We arrive at this conclusion because there is no 
evidence that the person is an automaton (e.g. they do not rust when dipped in water)23, 
or that we are in a dream state (i.e. our experience seems to be consistent).  Furthermore, 
an explanation should uncover the causal processes responsible for the occurrence of a 
given phenomenon or set of phenomena.  Psillos contends that the ampliative-abductive 
methods employed by scientists justify the belief that successful scientific theories are 
true (or approximately so).  I shall attempt to show later in this chapter that Psillos’ 
commitment to justification, truth, and belief reveals that he holds to an implicit justified 
true belief analysis of scientific knowledge.24   
 
 
2.3 The Circularity of the “No Miracles Argument” 
 
 
 In this dissertation, I am examining the facticity commitment of certain accounts 
of scientific knowledge.  However, the main argument for scientific realism would fail 
immediately if it were shown to be the result of fallacious reasoning.  Hence, before 
turning to challenges against the facticity of the accounts in question, I shall discuss the 
alleged vicious circularity of the “no miracles argument”.  
                                                 
23 I am indebted to Antoine Wilson’s short story “Everyone Else.” The Paris Review, Issue #171, Fall 2004 
for this example. 
24 In Chapter Three, I shall describe van arguments against the inference to the best explanation.  Moreover, 
in Chapter Four, I will discuss Hasok Chang (2003) and P. Kyle Stanford’s (2003) objections to the 
inference to the best explanation . 
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Psillos concedes that the no miracles argument is circular, but argues that it is not 
viciously circular.  For an argument to be viciously circular he states that the argument 
has to be premise-circular.  To explain premise circularity, Psillos cites Richard 
Braithwaite’s (1953): “one claims to offer an argument for the truth of α, but explicitly 
presupposes α in one’s premisses.  Such an argument has no probative force for anyone 
who does not already accept that α is true,” (1999, 82).  However, an argument that is 
rule-circular may not be viciously circular.  As Psillos states, “rule-circular arguments 
are such that the argument itself is an instance of, or involves essentially an application 
of, the rule of inference vindicated by the conclusion,” (1999, 82).  The relevant 
differences between premise-circularity and rule-circularity are that the conclusion of a 
rule-circular argument is not one of the premises, and the argument is not such that one of 
the reasons offered for the truth of the conclusion is the conclusion itself.  Therefore, the 
rule-circular argument is not blatantly viciously circular.   
Psillos contends that the no miracles argument is a rule-circular argument.  He 
gives the following structure to the argument: 
NMA 
 
(A) 
(A1) Scientific methodology is theory-laden. 
(A2) These theory-laden methods lead to correct predictions and experimental success 
(instrumental reliability). 
How are we to explain this? 
(C1) The best explanation (of the instrumental reliability of scientific methodology) is 
this: the statements of the theory which assert the specific causal connections or 
mechanisms in virtue of which methods yield successful predictions are approximately 
true. 
(B) 
(B1/C1) Theories are approximately true. 
(B2) These background scientific theories have themselves been typically arrived at by 
abductive reasoning. 
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(C2) Therefore, (it is reasonable to believe that) abductive reasoning is reliable: it tends 
to generate approximately true theories. 
                                                                                                                    (2011c, 23-24) 
   
The premises of the no miracles argument state that scientific methodology relies on 
theory to guide experimentation and that scientific methodology produces generally 
accepted instrumental and predictive success.  Next, through a general inference, or meta-
inference, to the best explanation, the argument concludes that the background theories 
serving as the premises for this general inference are nearly true.  Since these nearly true 
theories have normally been formed by inferences to the best explanation, this detail, 
along with the conclusion of the meta-inference to the best explanation, entail that the 
inference to the best explanation is reliable.  From this formulation of the no miracles 
argument, Psillos concludes the following: 
So, the truth of the conclusion of [“no miracles argument”] is (part of)  
a sufficient condition for accepting that [inference to the best  
explanation] is reliable.  [“no miracles argument”] is clearly not 
premiss-circular.  The conclusion of the meta-[inference to the best 
explanation] (that theories are approximately true) is not among the  
premisses of the argument.  In fact, no assumption about the  
approximate truth of the theories is made within the premisses,  
either explicitly or implicitly.  Besides, there is no a priori guarantee,  
as clearly there would have been if this argument were premiss-circular,  
that the conclusion of [“no miracles argument”] will necessarily be that  
theories are (approximately) true.  The conclusion is true, if at all, on  
the basis that it is the best explanation of the premisses, but it might not  
have been the best explanation.  
                                                                                                   (1999, 83) 
 
Moreover, he contends that this last point is implicitly admitted by the opponents of the 
no miracles argument because they are careful to create their own arguments for the 
success of science.  Since they argue that the conclusion of the “no miracles argument” 
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does not have to be the intended scientific realist conclusion, they implicitly concede that 
the “no miracles argument” is not premise-circular.  
 One may object that one has to assume the reliability of the rule being employed 
in a rule-circular argument.  However, if this assumption rests on the prior acceptance of 
the conclusion of the rule-circular argument, then those putting forth a rule-circular 
argument are ostensibly trapped in a vicious circle.  The proponents of a rule-circular 
argument would have to prove the conclusion before they accepted the rule employed to 
derive it.  Yet, they could not prove the conclusion since they first accepted the reliability 
of the rule.  This objection follows from an internalist theory of justification.  Internalism 
holds that a subject must be conscious of how a particular true belief is justified in order 
to have knowledge.  Internalist accounts demand more than mere reliability and truth; 
they require that one have a justification independent of mere reliability for believing that 
the conclusion generated by the rule is true.  On an internalist account rule-circular 
arguments seem to be vicious since the justification for the rule would have to be 
independent of the rule. 
 In response to this demand for an internalist justification, Psillos denies that any 
assumptions about the reliability of the rule must be manifest, implicitly or explicitly, 
when a rule is used.  Furthermore, the reliability of the rule does not need to be 
established before one can use it in a justifiable manner.  However, he admits, “[t]his is 
controversial” (1999, 83).  He appeals to an externalist theory of justification to support 
his view.  Externalism allows for a subject to know something without knowing the 
evidence in favor of that item of knowledge.  Psillos’ point is that when an instance of a 
rule is invoked as the connection between a set of true premises and a conclusion, what 
 59 
counts for the correctness of the conclusion is whether or not the rule is reliable.  What 
matters for reliability in this case is not: 
whether or nor the contingent assumptions which are required to be in place 
in order for the rule to be reliable are in fact in place.  If the rule of inference 
is reliable (this being an objective property of the rule), then, given true  
premisses, the conclusion will also likely be true (or, better, likely to be  
true—if the rule is ampliative).  (1999, 83) 
 
For example, we can imagine an inference machine that, when fed true premises 
and asked to form conclusions from them, draws true conclusions most of the time.  From 
the machine’s behavior we can assume that it is working off some rules of inference such 
that it activates a rule and reaches a true conclusion.  The machine does not make assume 
anything about the rules it employs, it just uses them.  As long as the machine reliably 
produces true conclusions, then we do not need to concern ourselves with identifying the 
rules being used and demonstrating why they are reliable in order to justify our belief that 
the machine is reliable.  Rather, it is only when the machine starts drawing consistently 
false conclusions that we need to concern ourselves with identifying the rules and 
showing why they fail. 
By appealing to externalist justification no assumptions that need to be made 
about the reliability of the rule of inference, whether implicit or explicit, matter for the 
correctness of the conclusion.  The conclusion will be correct or not whether or not 
anyone can provide a justification for why the conclusion is correct.  Therefore, the 
correctness of the conclusion does not depend on a defense of the rule.  
 However, a defense of the rule is necessary for the defense of the reliability of the 
rule of inference if one demands justification for why the conclusion using the rule of 
inference is correct.  Psillos again adopts an externalist theory of justification that does 
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not require reasons for holding a rule to be reliable.  According to externalism, all that is 
necessary for the justification of a particular rule is that the rule is reliable and the belief 
generated by the rule is true.  Thus, Psillos contends that scientific realists who rely on 
the no miracles argument should be externalists because the no miracles argument is rule-
circular, and externalism allows that rules can justify themselves if they reliably generate 
true beliefs.25 
 
 
2.4 Undetermination 
 
 
To defend against the underdetermination thesis, Psillos attacks two premises that 
are often used to support the conclusion of the argument.  The first premise, the empirical 
equivalence thesis, assumes that an alternative theory can always be found that will fit the 
observable evidence equally well as the theory in question.  The second premise, the 
entailment thesis, states that the only epistemic constraint on a theory is the entailment of 
evidence for the theory.  To combat the first premise, Psillos attacks the first premise by 
challenging the Duhem-Quine thesis which states that a theory cannot be tested in 
isolation since every theory is supported by background assumptions called auxiliary 
hypotheses.  An example of an auxiliary hypothesis is Newton’s celestial mechanics that 
                                                 
25 In Chapter Four, I shall try to argue that externalism is an instance of the mode of hypothesis.  Using 
Lewis Carroll’s “What the tortoise said to Achilles”, I will attempt to show that Psillos’ defense of 
abduction falls prey to the modes of hypothesis and infinite regress.  Furthermore, I shall note Psillos 
appears not to have accounted for why our seemingly successful use of logic does not need an explanation, 
but the success of science does.  Therefore, Psillos has not adequately explained why some of the success 
of some of our practices need an explanation for their success, but not others.  
 61 
was used to derive the orbit of planets.  When the orbit of Uranus could not be predicted 
accurately, scientists did not discard Newton’s theory, but sought to keep the theory by 
questioning another auxiliary hypothesis: that the solar system had only seven planets.  In 
this case the strategy paid off and led to the discovery of Neptune.  Yet, this same 
strategy failed when the planet “Vulcan” was posited to account for the failure of 
Newtonian celestial mechanics to accurately predict the orbit of Mercury.  The failure to 
accurately predict Mercury’s orbit eventually led to Newton’s theory being superseded by 
Einstein’s theory of general relativity.  These examples illustrate that it is not always 
predictable whether a hypothesis in a theory, or an auxiliary hypothesis that supports the 
theory, fails to be confirmed.  Thus, theories and the auxiliary hypotheses that support the 
theories are tested as a whole (Stanford 2013).  
However, Psillos claims that the threat posed to scientific realism by the Duhem-
Quine thesis is minimal.  He contends that the auxiliary hypotheses that support a theory 
are often trivial.  For example, as shall be discussed below, he contends that the positing 
of heat as a material substance called “caloric” was a trivial addition to 18th and 19th 
century theories of heat.  Psillos notes that the history of science does not support the 
empirical equivalence thesis since one theory eventually breaks the tie between two 
equally empirically well-supported theories.  The wave and corpuscular theories of light 
became empirically distinguishable by Foucault’s 1853 experiment, regarding the 
velocity of light through air and through water.  By showing that light moves more 
slowly through water than through air, Foucault refuted the corpuscular theory of light.  
The Ptolemaic and Copernican theories were distinguished when the latter was inserted 
into the framework of Newtonian dynamics.  Psillos claims that it is not clear that non-
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trivial auxiliary assumptions can always be found.  If this is so, then the Duhem-Quine 
thesis becomes, “at best, a promissory note,” (1999, 165).  Furthermore, if resolutions 
such as those above become available, then the underdetermination of theory by evidence 
is not a significant problem for the scientific realist.      
However, when dealing with highly theoretical matters, such as the structure of 
space as represented by incompatible geometries, Psillos accepts that theories are 
underdetermined by evidence.  He claims these highly theoretical matters are beyond our 
powers to adjudicate since these controversies take place at our epistemic limits.  For 
instance, there are many instances concerning the physical structure of space.  Psillos 
asks us to suppose that two-dimensional beings live on the surface of a hemi-sphere and 
they cannot leave it.  They attempt to reveal the physical geometry of their world.  They 
employ rigid rods to measure distances on the surface.  They triangulate their world, and 
discover that the sum of the angles of a large triangle is more is larger than that of two 
right angles.  Quickly, they conclude that they live on the surface of a semisphere.  
However, a mathematician of this world asserts that they are collectively in error.  He 
hypothesizes that their world is a plane, not the surface of a semisphere.  Furthermore, he 
posits a universal force (i.e. a force which acts upon everything in this world in the same 
way).  Specifically, this force causes all moving rods to contract as they move away from 
the center and towards the periphery.  Therefore, says the mathematician, as the 
measuring rods contract while in motion they appear to fit smaller intervals away from 
the center.  The mathematician concludes that the inhabitants of this world are mistaken 
since they have not taken into account the contraction of the moving rods.  All the 
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observable phenomena fit both theories, ostensibly leaving the inhabitants with no 
rational choice between these two theories.   
This fictional account can be extended to more realistic cases.  Psillos cites 
Reichenbach’s (1958) example: 
we may choose a model of Euclidean geometry as the physical geometry 
 of the universe.  Then we can create all and only the empirical 
 consequences of the general theory of relativity provided that we postulate 
 universal forces which make moving bodies (e.g. moving rods) contract  
accordingly.  So, roughly, the theories T = (rigid rods and non-Euclidean  
geometry) and T2 = (contracting rods and Euclidean geometry) are  
observationally indistinguishable (cf. also Carnap 1966: 157).  Hence, even 
though the strong thesis – for any theory there are interesting empirically  
indistinguishable alternatives – is implausible, a weaker thesis is that there 
are some interesting cases of empirical equivalence is correct.  
                                                                                                       (1999, 167) 
 
Thus, the scientific realist can concede the existence of local evidential equivalence that 
is at our epistemic limits (1999, 168).  The scientific realist would only need to worry if 
empirically equivalent theories were a global phenomenon.  But, as shown above with the 
examples in the paragraph above, the historical evidence shows that empirically 
equivalent theories have been distinguished by subsequent empirical evidence.   
Regarding the entailment thesis, Psillos contends that, while two theories may fit 
the same empirical evidence, they are not supported to the same degree by the evidence.  
In scientific practice not every positive instance of a hypothesis is taken to be evidence in 
favor of the truth of the hypothesis.  For instance, control groups are used in experiments 
to rule out spurious causes.  Psillos uses the example of a patient praying for a quick 
recovery from a cold being cured of the cold in three days to illustrate a positive instance 
of the false hypothesis that praying cures colds.  However, the evidence does not support 
the hypothesis since the evidence would fit a hypothesis, and the evidence can be 
 64 
accounted for by alternative hypotheses (such as, that the patient’s immune system fought 
off the cold after three days) (1999,170).  Moreover, hypotheses can be supported by 
evidence that does not logically follow from them.  Evolution does not follow from 
geology’s findings that the age of the Earth is 4.5 billion years old, but this evidence 
support the timeline needed by the theory of evolution for life to evolve.  Thus, since not 
all evidence supports a hypothesis, the entailment thesis fails.  
Furthermore, while two theories may enjoy the same evidential support, they do 
not thereby enjoy the same epistemic support.  As shown above, positive instances of a 
hypothesis can be used as evidence in favor of a false hypothesis.  The hypothesis that the 
common cold was cured through prayer and the hypothesis that the cold was cured by a 
patient’s immune system share the same evidential support.  Clearly, a measure of a 
theory’s epistemic support is required to test its truth value.  Epistemic support can be 
acquired through cognitive virtues such as simplicity, completeness, predictive power, 
novel predictions, and so on.  These cognitive virtues of theories are theoretical virtues.  
Theoretical virtues are taken into account when ascertaining the explanatory power of a 
theory, and, Psillos maintains, explanatory power is the theoretical virtue that carries the 
most epistemic weight.  For example, Darwin’s theory of evolution better explained the 
fossil record, the extinction of species, and led to novel predictions in the fossil record 
(missing links).  Following Ernan McMullin (1987), Psillos argues that these virtues are 
indicative of truth.  McMullin claims that theoretical values lead to the best explanation 
of the phenomena under investigation and that the best explanation is true.  However, the 
scientific realist has to show which theoretical virtues are related to the likelihood of a 
theory’s truth. 
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Psillos gives the following arguments as a sketch of how theoretical virtues relate 
to the truth of a theory.  He maintains the virtues which comprise the explanatory power 
of a theory are, indirectly, evidential.  They direct the scientists’ judgments about the 
theoretical plausibility of rival theories.  Among the various theories which could, or do, 
become available at any given time, scientists pick those which have the most 
explanatory power, compared to the other background theories they accept.  These 
background theories categorize the new theories by their theoretical plausibility.  
Moreover, these background theories were accepted because they have evidential support 
and show similar theoretical virtues.  Therefore, their evidential support and theoretical 
plausibility are preserved, and displayed in, the new theories which they warrant.  As 
Psillos states, “The virtues which constitute explanatory power become evidential 
precisely because they are present in theories which enjoy theoretical plausibility and 
evidential support” (1999, 172).   
For instance, Darwin followed the geological theory of uniformitarianism which 
states that the Earth changes through gradual processes, such as erosion, that are currently 
observed.  Natural Theology relied on the geological theory of catastrophism which 
stated the Earth changed through catastrophic processes as described in the Bible, such as 
the Deluge.  The Bible’s version of historical events could not be confirmed 
independently through observation.  The lack of independent verification makes 
catastrophism ad hoc.  Following uniformitarianism, Darwinism could explain how 
natural processes, such as flooding of the intensity experienced today, could cause tenrecs 
from mainland Africa to appear on Madagascar.  Moreover, Darwinism can account for 
why the tenrecs on Madagascar have a primordial form compared to their cousins on the 
 66 
mainland.  When the Mozambique Channel between the mainland Africa and 
Madagascar expanded Madagascar became isolated from the more sophisticated 
mammals that evolved on the mainland.  Thus, the tenrecs of Madagascar did not have to 
compete with these more sophisticated predators, and they kept their primordial form.  
Therefore, the lack of ad hoc hypotheses and explanatory power enjoyed by 
uniformitarianism in turn increases the explanatory power of Darwin’s theory. 
If one accepts that the virtues that comprise explanatory power are evidential 
because these virtues appear in other theories that are theoretically plausible and 
supported evidentially, then the scientific realist only has to show precisely how these 
virtues affect the degree of confirmation to the theories.  The past record of mature 
theories can be employed to assign prior probabilities to current theories.  The past record 
of scientific theories can be considered the “background knowledge” by which the 
plausibility of developing theories can be evaluated (Psillos 1999, 172).  In particular, 
 the suggestion is that, given two theories T and T’, which have the  
 same observational consequences but are differentiated in respect of 
 some theoretical virtues, one should regard T more plausible than T’  
 if, given the past record, theories which exhibit the virtues of T are  
 more likely to be true than are theories like T’.  (1999, 172) 
 
If theories which never relied on ad hoc adjustments have often been better supported by 
the evidence than theories with ad hoc additions, then this consideration should be 
employed when judging the prior probability of other theories in order to give theories 
that do not have ad hoc features a higher rank.  Clearly, discerning which theoretical 
virtues have been related to well-confirmed theories can be the result only of significant 
empirical and historical research.  As shown above, Natural Theology relied on ad hoc 
adjustments which led to its being overthrown by Darwinism.  Moreover, phlogiston 
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theory postulated that phlogiston is released upon combustion and saturates the air.  
However, when some materials gained weight after being burned phlogiston theorists 
claimed phlogiston had “negative weight”.  Phlogiston’s negative weight could not be 
independently verified and phlogiston theory was replaced by oxygen theory. 
The next difficulty for the scientific realist comes from Larry Laudan’s (1996) 
non-uniqueness thesis which states that a theory may arise which is as well supported as 
another theory in terms of evidence and theoretical virtues (1996, 175).  If theoretical 
considerations are supposed to break the tie between two empirically equivalent theories 
that are incompatible but seem to be equally true, then in this case the tie cannot be 
broken.  Psillos thinks that this thesis is only a mere logical possibility.  Historical 
examples are needed for this challenge to be a serious threat to rational theory choice.  
Laudan holds that he has supplied historical examples of the non-uniqueness thesis, 
including discarded scientific theories such as the crystalline spheres and the caloric 
theory of heat. 
Psillos responds the non-uniqueness thesis by arguing that examples such as the 
crystalline spheres were not predictively successful, but simply fit observable facts.  
However, if the best current theory is replaced by another theory with better evidential 
support, such as when phlogiston was replaced by oxygen theory, which does not 
necessarily mean that the abandoned theory was not approximately true.  Rather, all this 
challenge shows is that we cannot acquire the whole truth all at once and that we should 
be more cautious and refined in our judgments from evidence to approximate truth.  By 
exercising caution and refining our theories we only commit ourselves to those 
theoretical constituents that benefit from evidential support and which led to the success 
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of the superseded theory (1996, 175).  Thus, absolute judgments of approximate truth of 
current best theories are still rational as long those judgments are centered on the 
constituents of those theories that contain evidential support and as far as those 
constituents are actually retained in subsequent theories.  To identify which theoretical 
constituents contribute to a theory’s success and which do not, Psillos relies on a 
particular theory of reference.  This theory of reference will be discussed in detail in the 
sections on reference in this chapter. 
 While Laudan thinks that the challenge of underdetermination can be overcome in 
the manner Psillos’ describes, he does not agree with Psillos’ epistemic characterization 
of this solution.  Laudan doubts that science can access truth about the world, and his 
argument against the underdetermination thesis endeavors to save the methodology of 
science from skeptical attack, not the ability of science to access truth.  He is committed 
to instrumentalism, or the view that the goal of science is to predict and control 
phenomena, not to generate knowledge or true beliefs about the phenomena in question.  
According to instrumentalism, knowledge and/or true beliefs about nature are not 
necessary for science to be successful, as long as success is taken to be accurate 
predictions and control of phenomena.  For example, Newton claimed that he would not 
form any hypotheses as to what the nature of gravity was, but, while he could not explain 
how it worked, he was able to use his theory to accurately predict many phenomena, such 
as the orbits of planets.  The nature of gravity does not need to be known for this theory 
to generate accurate predictions.  The equations that make up Newton’s theory of gravity 
are neither true nor false, just as a hammer that effective forces nails through wood is 
 69 
neither true nor false, but just a tool.  In the section on theories of truth in this chapter, I 
shall show why Laudan does not think that truth is accessible to human beings.  
Since Psillos does not share Laudan’s instrumentalist intuitions he needs to find a 
way to epistemically justify the methodology of science.  Psillos employs reliabilism as 
his theory of epistemic justification for scientific methodology.  Reliabilism is an 
externalist theory of justification which holds that a belief counts as knowledge if the 
belief is true and was formed through a reliable process.  A reliable process is one that 
consistently leads us to truth.  For example, seeing is considered a reliable process since 
our sight does not often mislead us.  Most of us use sight to navigate our way through the 
world, and most of the time we see obstacles in our path.  Moreover, logic helps us to 
reliably form beliefs.  For instance, ignoring the law of non-contradiction could make life 
very difficult if you believed that you were both underwater and not underwater at the 
same time.  In this case you would not know whether to swim or walk, or whether to 
breathe or hold your breath.  Psillos thinks that the methods of explanation and 
justification in science should not be decided a priori, but must be continuous with those 
of the natural sciences.  This methodological view is called methodological naturalism.   
Relying on the methods of science to justify the ability of scientific methods to 
uncover truth seems viciously circular.  Against this charge of vicious circularity, Psillos 
contends that, though the reasoning and methodology are based on and evaluated 
empirically, naturalism is not trapped in a vicious circle.  Naturalism can escape the 
charge of vicious circularity in the same externalist manner as the inference to the best 
explanation.26 
                                                 
26 In Chapter Four, I shall endeavor to show that Psillos should not simply dismiss the non-uniqueness 
thesis (where a theory is as well supported as a rival theory by the evidence and theoretical virtues).  Not 
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2.5 The Pessimistic Meta-Induction and the Causal-Descriptive Theory of Reference 
 
 
2.5.1 The Pessimistic Meta-Induction 
 
 
The pessimistic meta-induction holds that the explanatory part of theories (where 
explanatory hypotheses posit unobservable entities and processes to account for the 
causes of scientific phenomena) are often abandoned as new theories replace old ones.  
Hence, current scientific explanations could also be false given the bad track record of 
explanation in science.  Psillos claims scientific realism can survive the challenge posed 
by the pessimistic meta-induction.  While past successful scientific theories seem to be 
false and thus abandoned, Psillos claims some of their theoretical constituents which 
were empirically supported and played a part in their success were retained in the 
successor theories.  Thus, he concludes there is a significant continuity of theoretical 
constituents in scientific theory change.  Psillos gives an in-depth analysis of the 
transition from “luminiferous ether” to “electro-magnetic field”.  He claims that, since 
significant theoretical continuity through theory change often occurs, this stability should 
                                                                                                                                                 
only may a new theory arise that is equally supported by theoretical virtues and empirical evidence, but 
theories thought to be refuted are sometimes revived.  Therefore, Psillos cannot rely on further evidence or 
theoretical virtues to eventually break the tie between two otherwise equivalent theories.  Furthermore, in 
Chapter Three, I shall discuss van Fraassen’s argument that theoretical virtues are pragmatic and not 
epistemic.  In Chapter Four, I will attempt to argue that van Fraassen’s arguments against the epistemic 
value of theoretical virtues shows Psillos has not conclusively shown that theoretical virtues are epistemic.  
Moreover, I will describe Chang’s arguments against Psillos’ treatment of “caloric” to show that Psillos’ 
identification of superfluous posits fails, and to demonstrate that explanatory power is not an indicator of a 
theory’s truth. 
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ground the epistemic optimism of the realists.  However, Psillos is a cautious optimist.  
As he notes, “it should be acknowledge that the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
cannot be had in science; but this does not mean that scientific theories have not latched 
upon important truths, or near truths, about the unobservable structure of the world,” 
(1999: xxiv).   These truths suggest that there is a secure system, “of theoretical 
principles and explanatory hypotheses [that] has survived revolutionary changes to 
become part and parcel of our evolving scientific image of the world,” (1999, xxiv).  The 
security for this system rests on Psillos’ causal-descriptive theory of reference of 
theoretical terms.   
Before discussing the causal-descriptive theory of reference, I will endeavor to 
give brief sketches of both the causal and the descriptive theories of references in the 
sections below.  Through these sketches I shall attempt to show what Psillos uses from 
both theories in the development of his own theory of reference.27   
 
 
2.5.2 The Descriptive Theory of Reference 
 
 
The descriptive theory of reference considers the referent of a term or expression 
to be determined by a particular description.  For example, the term “human” has been 
determined by the descriptions “rational animal” and “featherless biped”.  The descriptive 
                                                 
27 By describing the strengths and weaknesses of the descriptive and causal theories, I will attempt to 
argue, in Chapter Four, that his own theory of reference does not escape the criticisms he launches against 
these theories. 
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theory of reference suffers from significant weaknesses.  For instance, it does not provide 
necessary and sufficient conditions for fixing the reference of a term to a particular object 
or person.  A proper name can refer to a person though the descriptions attached to that 
name are false, or if the users of the name cannot collect a cluster of descriptions that are 
true only of that individual.  Moreover, an individual may fit a cluster of descriptions 
attached to that name, but that name may still fail to refer to that individual.  An example 
of the latter problem is Kripke’s (1980) Schmidt-Gödel case.  The Schmidt-Gödel case 
assumes that the most people know about Kurt Gödel is that he proved the 
incompleteness theorem that bears his name.  However, in this case, he did not actually 
prove the incompleteness theorem, rather he stole the theorem from his friend Schmidt.  
According to the descriptivist theory of reference, since this description of Gödel fits 
Schmidt, Schmidt is the reference of “Gödel”.  The main difficulty with the descriptive 
theory is that it attaches too rich of a description to a term or proper name.  The 
individual referred to does not always meet all, or even most, of the descriptions attached 
to the name.   
 
 
2.5.3 The Causal Theory of Reference 
 
 
The causal theory of reference deems the referent of a term or expression to be 
the causal chain that links the entity with the term that was introduced to name the entity.  
The initial description of the entity may differ wildly from later descriptions but the term 
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that was given to that entity still refers to that entity.  While Psillos discusses many 
objections to the causal theory of reference, I shall only focus on those that can also be 
applied to his causal-descriptive account.   
Psillos notes that the causal theory of reference, through ostension, permits us “in 
principle” to give a name to something before we are able to say what this object is and 
what features of the object make it what it is (1999, 284).  When the object has been 
identified and the features essential to it have been discovered, then it is placed into a 
category called a kind.  Two broad categories of kinds are artificial kinds and natural 
kinds.   An artificial kind is human made, such as an airplane or silly putty.  A natural 
kind is an entity that is mind-independent, but not created by humans, and that has certain 
core properties that pick it out uniquely.  Psillos claims that scientific theories identify 
natural kinds.  An example of a natural kind is water, or H2O.  Water existed before 
humans, is naturally occurring, and its atomic structure uniquely picks it out from 
whatever impurities (e.g. minerals, toxic chemicals, sand, etc.) may be mixed in with it.   
A proponent of the causal theory of reference, Hilary Putnam (1983) uses the 
examples of “water” and “tiger” to show how the causal theory of reference introduces 
natural kind terms that appear in folk and scientific theories.  For instance, when 
introducing a natural-kind term, one picks out an object by ostension, connects a name to 
it, then claims that this name applies uniquely to those objects which have the same 
nature as that present when the term was introduced.  As Putnam states, “a term refers (to 
the object named) if it stands in the right relation (causal continuity in the case of proper 
names; sameness of ‘nature’ in the case of kind terms) to these existentially given things” 
(1983:73 in Psillos 1999: 283).  After the introductory event has taken place, the term is 
 74 
spread through a linguistic community.  If the users are linked to the introductory event in 
some causal chain of term diffusion, then the term is employed by other users and this 
use consequently preserves reference.   
A variation of the same procedure applies for the fixing of physical magnitude 
terms.  When a new observable phenomena appears, a physical magnitude, or entity, 
which is the putative cause is posited.  This physical magnitude is then dubbed with a 
term, and this term is associated with this phenomena.  This is the terms introductory 
event for referring to this magnitude.  The term will then be surrounded by a description, 
a causal story, of the nature of the posited magnitude and for the characteristics through 
which the magnitude causes the observable effects for which it was first recognized.  This 
first description will likely be incomplete or mistaken.  However, according to the causal 
theory of reference, a term has been introduced existentially, that is, a physical magnitude 
that is causally responsible for particular effects to which the term in question refers.  
As indicated above, the initial description of the putative physical magnitude’s 
nature is often mistaken.  The description changes through more sophisticated and 
comprehensive interaction.  While the description of the magnitude’s nature may change 
drastically in the course of our causal interactions with it, that there is a magnitude which 
is the cause of certain effects remains invariant.  Psillos uses the example of “electricity” 
to show how the reference of a term is fixed existentially under the causal theory of 
reference.  If all the descriptions attached to this term do not establish what this term 
refers to, then all the various theories of electricity refer to, and quarrel over, the same 
existentially given physical magnitude “electricity” (or the causal agent of prominent 
electrical effects).   
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Psillos contends that the causal theory of reference allows us to say that past 
scientists were investigating the same phenomena, though they had partial or mistaken 
beliefs about the nature of the phenomena in question.  The investigations of past 
scientists continued with the work of subsequent scientists because they both seek to 
identify the nature of the same agent that is the cause responsible for the same effects.  
The successor theories have better descriptions of the same causal agent since they have 
had more sophisticated and comprehensive interaction with it.  Psillos claims that the 
causal theory of reference allows us to compare theories, and to judge that the subsequent 
theories are closer to the full truth than their predecessors (1999, 284). 
However, since drastic mistakes by past scientists, and drastic corrections by 
subsequent scientists, are permitted of the same putative entity “the causal theory reduces 
referential stability to the bare assertion that a causally efficacious agent operates behind 
a set of phenomena, continuity and sameness of reference become easily satisfiable” 
(1999, 290).  If the unobservable cause behind a range of phenomena is only given 
existentially, and if no description of its properties is used to fundamentally fix the 
reference of the terms that claim to refer to it, then the term will never fail to refer to 
whatever it is that causes the phenomena in question.   
For example, causal theorists claim that “water” refers to the substance with the 
chemical structure H2O.  Psillos notes that admitting that this chemical composition is the 
referent for “water” concedes that the manifest characteristics of water (such as 
translucence and wetness) are not enough to single out the extension of the term “water”.  
Yet, a causal theorist can respond that the internal structure of the entity in question fixes 
its reference, “whatever that is” (1999, 286).  We may be completely mistaken about its 
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internal structure, but the term “water” would still refer to whatever substance displays 
the manifest characteristics of the samples employed when the term “water’ was 
introduced.  If it turned out that H2O was the not the chemical composition of “water”, 
then the causal theorist has two options: either concede that the term “water” does not 
refer to water, or claim that it still does.   
 According to Psillos, the causal theory has to put the internal structure of the 
posited kind before the manifest properties of some samples to be able to argue that the 
resemblance between these samples is strong enough to justify positing a natural kind—
in this case, water—to which “water” refers.  However, when faced with the wrong 
internal structure of the posited kind, the causal theory of reference must put the manifest 
properties ahead of the internal structure to argue that those samples which have these 
properties in common still sufficiently resemble each other to be classified together as a 
natural kind with some internal structure, although they do not have the internal structure 
attributed to them previously by the scientific community.  For Psillos, such a reversal of 
priorities seems to be ad hoc.  He contends that if the internal structure (as described by 
our best theories) is employed to justify positing and identifying the referent of a natural-
kind term, then it should be placed ahead of the manifest properties when it comes to the 
misidentification of the referent of a natural-kind term. Otherwise those using the causal 
theory of reference would have to show that manifest properties are sufficient to 
determine natural kinds.  Psillos claims that such an approach is problematic. 
While ostension is employed when introducing a natural-kind, prior to having a 
description of the internal structure that makes it into a kind, Psillos argues that ostension 
is not enough to unambiguously fix the reference of a kind-word.  An ostensive definition 
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uses an example which points to the referent.  Often ostension will establish connections 
between a term and more than one kind, or at least there is no assurance that it will not.  
Moreover, ostension provides us with a sample of the kind, but not with its extension in 
its entirety.  The term is not meant to refer to only the sample present, but to everything 
that belongs to its extension.  Ostension cannot possibly tie together the sample present 
during the introductory event to all of the other items that fall under the extension of that 
term since a kind have the same manifest properties as another kind, and some samples of 
the same kind have different manifest properties.  Thus, reference-fixing must involve 
more than mere ostension.  The extra component necessary to fix the reference of a term 
is a description of the internal structure common to all of the ostensively given samples.  
Furthermore, causally relevant similarities and differences in the behavior of items that 
are classified together are normally the result of similarities and differences of internal 
structure.  As Psillos states, “Ice is a kind of water not because of its manifest properties 
but because of its internal structure.  And a liquid which has the appearance of water 
might well kill you if you drink it, unless it is H2O” (1999, 285). 
 Psillos asserts that an occurrence such as the term “water” not referring to H2O 
after all is not a science fiction story, and notes that just such an occurrence took place 
with the term “phlogiston”.  Phlogiston is an historical example of an entity whose 
internal structure was severely mistaken.  It was thought to be given off in combustion.  
When no measurement of phlogiston could be made, this purported entity was given up.  
Phlogiston cannot be shown to exist, and is not considered as being causally involved in 
combustion, rather oxygen is.  If we follow the causal theory, then one can claim that 
“phlogiston” actually refers to oxygen, since the latter is now seen as causally involved in 
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combustion.  Other than the claim that both are involved in combustion, the two entities 
do not share many properties in common.   
For instance, James Conant (1948) notes the following properties of phlogiston: 
when combined with metallic ore it produces metal, it combines with the air, when it 
saturates the air its combustion was no longer possible and the air no longer supports life 
since respiration removes phlogiston from the body (1948, 70).  Laviosier was able to 
show through his “doctrine of gases” that combustion involved chemical combination 
with some part of the air, and that part of the air was called “oxygen”.  Moreover, oxygen 
clearly has different properties than phlogiston, such as when the former saturates the air 
combustion is facilitated, not impossible.            
 
 
2.5.4 The Causal-Descriptive Theory of Reference 
 
 
To safeguard against the skeptical challenge of the pessimistic meta-induction, 
Psillos relies on a hybrid theory of reference that is a cross between the descriptive theory 
of reference and the causal theory of reference.  The theory of reference Psillos formed 
from the descriptive and causal theories is the causal-descriptive theory of reference.  
The causal-descriptive theory of reference takes the referent of a term or expression to be 
fixed by both the causal chain between the term and the entity named by that term, and by 
certain core descriptions of the entity.  He argues that his theory of reference illustrates 
how scientific theories can identify natural kinds.   
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The identification of a natural kind is a referential success.  However, if no entity 
is found that fits the core description attributed to it, then this is a referential failure.  An 
example of such a failure is the term “caloric” which was no longer needed to explain 
certain phenomena, such as the production of heat by friction.  The identification of 
natural kinds is crucial to Psillos’ realism since he assumes scientific realism must start 
with the assumption that the world is independent of the mind.  Using his causal-
descriptive theory of reference, Psillos holds that he can show the danger posed to 
scientific realism by the pessimistic meta-induction is far less than is supposed by the 
scientific anti-realists.  To illustrate his point, he cites the change from the “luminiferous 
ether” to the “electromagnetic field” as a continuity of reference through theory change. 
 
 
2.5.5 The Luminiferous Ether and The Electro-magnetic Field 
 
 
As an example of past successful scientific theories, Psillos examines 19th century 
dynamical theories of light, which posited the luminiferous ether as the medium through 
which light travels, and Maxwell’s postulation of the electromagnetic field.  The former 
theories postulated an ethereal medium as the carrier of light-waves that had some basic 
properties that it must possess if it were to be considered a natural kind.  The 
luminiferous ether was posited to serve a dynamical role with two significant and 
interconnected clusters of properties.  The first cluster of properties is kinematical since 
experiments show that light propagates with a finite velocity, and it should propagate 
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through a medium rather than through action-at-a-distance.  The second cluster of 
properties is dynamical since the luminiferous ether stored potential and kinematic 
energy during the propagation of light.  The term “ether” was used to denote the entity 
which, if it existed, should possess the above mentioned natural kind properties.  These 
natural kind properties are the core causal description of the “ether”.  The core causal 
description is the set of descriptions that depict the natural kind properties of the entity or 
magnitude putatively referred to by a particular term that perform the entity or 
magnitude’s causal role for a given set of phenomena (1999, 295).  The term “ether” was 
connected to a core causal description of the properties through which the ether was 
claimed to fill its intended causal role.   
 Psillos contends that the “luminiferous ether” has the same reference as the 
electromagnetic field, not only because they fill the same causal role, but because, “the 
core causal description associated with the term ‘electromagnetic field’ takes up the same 
core causal description associated with the term ‘ether’” (1999, 296).  That is, the 
electromagnetic field fills all of the same kinematic and dynamic descriptions that the 
“luminiferous ether” did before the term was abandoned.  The kinematic and dynamical 
properties of both terms are the properties that make “luminiferous ether” and 
“electromagnetic field” denotes the same natural kind.  Moreover, by sharing the same 
core causal descriptions, the terms also share the same core explanatory structure.  The 
shared ontology stems from the shared core descriptions of what is doing the explaining.  
These shared core descriptions of the natural kind-constitutive properties are what 
justifies the referential stability from luminiferous ether to electromagnetic field. 
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 Psillos notes that one may object that there is an ad hoc element in deciding which 
descriptions are to be considered as core causal descriptions.  He responds that “in 
principle” one can identify and delineate the descriptions associated with an entity and to 
examine them in terms of importance for the causal role attributed to the posited entity.  
The most important descriptions, according to Psillos, are those that pick out the causal 
role a putative entity plays.  If the descriptions ascribed to the entity are not necessary for 
it to fulfill its causal role, then they are not as fundamental or important.  For the 
luminiferous ether, the less fundamental descriptions are those involving its possible 
constitution, such as Green’s elastic-solid model and McCullagh’s rotational elasticity 
model.  Psillos stresses that the identification of core causal descriptions is not ad hoc.  
The choice of which properties are taken to be core causal descriptions is determined by 
examining what properties are necessary for the posited entity to play its causal role with 
regards to a certain range of phenomena.   
Furthermore, Psillos notes, “It is certainly constrained by the way in which the 
scientists who posited the entity described it” (1999, 298).  Hence, it is the ampliative-
abductive methods of the scientists themselves that delineate what is a core causal 
description and what is not.  Returning to his examples of phlogiston and luminiferous 
ether, Psillos concludes that since the former does not fit the same core causal description 
as oxygen while the latter fits the same core causal description as the electromagnetic 
field, “phlogiston” does not refer, while the “luminiferous ether” does refer.          
Another objection Psillos answers comes from Niiniluoto (1997), who points out 
that there are a number of actual cases where the core causal description is mistaken in 
some way.  He uses the example of the HI-virus where the first assumptions of its causal 
 82 
properties were simplified.  Rather, there are many variants of HI-virus, and the causal 
mechanisms and the conditions that produce AIDS are still largely unknown (1997, 549).  
Psillos responds that the initial assumptions of the putative entity’s causal properties may 
be “exploratory or speculative” (Psillos 1999, 299) and should not be taken seriously 
until the term becomes part of a well-established theory which links it with a core causal 
description.  When discussing why it is that a term such as “luminiferous ether”, despite 
being linked to firm theories, was dropped, Psillos responds that this is a question for 
sociology (1999, 298).28 
Psillos concludes that if the luminiferous ether/electromagnetic field case is 
typical, then realism is on solid ground.  However, if future investigation shows that all or 
most core causal descriptions linked with theoretical terms are false, then scientific 
realism faces a major difficulty.  In order for his theory of reference to work, he notes 
that the determination of the core causal properties must be neither too broad nor too 
narrow.  If too broad, it may include properties that are not necessary for the putative 
entity to fulfill its attributed casual role.  If too narrow, then reference is too easily had 
and becomes trivial.  Thus, through his theory of reference, Psillos has putatively shown 
how scientific realism can cope with theory change.29 
                                                 
28 Different interpretations for the abandonment of the term “luminiferous ether” are possible.  For 
example, Michael Friedman argues that the Michelson-Morley experiment led to the demise of the 
luminiferous ether when they showed that the luminiferous ether had no detectable effect on the velocity of 
light (2001, 87). 
29 In Chapter Four, I shall attempt to show that Psillos has not successfully avoided apparent arbitrariness in 
identifying the core causal properties that pick out natural kinds.  One source for the arbitrariness of 
Psillos’s theory of reference stems from his intuition that scientific realism is comprised of three theses 
about how the world is constituted and of out ability to access the world.  His three theses are that the world 
is (1) mind-independent, (2) theories should be taken literally, and (3) science gives us the most accurate 
picture of the world through approximately true beliefs.  Psillos finds scientific realism “an intuitively 
compelling philosophical position”, so he seeks to make clear, and to defend, this intuition (xvii).  The 
three theses he posits are meant to clarify what he means by “scientific realism”.  If his arguments support 
these theses, then he has successfully defended his version of scientific realism.  If he cannot find sound 
arguments for one or more of these theses, then his defense has failed and his intuition is mistaken.  Thus, 
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2.5.6 Reference to Abstracta 
 
 
Psillos (2011a) contends that the referents of the terms and models that make up a 
scientific theory are the abstracta.  Abstracta are entities and processes whose definitions 
are not satisfied by anything in the physical world.  Thus, according to Psillos, abstracta 
both represent entities and process in the physical world and exist as entities that serve as 
the referents for particular posits.  To show the ubiquity of abstracta in science, Psillos 
gives the following list of posits, “imponderable fluids, frictionless planes, ideal gases, 
perfectly spherical objects, mass-points, perfectly isolated systems, as well as linear 
harmonic oscillators, Hilbert spaces, and the like” (2011a, 5).  As noted in Chapter One, 
abstractions and idealizations are used so that scientific theories and models are not so 
cognitively costly as to be untenable.  However, abstracta do not exist in the physical 
world, and thus cannot be detected through naturalistic means.  Hence, the scientific 
realist confronts a dilemma: either all scientific theories are false or scientific theories 
cannot be taken literally.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Psillos does not enter the scientific realism debate as a disinterested party, but is motivated by his desire to 
defend his intuition that scientific realism is true.  Thus, Psillos is voluntarist.  Voluntarism is the view that 
we choose certain epistemic and metaphysical assumptions as starting points for our philosophical 
positions, as well as the criteria for success, based on our prior intellectual commitments.   
Furthermore, I shall endeavor to argue that Psillos’ epistemic voluntarism lead to an unintended 
ontological and semantic voluntarism.  While Psillos is careful to show how his theory of reference works 
to identify natural kinds, because of his voluntarism, he has not shown why his particular criteria should be 
adopted rather than some other criteria.  Following Hasok Chang (2003) and P. Kyle Stanford (2003), I will 
contend that Psillos’ reading of the history of science seems to be inaccurate.  Chang argues against Psillos’ 
claim that the term “caloric” and the description of the entity the term putatively referred to was a 
superfluous addition to caloric theory.  Rather, the term “caloric” fit all of Psillos’ criteria for inclusion as a 
natural kind in the 18th and 19th centuries and played a crucial explanatory role in the empirical success of 
the theory during that time.  Stanford shows that Psillos’ standards were not adopted by all the important 
scientists in the historical episodes he cites.  Thus, Stanford concludes that Psillos cannot use scientific 
consensus as a criterion for the identification of natural kinds since consensus in the scientific community 
on such matters is rare. 
 
 84 
Psillos’ response to the dilemma is to claim that abstract entities and processes are 
real, not imaginary fictions.  These abstract entities have similar counterparts in the 
physical world, particular gases (such as hydrogen), particular spheres, and planes, but 
the abstract entities are not comprised of some of the features that their physical 
counterparts have.  Unlike concrete objects, abstracta do not have causal efficacy.  For 
instance, every physical plane observed thus far creates friction, and every physical 
object has a particular color, often a particular taste, and so on, that abstracta do not.  But, 
because abstracta lack certain features they bring into focus certain characteristics of their 
physical counterparts that account for the latter’s behavior.  For example, when 
constructing a model to calculate the motion of a projectile, the gravitation of the Earth is 
assume to be the only force acting upon the projectile.  Taking into account the 
gravitational forces exerted on the projectile by other objects in the physical world are 
negligible, and including them would make the calculation cognitively costly.  The Earth, 
Moon, and the force of gravity acting on them are modeled as a “two-particle Newtonian 
system” (2011a, 7).  It is important to note that the Earth, Moon, and gravity are all 
existent in the physical world because they have causal efficacy.  The two-particle 
Newtonian system exists because the model is required to account for the motions of the 
Earth and the Moon.  As shall be discussed below, if a hypothetical entity or process is 
necessary for the explanation of well-established phenomena, then the entity or process 
must exist. 
According to Psillos, abstracta must exist because they fit the explanatory 
criterion.  The explanatory criterion states that a posit is real if its being posited is 
required in the explanation of well confirmed phenomena.  Psillos claims that what is 
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directly referred to in scientific theories are the abstracta described by the theory’s 
models, thus we get full knowledge of abstracta and not of the world.  Rather, we only 
get approximate truth and approximate knowledge of the world through our theories.  
This result seems to conflict with the scientific realist intuition that science is the best 
generator of knowledge of the natural world.  Psillos recognizes that his realism about 
abstracta carries serious metaphysical baggage (which he concedes but does not address).  
For instance, he admits that he can only give a sketch of how it is that these models are 
known if they cannot causally interact with the world.  His response is that they come to 
be known “hypothetico-deductively”, they are posits that must exist because they are 
necessary to account for the behavior of physical entities and processes (2011a, 19).30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 However, as I shall attempt to argue in Chapter Four, Psillos assumes explanation is a requirement for a 
good scientific theory, but as shall be discussed in Chapter Three, van Fraassen contends that explanation 
may be safely ignored.  An explanation presumably shows how it is that something is the cause of one or 
more effects, yet a scientific theory does not need to have posited a cause for every effect in the theory’s 
domain to be considered a good theory.  For example, quantum mechanics has enormous predictive power 
and thus is used by physicists even though there is no explanation for why the quantum universe is not 
deterministic.  In a non-deterministic framework, the causes of phenomena cannot always be indentified, if 
they exist at all. 
 Moreover, if the pessimistic meta-induction is true, then there are many incompatible explanations 
that have been incompatible explanations that have been given to the same phenomena.  I shall return to 
Chang’s argument that caloric theory is a clear counter-example to Psillos’ theory of reference.  Returning 
to Stanford, I shall attempt to show that “phlogiston” is another challenge to Psillos’ causal-descriptive 
theory of reference.  Lastly, I will endeavor to argue that Psillos’ reliance on abstracta as the referents for 
scientific terms is untenable since he cannot show how we can know that abstracta exist independently of 
the explanatory criterion, nor can he account for how abstracta interact with us and the physical world. 
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2.6 Theories of Truth 
 
 
2.6.1 The Correspondence Theory of Truth 
 
 
 The causal-descriptive theory of reference is tied directly to Psillos’ position on 
truth.  The test for whether or not a term or a statement refers to anything is also the test 
for whether or not it is true that the entity putatively referred to exists.  As explained in 
the section above, the term “phlogiston” does not refer to anything, nor is it true that 
phlogiston exists, since a key element in the core description (i.e. weight) of “phlogiston” 
cannot be detected.  Thus, having a referent in the world is what makes a term or a 
statement true.  This theory of truth is called the correspondence theory of truth since a 
term or statement is true if and only if it corresponds to something in the world.  For 
example, the statement “the cat is on the mat” is true if and only if there is a cat on the 
mat.  This statement can be tested for truth by looking to see if a cat is on the mat, 
touching the cat, hearing it purr, and so on.  The truth value for statements about 
unobservable scientific terms is tested through the observable effects they purportedly 
produce and from inferring their existence as the best explanation of a given phenomena.  
For instance, the silver-grey track in a cloud chamber is best explained by the existence 
of positrons, hence the track is both the both the means of detecting a positron and what 
is explained by the existence of the positron.  Although this method of establishing truth 
conditions seems viciously circular, Psillos contends that it is not since the core 
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description of “positron” may not have matched with the expected experimental results 
(as was the case with phlogiston). 
 While Psillos thinks that the full truth about what is observable is accessible to us 
through our senses, he claims that the full truth of scientific theories and models is not 
directly accessible to us.  Therefore, there is no direct correspondence relation between 
theoretical claims and the world.  However, he defends the correspondence theory of 
truth from the claim that truth as correspondence may be attainable, but that we would 
not know if we have attained it or not.31   
 
 
2.6.2 The Correspondence Theory of Truth and Our Indirect Access to the World 
 
 
The correspondence theory of truth faces many skeptical challenges.  A 
longstanding criticism against this theory of truth is that we cannot go beyond our senses 
to judge whether or not they accurately perceive the world.  Moreover, as noted earlier in 
this chapter, our observations are theory-laden.  If our theories affect how we perceive the 
world, then we do not have unmediated access to the world.  Moreover, as described in 
Chapter One in the section on Catherine Elgin, experiments do not give us direct access 
to how the world works, but only how phenomena behaves in laboratory conditions.  
Lastly, scientific realists claim the inference to the best explanation can be used to pick 
the theory that is closest to the truth.  However, as I shall show in Chapter Three, this 
                                                 
31 In Chapter Four, I shall argue that Psillos has not established that we can know when we have obtained a 
true belief. 
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inference also faces skeptical challenges, such as how we can know that the best 
explanation is the most true and how we can know we have arrived at the best 
explanation.  Thus, these challenges imply that, in order to acquire truth as 
correspondence, one would need to be able to surpass our senses, theories, and 
inferences.  If we cannot surpass them, then we cannot tell if we have acquired truth as 
correspondence with the world.  Therefore, truth is an unattainable ideal.  Moreover, 
surpassing one’s senses, theories, and inferences is necessary for the attainment of 
approximate truth too so, a fortiori, approximate truth about the world is also 
unattainable.   
Against these challenges, Psillos contends that truth as correspondence is 
attainable if the truth conditions, or the conditions that make a belief true, obtain.  For 
example, a cat being on a mat makes the belief “the cat is on the mat” true.  A charged 
particle’s interaction with supersaturated vapor causes a silver-grey streak in the Wilson 
cloud chamber makes the belief “a charged particle’s interaction with supersaturated 
vapor causes silver-grey streaks in the Wilson cloud chamber” true.  These conditions are 
different from the evidence conditions which, when they obtain, make a belief rational 
(1999, 181).  The evidence conditions make a belief rational and justified because the 
evidence is collected through processes that have reliably acquired truth in the past.  
Hearing the cat meow and purr, feeling her fur, and seeing her on the mat are all items of 
sensory evidence that make the belief “the cat is on the mat” justified and rational to 
believe.  Seeing the silver-grey streaks in the Wilson cloud chamber is an item of sensory 
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evidence and inferences made on the basis of the Lorentz force law32 that make the belief 
“a charged particle’s interaction with supersaturated vapor causes silver-grey streaks in 
Wilson cloud chambers” justified and rational.  However, whether or not the evidence 
one is collecting is true or not depends on the world, and not what one is experiencing 
since these processes are not perfect.  The processes can be led into error by other 
conditions.   
For instance, if one was given a hallucinogen and did not know it and perceived a 
cat that was not there, then the truth conditions are not met, though the evidence 
conditions have been obtained.  Thus, while the belief “the cat is on the mat” is false, 
because it was formed through senses that are otherwise reliable the subject is justified 
and rational in believing there is a cat before her.  Likewise, if the silver-grey streaks in a 
Wilson cloud chamber were not caused by positrons, then the belief that they do would 
be false, but, because of the evidence and reasoning mentioned above, the belief would 
be justified and rational.   
Yet, it is still not clear how we can know that we are in a position to know that 
our evidence conditions and truth conditions merge to make a belief true, justified, and 
rationally believed.  To this challenge Psillos responds that unless certainty is necessary 
to justify belief in a claim, then we can judge the truth of a claim.  Following Rudolf 
Carnap (1945/6), Psillos claims that there is a point at which enough evidence has been 
gathered to justify a belief.  Moreover, Psillos holds that the truth predicate is 
disquotational.  The disquotational theory of truth states that true predicates added to an 
assertion is redundant.  As Psillos explains: 
                                                 
32 The Lorentz force law states that positively and negatively charged particles in an electromagnetic field 
will curve in opposite directions.  Positrons were posited to explain the appearance of streaks in the Wilson 
cloud chamber that curved in the opposite direction as electrons in an applied magnetic field. 
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Now, let us grant that assertion S, ‘Substance X is an acid’, is decidable 
- that is, confirmable to a high degree – by some scientific procedures.  
As Carnap rightly observes, if S is confirmed to a degree r, then sentence 
S’, ‘ “Substance X is an acid” is true’, is confirmed to exactly the same  
degree, since S and S’ are equivalent, given the English language and the 
disquotational property of the truth predicate.  Carnap concludes that ‘is 
true’, and ‘truth’, are legitimate scientific notions, precisely on the  
grounds that sentences which state truth-values are confirmable.  (1999, 182) 
If the belief that a particular sentence is true was generated by a reliable method, then the 
addition of the truth predicate is redundant.  Clearly, it is possible that the belief 
warranted by a reliable method is false (e.g. a belief in phlogiston).  Reliable methods do 
not guarantee certainty, they are fallible.  As Psillos states, “The link between a reliably 
produced belief and a true belief is synthetic, not conceptual.  But, notice that fallibility 
does not entail actual falsity” (1999, 182).  Hence, we discover reliability through 
experience and not a priori, and reliable methods often, but do not always, generate true 
beliefs. However, unless one holds that no belief can be rationally judged to be true 
unless it is certainly not false, then belief in truth is rational despite the logical possibility 
that the belief could be false.  Thus, if scientific methods are generally reliable methods 
for obtaining true beliefs, then we do not need to transcend time to know that our best 
theories are probably true.  Psillos concludes that access to the truth is not a utopian ideal. 
Now let us turn to Psillos’ defense of the correspondence theory of truth.     
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2.6.3 Correspondence and Our Mediated Access to the World 
 
 
 As noted in Chapter One, Catherine Elgin argues that scientific experimentation 
does not provide the full truth about how phenomena behave in the world unaffected by 
humans, but what truth experimentation does provide is of how phenomena behave in 
laboratory settings.  Since scientific descriptions of the world make claims about the 
world based on experimental findings, and experimental findings refer to laboratory 
settings and not the world, then these claims are false.  If Elgin is correct, then, according 
to the correspondence theory of truth, scientific descriptions of the world based on 
experimental findings do not correspond to the world.  Thus, scientific descriptions of the 
world are false.  If Psillos cannot respond to this challenge, then he cannot show how 
terms and statements about the world are to be understood as corresponding to the world. 
 An additional challenge against the correspondence theory of truth arises from 
theory-ladeness.  As Kuhn shows in his (1970), the discoveries of oxygen and X-rays 
show that Priestly and 19th century physicists apparently could not observe oxygen and 
X-rays, respectively.  The theories Priestly and 19th century physicists used to categorize 
the world did not allow for these new discoveries in their respective ontologies.  Kuhn 
claims that according to the correspondence theory of truth, Priestly and 19th century 
physicists should not have been blinded by their theories and they should have 
recognized these discoveries.  Because of the failure of many scientists to recognize 
novel phenomena, Kuhn concludes, ‘There is, I think, no theory-independent way to 
reconstruct phrases like “really true”; the notion of a match between the ontology of a 
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theory and its “real” counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in principle” (1970: 
206 in Psillos 1999: 246). 
 Against the first challenge, Psillos claims that our interaction with the world does 
not preclude our acquiring knowledge about the entities with which we have interacted.  
Rather, he asserts that our interactions with the world are a reliable way for us to gain 
knowledge about the world.  If we could not interact with the world, then we could not 
have epistemic access to the world.  Furthermore, it is through our interaction with the 
world that we can fallibly state that the truth conditions of our beliefs obtain (1999: 245).  
The same information that we conceptualize and theorize about is information about the 
interacted-with objects.  Since our causal interactions and connections provide our 
knowledge of the world, we should have no trouble accessing truths about this world. 
In response to the second challenge, Psillos argues that our interaction with the 
world facilitates epistemic access to the world instead of undermining it.  He states, the 
main realist point about truth is that, “[it] is logically independent of human opinion: 
there is no conceptual or logical link between the truth of a statement and our ability to 
recognise it, assert it and the like.  Our beliefs are about interacted-with objects – since 
they cannot be about uninteracted-with objects” (1999: 246).  Without interacting with 
objects we cannot know anything about them.  Simple passive observation of a substance 
thought to be carcinogenic will not conclusively tell us if the substance is carcinogenic or 
not.  However, exposing mice to that substance, isolated from as many other substances 
as possible, can lead us to conclude that the substance is, or is not, carcinogenic.  Yet, the 
conclusions arrived at about these interacted-with-objects - “insofar as they are true” - 
(1999, 246) is not logically dependent on methods of confirmation, justification, and so 
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on.  Thus, returning to Kuhn’s examples of oxygen and X-rays, these entities would exist 
whether we could theorize about them or not.  These objects are independent of us in a 
logical, not causal sense, they are not the result of our theorizing and conceptualizations.  
Rather, we create our theories and concepts from our interactions with the world. 
Moreover, to further defend the correspondence theory of truth from the 
challenges of interaction and theory-ladeness, Psillos invokes the success argument.  This 
argument states, “that an appeal to truth-conditions is essentially involved in the 
explanation of why successful actions are successful.  This explanation is based on the 
claim that the truth-conditions of the belief(s) on which successful actions were based 
have been realised” (1999, 247).  In particular, it is grounded in the claim that a variety of 
reliable beliefs are necessary for success in various domains, and that a belief should 
reliably reveal its truth-conditions to be considered reliable.   
An explanation of a successful action is basically dependent on the employment 
of truth-conditions.  An action based on certain beliefs is successful because the beliefs’ 
truth-conditions are realized.  For instance, “what explains the efficacy of the physician’s 
prescription in curing the disease is that the truth-conditions for his beliefs, e.g. that the 
patient is infected by such-and-such a virus and that this virus is killed by such-and-such 
an anti-biotic, were realised” (1999, 247).  Thus, generally, a subject is more likely to 
meet with success when the truth-conditions of their beliefs obtain (1999, 247).  The 
beliefs that produce a “systematic pattern of success” are those whose truth conditions are 
the realization of “referred-to entities standing in the referred-to relations” (1999, 248).  
Put more simply, successful actions are based on beliefs that “correspond to reality” 
(1999, 248).  This property of correspondence with reality that is shared by all these 
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beliefs is what gives this account of truth its substance.  Clearly, beliefs are expressed in 
terms of concepts and theories.  Thus, while theory-ladeness is unavoidable, the success 
of actions based on these concepts and theories show that the concepts and theories are 
true.33   
 
 
2.7 Truth-likeness 
 
 
2.7.1 Psillos’ Intuitive Approach 
 
 
Scientific realists typically argue that our best scientific theories should be 
considered truth-like, since, as Psillos notes, “In our interactions with the world, the exact 
truth cannot generally be had, especially concerning the unobservable and 
spatiotemporally remote aspects of the world.  A perfect match between theories and the 
world is almost impossible” (1999, 276).  Thus, we cannot obtain the full truth about the 
world and have to settle for approximations to the truth about the world in our scientific 
theories and models.  The structure of natural phenomena is so interwoven and complex 
that it cannot be fruitfully studied and represented in complete theories without 
idealization and simplification.  Scientific theories are often constructed with many 
                                                 
33 However, as I shall attempt to show in Chapter Four, Chang (2003) and Stanford (2003) both contend 
that past theories have met the explanatory criterion of the success argument, but these theories are now 
seen as false.  Furthermore, I will argue that Psillos has not shown that the success of science is not 
viciously circular.  Moreover, even if his success argument is sound, he has only shown that concepts and 
theories are true of abstracta, not of the world. 
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idealizations, such as point masses and ideal gases, which give a simplified representation 
of the world.  This simplified representation makes investigating it easier.  For instance, 
our representations of the laws of nature are formed by bracketing off many obfuscating 
features and conditions, such as air resistance in the law of free fall.  As Psillos states: 
Theoretical predictions are tested against experimental results, but almost 
no prediction exactly matches the experimental results.  Most predictions 
stand within an ε, however small, from the experimental outcome, which 
itself has an error-estimate.  Demanding the truth in science would amount  
to demanding the exclusion of all approximations, simplifications,  
idealisations, approximate derivations, sources of error in measurements  
and calculations.  (1999, 276) 
 
Even if such an exact science were possible, it would be a different kind of science than 
that with which we are familiar (1999, 276).   
 However, in general, scientific results are self-corrective.  Scientists specify the 
idealizations and specifications employed in theoretical laws and mechanisms.  
Moreover, they specify, as precisely as possible, the respects and the degree to which 
natural phenomena diverge from their theoretical representations.  Psillos employs the 
case of a law that is derived from a more fundamental law as an example of how 
simplification occurs in science: 
 
Take for instance,…the derivation of Kepler’s first law from  
Newton’s inverse-square law.  This derivation is, strictly speaking,  
false.  Actually, from premises which are strictly speaking false, i.e.  
considering the revolution of Mars around the sun as a two-body  
problem, a false conclusion is derived – that Mars’ orbit is elliptical.   
But, the degree of accuracy of the derivation is specifiable, as are the  
respects in and degrees to which the conclusion, Mars’s orbit is  
elliptical, deviate from the actual orbit of Mars.  This is where the  
idea of truth-likeness enters science.  For both the premises of the 
derivation (i.e. the two body problem) and its conclusion(Mar’s  
orbit is elliptical) are, in one sense, truth-like.  (1999, 276) 
 
 96 
Kepler’s laws approximate to a high degree of accuracy the motion of the planets, and are 
thus truth-like.  The two-body simplification in the derivation of Kepler’s first law from 
the law of universal gravitation is truth-like, since the other planets’ gravitational effects 
on the motion of Mars are negligible in contrast to the Sun’s gravitational field.   
 To be accepted as true, a theory (or theoretical description) must fit the world.  To 
fit the world the theory or theoretical description must give an isomorphic representation 
of the phenomena in the theoretical description’s domain.  This conception of truth 
Psillos calls fittingness.  If truth is fittingness, “then truth-likeness should be understood 
as approximate fittingness: a description, statement, law, theory are truth-like if and only 
if there are respects and degrees to which they fit with the facts” (1999, 276-277).  
According to Psillos, a statement is as approximately true to the extent that it is accurate 
in whatever it asserts (1999, 277).  For instance, a theory which states that Mars has a 
square orbit is less true than a theory which states that Mars has a circular orbit.  
Moreover, the theory which states that Mars’ orbit is circular approximately fits the fact 
that Mars’ orbit is elliptical.  Clearly, the theory which states that Mars’ orbit is elliptical 
is more approximately true since it more fully fits the facts.   
 Psillos considers his approach to be intuitive since it aligns with our intuitions that 
“a theory is approximately true if the entities of the general kind postulated to play a 
central causal role in the theory exist, and if the basic mechanisms and laws postulated by 
the theory approximate those holding in the world, under specific conditions of 
approximation” (1999, 277).  He argues that the cognitive significance of false 
descriptions furnishes these false descriptions with their truth-likeness.  These 
descriptions may have a better or worse fit with the facts they claim to describe, and they 
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may represent the domain they propose to describe to a low or high degree of accuracy.  
For example, “The wave theory of light is strictly speaking false.  Yet, its description of 
the interference phenomena is a better approximation to the truth than is the relevant 
description of the theory of luminous molecules.  Similar examples can be generated at 
will” (1999, 277).  Rather than discard the notion of verisimilitude, “since all truth-like 
assertions are – strictly speaking – false” we should attempt to discover as sufficiently as 
possible the conditions where a representation fits as accurately as possible the pertinent 
facts (1999, 277).   
 Psillos give following clarification of his intuitive approach of truth-likeness: 
A description D approximately fits a state S (i.e. D is approximately true 
 of S) if there is another state S’ such that S and S’ are linked by specific 
 conditions of approximation and D fits S’ (D is true of S’).  (1999, 277) 
 
To further clarify his notion of truth-likness Psillos states that a theoretical law is 
approximately true of the world, if it is fully true in a world which approximates ours 
under certain conditions (1999, 277).  In his (2011a), Psillos further clarifies that the full 
truth of scientific theories and models are to be found in the abstracta that constitute a 
scientific theory’s descriptions of the phenomena in the theory’s domain.  For example, 
“the law of gases, PV = RT.  This is approximately true of real gases, since it is true of 
ideal gases and the behaviour of real gases approximates that of ideal gases under certain 
conditions” (1999, 277).  Psillos concedes that this is a sketch of a theory of truth-
likeness, but it also incorporates the proper intuitions that judgments of approximate truth 
entail some comparison between the actual world and the world, or state, the theory 
describes.   
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 An objection to an intuitive approach to truth-likeness is that it makes the notion 
of truth-likeness vague.  Psillos responds that the notion of truth-likeness operating in 
science is clear enough.  Paradoxes, such as the Liar’s paradoxwhere difficulty arises in 
assessing the truth of a statement that asserts its own falsity34, led to Alfred Tarski’s 
formulation of the semantic approach to the truth: x is a true sentence if and only if p 
(1983, 155).  In this formulation, x is the sentence and p is the states of affairs the 
sentence putatively represents.  For example, the statement “The grass is green”, is true if 
and only if the grass is green.  But, no such formulation is necessary for the intuitive 
approach to truth since no such paradoxes arise for this latter approach.  Furthermore, 
Psillos maintains that the vagueness of truth-likeness does not count against it.  The 
charge of vagueness can be overcome by focusing on the notion of approximation.  
Different theoretical descriptions will have different degrees of similarity and different 
respects in which they are similar to the phenomena in their domain.  Thus, the notion of 
approximation plays a crucial role in elucidating truth-likeness through particular 
examples.   
A second objection against the intuitive approach to truth-likeness is that it is not 
robust enough to be used by scientific realists.  The reliance of the notion on 
approximation may not be sufficient to support the epistemic optimism of scientific 
realism that current theories are approximately true.  Psillos claims the “objection is 
misguided” (1999, 278).  He gives the following answer to this objection: 
 For it is one thing to explicate the claim that a theory (or a theoretical  
 statement) is approximately true, but it is quite another to ground the  
 judgment that a theoretical description, or a theory, is approximately true. 
 The first is, broadly speaking, an issue in semantics, whereas the second is 
 an epistemological problem….The present aim has been to show that  
                                                 
34 E.g., “What I am now saying is false”. 
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 insofar as the conditions under which a certain description (or state)  
 approximates another are specifiable, to say of a statement D that it is  
 approximately true of state S is to say that it is true of a state S’ which 
 approximates S.  Whatever else it does, this explication at least  
 legitimises ascriptions of approximate truth when there are specifiable 
 conditions of approximation.  (1999, 278) 
 
When these ascriptions are shown to be legitimate, the question remains whether a certain 
statement (or theory) can be warrantedly asserted to be approximately true.  The 
epistemic optimism linked with scientific realism states that such ascriptions of 
approximate truth are capable of being warranted.  The warrant for attributing 
approximate truth to mature and successful theories rests on the inference to the best 
explanation.  As shown in previous sections, Psillos is confident that the inference to the 
best explanation has been shown to be a reliable method for generating true beliefs. 
 
 
2.8 Psillos’ Account of Scientific Knowledge 
 
 
In this section, I shall argue that Psillos has an implicit justified true belief 
analysis of scientific knowledge.  My argument will examine Psillos’ development of this 
account of scientific knowledge from his (1999) to his (2011a).  I will first discuss his 
account as presented in his (1999).  Using Alexander Bird’s approach for obtaining full 
truth of the world, I will argue that Psillos could use this approach for his (1999) account 
of scientific knowledge.  In his (2011a), Psillos argues that the full truth of scientific 
theories is to be found in the abstracta employed in the theories.  I shall argue that this 
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additional view of what constitutes scientific truth gives a fuller description of his 
account of scientific knowledge.   
 
 
2.8.1 Psillos’ (1999) Account of Scientific Knowledge 
 
 
Psillos (1999) explicitly states that the goal of science is the attainment of 
approximately true beliefs justified through abductive reasoning.  The theory of truth he 
is committed to is the correspondence theory of truth, the theory of justification he adopts 
is reliabilism, and he claims that scientific theories that have been shown through 
reliabilism to be true should be believed.  However, despite showing how these three 
components of traditional knowledge work together to attain non-accidental approximate 
theoretical truth, Psillos does not claim to have an account of scientific knowledge.  Yet, 
he does not explicitly deny that he has an account of scientific knowledge either.   
However, as noted in Chapter One, Catherine Elgin argues that approximate truth 
is not sufficient for knowledge.  Knowledge requires the full truth and nothing less.  
Scientific realists recognize this and thus claim only to have acquired approximately true 
beliefs and not knowledge.  However, Psillos seems to think that approximately true 
beliefs can be justified in the same way that true beliefs can, and that these approximately 
true, warranted beliefs are worthy of the name “knowledge” in both of his (1999) and 
(2009) (at least in the case of “background knowledge”).  While he does not explicitly 
deny the possibility of knowledge on the grounds that approximate truth of the world is 
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all that can be achieved and knowledge needs nothing but the truth, Psillos could follow 
Alexander Bird’s account of truth used in the latter’s account of knowledge.  Bird’s 
account of truth shall be described in the paragraph below.  Rather, not until his (2011a) 
does Psillos state of what it is that scientific theories are true.  There he argues that we 
acquire full truth only about the abstracta that represents the world and we only acquire 
approximate truth about the world itself.   
In arguing for the possibility of full truth about the physical world, and thus 
knowledge, in science, Bird also relies on an informal and intuitive concept of 
approximate truth.  He contends that “If [a proposition] p is approximately true, then the 
proposition q, that p is approximately true, is itself true, not merely close to the truth” 
(2007: 76).  He uses the following propositions to illustrate his point, “‘if planets travel in 
ellipses’ is a scientific proposition, then so is ‘approximately, planets travel in ellipses’.  
Even if p is not true and so not knowable, q (q = approximately p) might well be 
knowable” (2007, 76).  Moreover, such propositions as q are true about the world, and 
can be used in explanations and predictions.  For instance, “the fact that it is 
approximately true that the only force acting on the Earth is a central force directed 
towards the Sun explains why the Earth’s orbit is approximately an ellipse” (2007, 77).  
Clearly, explanations that involve “approximately p” are frequently parasitic on what p 
would account for if p were true.  However, this might not always be the case.  As Bird 
explains: 
That the motion of a pendulum is approximately simple harmonic is  
explained by the fact that small θ, sin θ is approximately equal to θ. 
This is not best understood in terms of what would be explained if sin 
θ were exactly equal to θ.  For if sin θ = θ (exactly) then θ = 0, and we 
do not have any pendulum motion at all.  (2007, 77). 
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 In some cases, increasing nearness to truth can also show increasing full truth.  As 
Bird states, “And so those cases can in principle show the accumulation of knowledge 
also, should the required epistemic conditions be met” (2007, 77).  In Psillos’ case, the 
epistemic conditions to be met for truth-likeness seem to be justification and belief.  Bird 
illustrates how an accumulation of truth-likeness can lead to knowledge: 
 Let <p,…pk> be a series of hypotheses, accepted in that order over time, 
 that monotonically get closer to the truth.  This sequence shows progress 
 according to the verisimilitude account.  We can see that there is also a  
 distinct but related sequence of propositions, entailed by the first, that  
 exhibits the accumulation of truth and (potentially) the accumulation of 
 knowledge.  Let A(…) be a propositional operator whose meaning is  
 given thus: A(p) iff approximately p.  Assuming first, for simplicity, that 
 all pi are approximately true, the sequence of propositions  
 <A(p),…, A(pk)> will be a sequence of propositions each of which is  
 fully true and adds to the truth provided by its predecessors.  If these  
 propositions are believed, then we have an accumulation of fully true  
 propositions; and if they are sufficiently well supported by the  
 evidence, the propositions will be known and we will have progress 
 according [to] the cumulative knowledge account.  The improving 
 precision of our approximations can be an object of knowledge.  (2007, 77) 
 
The above illustration seems to cohere with Psillos account of “background knowledge”.  
As Psillos states, “Those beliefs for which scientists acquire overwhelmingly supportive 
evidence augment the mass of warranted background beliefs and become the pivots for 
new warranted beliefs” (1999: 219).  If I am correct to assume that Psillos would find this 
account of truth acceptable, then he has the ingredients to formulate an account of 
scientific knowledge. 
In this sketch of Psillos’ (1999) account of truth, it seems that he is arguing for 
something very much like the traditional justified, true belief account of knowledge for 
science.  Perhaps, scientific knowledge could be seen as a special kind of knowledge 
whose components are justification (through abduction), truth (approximately of the 
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world), and belief.  However, it is important to note that all of his (1999, 2009, 2011) 
accounts of scientific knowledge may not require justification since he never explicitly 
claims it is necessary for scientific progress or scientific knowledge. Hence, it appears his 
account of scientific knowledge can also be analyzed in terms of truth and belief.  While 
Psillos may hold to a true belief account of scientific knowledge, such an account would 
seemingly not affect the arguments in Chapter Four regarding his commitment to 
facticity. 
 
 
2.8.2 Psillos’ (2009) Account of Scientific Knowledge 
 
 
In Psillos’ latest book Knowing the Structure of Nature (2009), he takes a more 
epistemically optimistic position.  He claims that there should be no principled limit on 
our knowledge of nature, hence a large part of his book is aimed at those philosophers, 
such as the structural realists, who seek to impose such limits.  The structural realists 
hold that we can only know the mathematical structure of nature and deny that we can 
obtain any description about the character of the unobservable entities and processes 
represented mathematically.  Structural realists assume that pessimistic meta-induction is 
cogent, and hence have given up hope of giving true descriptions of unobservables.  
However, they are committed to the “no miracles argument” since they hold that we do 
discover the structure of the world and the structure accounts for the empirical success of 
science.  For example, the equations representing Fresnel’s elastic solid ether are largely 
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the same as those that represent the electromagnetic field in Maxwell’s theory.  Psillos 
contends we can have knowledge, not only of the structure of nature, but also of whatever 
fills in the structure of nature, such as the characteristics of the entities and processes that 
constitute the structure.  In this section, I shall summarize the changes in his epistemic 
position.   
Clearly, Psillos explicitly mentions “knowledge” in a scientific context in the title 
of, and throughout, his (2009).  However, in this work too he fails to give an explicit 
account of scientific knowledge.  Nowhere does Psillos state that scientific knowledge is 
constituted of particular components, such as truth, justification, and belief.  Nor, does he 
explicitly discuss justification, truth, or belief as being components of scientific 
knowledge.  Yet, does he give a more detailed account of the justification of beliefs in 
unobservable entities.  He no longer relies on a purely externalist account of justification 
and supplements it with John Pollock’s internalist perspective, “where justification and 
warrant are tied to the presence (or absence) of defeaters” (2009, xxiv).  Defeaters are 
propositions that are true, and if one were to learn of the propositions in question, then 
they would undermine the justification for a belief.  This condition blocks the original 
counter-examples.  For instance, in one of Gettier’s (1963) examples, Smith has a 
justified true belief that the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job.  However, 
unbeknownst to Smith, he has ten coins in his pocket and will get the job.  Thus, Smith 
has a justified true belief, but it is not knowledge since the justification for his belief does 
not apply to him, but to Jones who Smith knows has ten coins in his pocket.  Smith 
formed his belief that the person with ten coins in their pocket would get the job, and he 
was justified in believing that Jones had ten coins in his pocket.  If Smith had known that 
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Jones would not have gotten the job, then this proposition would have defeated his 
justified false belief that Jones would get the job.  Moreover, if Smith knew that Jones did 
not own a Ford, then he would not have the justified false belief that Jones owns a Ford.  
In both cases, Smith’s justified true beliefs are defeated.  If Smith acquired justified true 
beliefs that had not been undermined by defeaters, then he would have knowledge.   
In particular, Psillos needs to safeguard ampliative reasoning, or inference to the 
best explanation, from two challenges.  The first is the challenge of justification: “given 
that ampliative reasoning is not necessarily truth preserving, how can it be justified?” 
(2009, xxiv).  For example, our ancestors were justified in believing that the Earth is 
stationary, flat, and the sun and other celestial bodies moved around it.  The Earth does 
not seem to be moving, or round, and we can see the sun “rise” and “set” each morning 
and evening.  Thus, they did not have evidence for the movement of the Earth or for its 
being round.  Thus, our ancestors were justified in believing what they believed about the 
Earth though, by contemporary lights, they are wrong.  The second challenge is to 
discover the structure of ampliative reasoning.  For example enumerative induction is one 
form of ampliatvie reasoning where if something A has been observed to be a certain way 
B for long enough, then one can infer the generalization that “All As are Bs”.  Thus, if all 
observed eagles have talons, then one can infer the generalization “All eagles have 
talons”.  As Psillos states, “The first is Hume’s problem; the second is Peirce’s problem” 
(2009, xxiv).  While these are distinct philosophical issues, a proper discussion of 
ampliative reasoning needs to deal with both.  Specifically, a proper discussion should 
show how some epistemic warrant is bestowed on the results of ampliative methods.   
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 According to Psillos, inference to the best explanation is the best description of 
the scientific method, and it is inference to the best explanation that confers warrant on 
the results of this method.  Psillos justifies inference to the best explanation “within 
Pollock’s (1986; 1987) framework of defeasible reasoning.  By thinking of justification 
in terms of the absence of defeaters, this framework makes possible the investigation of 
the conditions under which defeasible reasoning can issue warranted beliefs” (2009, 
xxiv).  Clearly, ampliative methods of reasoning are defeasible since new information or 
evidence can defeat an outcome.  Further evidence or information can remove the warrant 
for believing the outcome of the method.  Psillos follows Pollock in calling, “‘prima 
facie’ or ‘defeasible’ any type of reason which is not conclusive (in the sense that it is not 
deductively linked with the output it is a reason for)” (2009, 177).  Since ampliative 
reasoning is defeasible, such reasoning supplies prima facie warrant for an outcome 
(belief).  Psillos agrees with Pollock that in calling a warrant (or reason) prima facie is to 
emphasize that it can be defeated by further reasons or information; and (b) its 
robustness, qua reason, is derived from the presence or absence of defeaters (2009, 177).  
The degree to which one is warranted in holding a particular belief is directly reliant on 
the presence or absence of defeaters.  As applied to ampliative methods, the extent to 
which an ampliative method can bestow warrant on an outcome is directly linked to 
whether or not defeaters are present, and to what degree (2009, 177).  As Psillos explains, 
“To say that S is prima facie warranted to accept the outcome Q of an ampliative method 
is to say that although it is possible that there are defeaters of the outcome Q, such 
defeaters are not actual” (2009, 177-178).  Specifically, it is to say that S has thought over 
a range of possible defeaters of the reasons offered for this outcome Q and has shown 
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they are not present.  It is logically possible that the subject in question is being 
constantly deceived by an omnipotent deceiving demon, but without any evidence to 
support this possibility this defeater can be considered as not actual.  The existence of 
black swans is an actual defeater to the generalization that “All swans are white”, and of 
enumerative induction as a reliable method for conferring warrant to the generalizations 
produced by this method.  If this no defeaters have been discovered, then we can assert 
there are no specific doubts regarding the outcome of the method, and that there is prima 
facie warrant in this belief.   
 Psillos contends that, “This talk of defeaters is not abstract.  There are general 
types of defeater that one can consider” (2009, 178).  Thus, when judging whether an 
outcome is warranted, there are particular things to pay attention to such that, if present, 
would remove the warrant for the outcome.  Mere logical possibility of defeaters is not 
enough to warrant consideration, the threat has to come from an actual defeater.  As 
Psillos states, “Besides, if the reasoner has done whatever she can do to ensure that such 
defeaters are not present in a particular case, there is a strong sense in which she has done 
what it can plausibly be demanded of her in order to be epistemically justified” (2009, 
178).  For instance, in the case of the omnipotent deceiving demon, by definition there is 
no way for an inquirer to know that she is being deceived since the demon constantly 
supplies her with false information.  Without anyway to show how one could circumvent 
the alleged demon’s omnipotence to discover she is being deceived there is nothing for 
her to do to show that this logically possible defeater can be guarded against.  Thus, she 
is epistemically justified in ignoring this defeater.  However, if the inquirer is a building 
inspector who does not actually go onto the roof of a roofing job, then her epistemic 
 108 
warrant cannot be conferred on her claims that the roof is being constructed according to 
code.   
As in his (1999), Psillos (2009) stresses the importance of justification, truth, and 
belief in his account of the epistemic progress of science.  Still he does not provide an 
explicit account of scientific knowledge.  Perhaps he is afraid that an explicit analysis of 
scientific knowledge in terms of justification, truth, and belief would leave his account of 
progress open to the same vulnerabilities as the traditional analysis of ordinary 
knowledge.  For instance, this latter analysis has been plagued for nearly fifty years by 
Gettier cases.  Regardless of the motivation for his caution, Pollock’s theory of 
justification originated as a response to Gettier cases.  Therefore, Psillos would likely 
present Pollock’s account of knowledge as justified true belief with no defeaters as his 
account of scientific knowledge. 
 
 
2.8.3 Psillos’ (2011) Account of Scientific Knowledge 
 
 
 As noted in section 2.4.6, Psillos claims that the full truth in scientific theories is 
to be found in the abstract models of natural phenomena.  Since the full truth is to be 
found in abstracta, and not in the approximate truths of the world, we do not have 
knowledge of the world, but only of abstracta.  Thus, while the domain of science seems 
to be the natural world, Psillos maintains that the knowledge science produces is of 
abstracta.  We now have a complete description Psillos’ account of scientific knowledge.  
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The theory of justification he is committed to is reliabilist, internalist (except he adopts 
externalism to justify the “no miracles argument” and the inference to the best 
explanation), and defeasible.  His theory of truth is the correspondence theory of truth, 
and our beliefs correspond to abstracta and not directly to the world.  Psillos’ theory of 
belief is that we should believe what has been shown to be true through reliable methods, 
rather than withholding judgment on their truth or falsity.   
 
 
2.9 Alexander Bird 
 
 
2.9.1 Scientific Knowledge as Unanalyzable 
 
 
Alexander Bird (2007) explicitly argues, not only that scientific knowledge is 
possible, but that its accumulation is the proper measure of scientific progress (64).  This 
knowledge is propositional and theoretical.  He adopts Timothy Williamson’s (2000) 
account of knowledge as primitive and unanalyzable, and extends this account to 
scientific knowledge.  Motivated by the failure to overcome Gettier cases, Williamson 
analyzes justification, truth and belief in terms of knowledge, rather than analyzing 
knowledge in terms of justification, truth and belief (and perhaps some fourth element 
that blocks Gettier cases).   
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Bird (2007) is motivated by two major views in the philosophy of science.  The 
first is semantic realism, where truth-likeness is the goal of science.  He argues that 
philosophers, such as Psillos, allow for truth to be acquired accidentally.  Without 
justification to show how the belief was reliably acquired, the accidentally obtained true 
belief can just as easily be lost.  For instance, a true belief gained through spurious 
means, such as reading tea leaves, can lead to the true belief being abandoned once the 
unreliability of the method has been revealed.  Moreover, he notes that scientists spend 
tremendous energy justifying their conclusions through certain procedures, such as 
repeatable experiments.  Thus, mere accumulation of true beliefs cannot be the goal of 
science since true beliefs can be easily gained and lost, and is not reflective of actual 
scientific practice.  Moreover, Bird is keen to point out that he is talking about 
propositional knowledge of unobservables. 
The other position motivating his approach he calls the functionalist-internalist 
approach, where scientific progress is measured through the fulfillment of a certain 
function, such as reliably predicting phenomena, and whether or not that function has 
been fulfilled can only be judged by the scientists employing that function.  The 
fulfillment of a function (such as solving a puzzle) does not require truth.  For instance, 
Nicole d’Oresme thought that hot goat’s blood would split diamonds.  Oresme’s claim is 
now seen as false.  On the functionalist-internalist conception of progress, scientific 
progress was achieved by Oresme if his putative solution was accepted by his 
contemporaries.  However, Bird contends that since it is false that hot goat’s blood does 
split diamonds (regardless of what any community says), then truth becomes relevant to 
whether or not a given solution really is a solution to a particular puzzle.  Instead, he 
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argues that the goal of science should be knowledge.  Bird calls his view the epistemic 
approach.   
 
 
2.9.2 Bird on Truth 
 
 
Bird notes some supporters of scientific realism, such as Karl Popper, argue that 
science cannot deliver the full truth; rather we can only ever achieve approximate truth.  
Thus, they claim science should not aim to generate knowledge, which requires the full 
truth, but should seek truth-likeness as its goal.  As shown on pages 99-100 of this 
chapter, Bird contends that the full truth is possible, even if we only often obtain 
approximate truth.  Yet, even with the acquisition of approximate truth we know fully 
that a particular proposition is approximately true, though we do not know the full truth.  
For instance, that the Earth travels in an ellipse is only approximately true because it is 
only approximately true that the only force exerted upon the Earth is a central force 
directed towards the Sun.  Furthermore, Bird holds that an accumulation of (non-
accidentally obtained) true beliefs can eventually lead to acquiring the full truth and, 
hence, knowledge.  For instance, successive approximations of the speed of light become 
more and more accurate until we finally know the speed of light (within a certain margin 
of error).35 
 
                                                 
35 In Chapter Four, I shall attempt to show that Bird’s notion of approximately true background knowledge 
cannot support knowledge claims since approximately true items of “knowledge” are false, and false claims 
cannot be considered to be evidence or knowledge. 
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2.9.3 Bird on Belief 
 
 
In accord with Williamson, Bird holds that the aim of belief in general is 
knowledge, so the aim of scientific belief is scientific knowledge.  Beliefs have an aim 
because mental capacities have aims.  These functions are explained by their contribution 
to fitness.  The function of the capacity to believe aims to generate knowledge and to 
provide that knowledge to other cognitive functions (Bird 2010, 1).  If beliefs aimed only 
truth, then they could be easily acquired, but also easily abandoned.  Thus, knowledge as 
the goal for belief blocks the possibility of true beliefs being easily acquired and 
abandoned.  Moreover, the goal of knowledge acquisition accurately represents scientific 
practice and knowing whether or not a given solution is really a solution or not is a 
contribution to scientific progress.  As an historical example of a true belief accidentally 
obtained, Bird claims that Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental drift arrived at true 
conclusions with insufficient evidence that was confronted by strong counterevidence.36   
 
 
2.9.4 E=K 
 
 
If the assumption is allowed that belief, and scientific belief specifically, aims at 
knowledge, then we can characterize evidence in functional terms.  As Bird states, “the 
                                                 
36 In Chapter Four, I shall use Naomi Oreskes’ (1999) take on Wegener’s theory to show that his theory 
appears to be scientific, and an item of scientific knowledge, by Bird’s own standards.   
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function of evidence is to provide the propositional input into a process of reasoning that 
can achieve this aim.  More precisely, then: 
 (E) the proposition p is in S’s evidence if and only [sic] S can gain  
knowledge by (non-redundant) inference from p.”  (2010, 3) 
 
The quality of the propositional input and of the reasoning process will determine 
whether or not the aim of belief has been achieved.  Bird leaves discussion of the 
reasoning process for later in his paper, and merely mentions that we assume the 
reasoning process is impeccable.  He focuses on what constraints (E) puts upon evidence.  
Knowledge only will suffice to constitute evidence.  Bird contends that, “[i]f conclusion c 
depends inferentially on evidence e, then if e is not known then c is not known either” 
(2010, 3).  Moreover, any bit of knowledge can be evidence, because there will always be 
conclusions drawn from this bit of knowledge that can thereby be known in principle.  
Thus, “(E) supports Williamson’s (2000) claim that a subject’s evidence is precisely what 
that subject knows, (E=K)” (2010, 4).   
The distinction between when a proposition counts as “evidence” and when it 
counts as “theory” is contextual.  For instance, Ignaz Semmelweis showed that infectious 
material from the hands of medical students from dissections had caused puerperal fever 
in post-partum women the medical students had subsequently examined.  The finding that 
the cadaverous material on the medical students’ hands was highly correlated with 
instances of puerperal fever is evidence that helps to establish the truth of the theory that 
cadaverous material is the cause of puerperal fever.     
 The evidence that comprises background knowledge is arrived at through the 
inference to the best explanation.  Oftentimes, more than one hypothesis is put forth to 
account for some scientific phenomenon.  Then, the hypotheses offered are judged for 
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how well they explain the phenomenon.  The best explanation of the phenomenon is 
given the greatest possibility of being the actual explanation, or at least approximately so.  
Returning to the example of Semmelweis, the steps he took to explain the cause of 
puerperal fever illustrate how the inference to the best explanation proceeds.  
Semmelweis showed that infectious material from the hands of medical students from 
dissections had caused puerperal fever in post-partum women the students had 
subsequently examined.  This hypothesis won out over alternative hypotheses for the 
cause of the fever, such as, the presence of a priest, or overcrowding.    
According to Bird, this characterization of the inference to the best explanation 
faces three objections: the problem of underconsideration, Hungerford’s objection, and 
Voltaire’s objection.  The first objection states that there may be explanations that have 
not been considered, and that the actual explanation may be in the set of unconsidered 
explanations.  Hungerford’s objection asserts that the notion of “goodness” used to 
decide which explanation is best is too subjective to have any connection with truth.  The 
last objection maintains that, even if explanatory goodness could be objectively rated, 
there is still no reason to assume that the best explanation is the actual explanation since 
that would be to assume that we live in the best of all explanatory worlds, and that is not 
a safe assumption.   
Bird first answers the second and third objections by appeal to the inference to the 
only explanation.  This inference proceeds by eliminating the competing explanations as 
plausible explanations until the only explanation remains.  Bird contends that 
Semmelweis proceeded in this manner when he showed that the competing explanations 
were not explanations of the phenomenon in question.  Against the problem of 
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underconsideration, Bird argues that controlled experiments are designed precisely to 
reduce the number of hypotheses to one.  Moreover, following Williamson’s principle of 
safety, our evidence does not need to refute all false hypotheses, but only plausible false 
hypotheses.  Thus, there is no need to be concerned about hypotheses that are radically 
different from the ones being considered.   
A mechanism is required to ensure that only plausible hypotheses are considered.  
Kuhn’s notion of an exemplar forms part of this mechanism.  An exemplar is a model 
solution to a given scientific puzzle.  When scientists are searching for a solution to a 
puzzle they will often search for a solution similar to an exemplar being used to solve an 
existing problem.  For example, the equations that Newton used to predict the motions of 
celestial bodies are the exemplars that served as models for the creation of new sciences 
studying terrestrial motion, such as hydrodynamics.  These exemplars are, according to 
Bird, true or approximately true.  When potential solutions to a similar problem are put 
forward, and these potential solutions resemble the problems solved by existing 
exemplars, then the potential solutions are considered plausible.   
Bird notes that sometimes not all of the plausible solutions are considered, and the 
actual solution to a problem is not found.  When the existing exemplars fail to solve an 
increasing number of problems, then radically new exemplars are proposed.  For 
instance, phlogiston theory was overthrown when the mass of metals was found to 
increase when burned.  When a new exemplar has been found then a scientific revolution 
has occurred.  Bird claims that large scale occurrences such as the replacement of 
phlogiston with oxygen or of Ptolemaic to Copernican astronomy, is rare.  However, they 
often occur on a smaller scale, as when stress was replaced by Helicobacter pylori as the 
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principal cause of stomach ulcers.  While exemplars are replaced in large scale scientific 
revolutions the defeated exemplars are rarely abandoned completely.  For instance, 
Newtonian exemplars are limited to calculating the motion of middle-sized Earth bound 
objects, but neither celestial, nor sub-atomic objects.  Thus, there is often continuity 
among exemplars in scientific revolutions. 
 
 
2.9.5 Bird and The Causal Theory of Reference 
 
 
 From the above description of exemplars it seems we can surmise that Bird is 
committed to the notion that radical breaks from past scientific theories are possible 
during scientific revolutions.  Furthermore, Bird claims that know-how can be interpreted 
in terms of knowing-that, but he does not specify when such a translation is appropriate 
and when it is not.  Hence, radical changes in how science is practiced can be 
accompanied by radical conceptual changes.  Since Bird believes that know-how can be 
translated into propositional knowledge it seems he will have to show in what way 
reference is preserved across theoretical change.  In particular, Bird is keen to avoid 
Kuhn’s (1970) challenge to the referential continuity of theoretical terms.  Kuhn contends 
that during scientific revolutions the terms used by successor theories are often the same 
as those in the previous theories, but the meanings of the terms have changed so 
drastically that they no longer express the concept.  Thus, the earlier term is homophonic 
with the later term, but the terms do not translate each other (Bird 2004, 40).  For 
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instance, earlier astronomers described “Earth” as being immovable, the center of the 
universe, and orbited by planets (including the Sun), but now astronomers describe 
“Earth” as mobile, not the center of the universe, and as orbiting the Sun (which is not 
now seen as a planet).  According to Kuhn, though the same word is used by the earlier 
and later astronomers, since the word does not have the same meaning between these two 
communities, the two communities are referring to different entities when they use the 
same word.  Kuhn’s challenge is known as the incommensurability thesis.  If the 
incommensurability thesis is true, then scientific progress cannot be characterized as the 
correction of mistakes made by past scientists about the same concepts referred to by the 
same terms as present scientists.  If scientific progress cannot include the process of 
overcoming mistaken notions about the same concepts, then scientific progress cannot be 
seen as the accumulation of scientific knowledge.   
In response to Kuhn’s challenge, Bird (2000) adopts a causal theory of reference.  
Bird notes that continuity of reference is crucial to understanding the scientific realist 
view of truth and falsity.  A causal theory of reference allows scientific realists to claim 
that later scientists are referring to the same object picked out by the same term as earlier 
scientists even though the latter described gave vastly different descriptions of the object 
in question.  Thus, the causal theory of reference allows scientific realists to claim that 
earlier scientists were mistaken in their views about the same objects that later scientists 
refer to with the same names, such as “Earth” and “Sun”.   
Bird is aware of the criticisms of a purely descriptive theory of reference 
discussed earlier in this chapter.  To avoid these shortcomings he adopts a causal-
descriptive theory of reference.  According to this theory of reference, a term’s 
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descriptions of the causal role of a putative entity in some specifiable phenomenon are 
crucial to the referential success of the term (2000, 186).  Bird uses the example of 
“phlogiston” to show how the false descriptions of phlogiston’s causal powers make the 
term non-referential.  Moreover, he uses the Newtonian and Einsteinian notions of 
“mass” to show how reference is preserved through revolutions.  According to Bird, 
“mass” merely describes the quantity that we are causally acquainted with through the 
quantity’s presence in instances of forces leading to changes in the motion of objects.  
Since both Newtonian and Einsteinian mass measure the same quantity then “mass”, 
whether used in Newtonian mechanics or Einsteinian mechanics, refers to the same 
property.  While Bird does not explicitly mention the role of other descriptions, such as 
descriptions of the constitution of the entity putatively referred to, presumably he does 
not consider them to be crucial to the referential success of the term.37  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 In Chapter Four, I shall use the same arguments against Psillos use of the inference to the best 
explanation against Bird’s use of the same inference.  Against Bird’s use of the inference to the only 
explanation, I will attempt to show that Bird has not explained how we can know that we have actually 
arrived at the only explanation.  The history of science has shown that an item of putative knowledge can 
be lost, and then reacquired in light of new evidence.  Moreover, Bird is vague as to what is retained or 
discarded in revolutions.  He mentions the appearance of new exemplars during revolutions, but relies on a 
causal theory of reference.  Although he does not give as detailed an account of the causal-descriptive 
theory of reference as Psillos does, his theory seems to be very similar to the latter’s account.  Thus, in 
Chapter Four, I shall use the same criticisms against Bird’s account of reference as I do against Psillos’ 
casual-descriptive theory of reference.    Furthermore, I will attempt to argue that Bird seems to equivocate 
on the term “true”.  He appears to be committed to the correspondence theory of truth, but he seems to be 
using the term in the pragmatic sense when he speaks of exemplars.   
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2.10 Conclusion 
 
 
 In this chapter, I have endeavored to describe the accounts of scientific 
knowledge as stated by the scientific realists Psillos and Bird, respectively.  I chose 
Psillos’ account since his is an example of the widely held justified true belief plus 
Gettier blocking fourth condition account of knowledge in general epistemology.  I have 
tried to argue that, while Psillos never explicitly asserts that scientific knowledge is the 
analyzed in the form given above, his use of the term “scientific knowledge” in relation 
to justification, truth, and belief heavily suggest that this is his account of scientific 
knowledge.  His treatment of justification as necessary for confirming that one has 
obtained truth (or truth-likeness) and as necessary for claiming that one has acquired a 
true (or truth-like) belief mirrors all the steps needed to acquire knowledge in general 
epistemology.  Moreover, I have chosen Bird’s epistemic approach to scientific progress 
since he follows Williamson’s radical departure from the longstanding justified true 
belief account of knowledge with his knowledge as primitive term account of knowledge.  
Furthermore, I have attempted to argue that facticity is a feature of both Psillos and 
Bird’s accounts of scientific knowledge.38     
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 In Chapter Four, I shall attempt to contend that neither Psillos nor Bird’s accounts of scientific 
knowledge meet the criterion of facticity.  Since their accounts of scientific knowledge do not meet the 
facticity criterion, I will attempt to show that their respective accounts of scientific knowledge seem to fail. 
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Chapter 3. 
 
 
 
Bas van Fraassen’s Anti-realist Account of Scientific Knowledge 
 
 
 Bas van Fraassen is a leading figure against scientific realism and against 
justification.  In the course of his arguing against various forms of scientific realism, van 
Fraassen develops his scientific anti-realist positions.  In The Scientific Image (1980), he 
introduces constructive empiricism.  In Scientific Representation (2008), van Fraassen 
modifies his views on semantics and adopts a form of structuralism called empiricist 
structuralism.  In Laws and Symmetry (1989), van Fraassen attacks the notion of 
justification in traditional epistemology and he champions probabilism, which takes prior 
opinion to be the starting point of inquiry.  Moreover, he argues for a voluntarist 
epistemology in The Empirical Stance (2002). 
In this Chapter, I shall examine the implicit and explicit features of Bas van 
Fraassen’s account of knowledge in his constructive empiricism, empiricist structuralism, 
probabilism, and voluntarism.  While discussing these positions, I will describe van 
Fraassen’s arguments against scientific realism, analytic metaphysics, the inference to the 
best explanation, and traditional epistemology.  Since van Fraassen seemingly does not 
make a distinction between knowledge and scientific knowledge he appears to use the 
same account for both.  Thus, I will refer only to his account of knowledge whether I am 
speaking of general knowledge or scientific knowledge.  Since van Fraassen is the 
foremost contemporary scientific anti-realist I have chosen his account of knowledge as 
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an exemplar of a scientific anti-realist account of knowledge.  Moreover, his general 
epistemology, which informs his philosophy of science, differs radically from 
mainstream epistemology because he argues against justification.  Despite van Fraassen’s 
significant departure from traditional epistemology, he still holds to facticity in his 
account of knowledge. 39   
 
 
3.1 van Fraassen’s Epistemology 
 
 
3.1.1 Probabilism and Knowledge 
 
 
As noted in Chapter One, van Fraassen’s starting point for both his epistemology 
and his philosophy of science is his commitment to empiricism.  While van Fraassen 
began propounding an empiricist philosophy of science before he developed his 
empiricist epistemology, I shall start my description of his thought with his epistemology 
rather than with his philosophy of science.  In many cases, van Fraassen seems to have 
been creating the foundation for his philosophy of science through his epistemology only 
                                                 
39 In Chapter Four, I shall argue against his positions in the philosophy of science and epistemology, and 
thus his account of knowledge appears to fail.  In particular, I shall argue that the probabilism is 
undermined by the mode of hypothesis and thus seemingly cannot succeed from the start.  Furthermore, I 
shall describe how van Fraassen’s account of knowledge seems to fall short of facticity.  Moreover, I shall 
use van Fraassen’s views as a counterbalance to the respective scientific realist claims of Psillos and Bird 
leading to a draw between the three positions.     
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after developing his philosophy of science.40  Since van Fraassen’s epistemology is the 
foundation for his philosophy of science it will be clearer to begin an examination of the 
latter with the former.  
As noted above, van Fraassen does not accept the framework of traditional 
epistemology which assumes that there is some rule or method that if one were rational, 
one would have to adopt some conclusion adjudged rational by the framework (2000, 
274).  For example, the rationalists assumed that deductive reasoning was the method to 
use to arrive at infallible knowledge.  Descartes’ method of doubting everything that 
could be doubted to arrive at least one item of infallible knowledge is one such method.  
Rather, van Fraassen focuses on the rationality of opinion and opinion change (2007, 
337).  This change in focus commits him to (1) a voluntarist epistemology, (2) 
probabilism, and (3) a permissive view of rationality.  I shall describe each of these 
aspects of his epistemology below.  His voluntarism stems from his agreeing with 
William James (1948) that we are motivated in the search for truth by the desire to 
believe truth and avoid error.  There is nothing in the canons of logic that can tell us 
which of these attitudes to adopt over the other, or to what degree we should reconcile 
them.  The epistemic enterprise cannot begin without a certain stance as a starting point.  
A stance is an attitude, commitment, approach, or any combination thereof.  Clearly, van 
Fraassen’s stance is epistemically cautious.  He follows Blaise Pascal’s probabilism 
which disregards traditional concerns with justification.  To illustrate his how his 
epistemology works, van Fraassen uses Bertrand Russell’s (1912) response to external 
                                                 
40 For example, only in his (2007) did he finally explain why the privileging of sense perception over 
instrumentation and inference is a rational choice as a starting point for epistemology.  I shall return to this 
aspect of his epistemology and philosophy of science later in the chapter. 
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world skepticism.  Russell notes that we do not come to the belief that the world is mind 
independent through argument, rather we cannot think of a good reason to reject this 
assumption.  Thus, we cannot justify our opinion that the external world exists, but we 
are rational to continue holding this opinion because this belief seems to be reliable.  
According to van Fraassen, we assume our beliefs to be true and reliable, to hold beliefs 
we think to be false and unreliable would be irrational.  Dissolving the problem of 
external world skepticism (or any skepticism) in this way, the epistemological focus has 
switched from justifying our beliefs to the rationality of changing opinion.  
The form of rationality van Fraassen maintains is permissive.  Rationality 
constrains what we can believe, but does not compel us to believe anything.  In particular, 
rationality provides two constraints on belief.  The first is logic, the belief must be 
consistent.  Thus, one is not permitted to believe p and not-p.  The second is that, when 
we create bold new hypotheses about the world, we can embrace these hypotheses if the 
evidence supports them, even if the hypotheses go beyond what the evidence permitted 
by previous opinion.  For example, scientific realism is rational since the proponents of 
this stance are more incline to believe truth than avoid falsehood.  This position on 
rationality seems to lead to irenic relativism, or the view that (1) there is no objective 
standard for judging the rightness of an opinion, and/or (2) that all standards of rationality 
are trivial making truth a subjective matter (1989, 176).  Moreover, one may object that 
this form of rationality leads to skepticism.  For van Fraassen, “skepticism” is the dual 
claim that, whether objective truth exists or not objective truth cannot be obtained, and/or 
rational opinion is impossible.   
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Van Fraassen considers the possible charge of irenic relativism and claims in 
response that there is objective truth.  Our opinions about the world are right or wrong, 
and what makes them right or wrong relies on how the world is.  For example, I correctly 
have the opinion that I am seeing a cat on the mat if there really is a cat on the mat before 
me.  While this notion of truth seems to suggest that truth is the relation of a statement to 
the world, van Fraassen maintains he is committed to the disquotational theory of truth.  
The disquotational theory of truth states that to assert a statement, and to assert that the 
statement is true, is redundant.  Hence to say, ‘The cat is on the mat’ is true is to say that 
the cat is on the mat.  However, whether or not any of our assertions are true is a matter 
of luck.  Thus, van Fraassen maintains that it is rational to hold onto unjustified opinion, 
and that we cannot have an independent justification for our opinion.  He contends that 
we start out, as in Neurath’s boat, with the opinions handed down to us by our parents, 
society, etc., and that we can only revise these opinions, not find some solid justificatory 
foundation for all of our beliefs.   
Van Fraassen’s account of knowledge is true belief that is rationally held.  
According to his permissive version of rationality, to be rational is to be logically 
consistent and not to ignore evidence contrary to one’s belief.  On this view, to hold a 
belief when there is convincing evidence against it is irrational.  Since van Fraassen 
argues that there is an objective world that determines whether or not a belief is true or 
false he is committed to facticity.41 
 
 
                                                 
41 In Chapter Four, I shall argue that van Fraassen’s views on true belief and rationality are pragmatic rather 
than epistemic, and thus his commitment to facticity seems to be incoherent. 
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3.2 van Fraassen on Theory Change 
 
 
 In his (2002), van Fraassen seeks to provide a sketch of what empiricism is today 
as opposed to the earlier incarnations of empiricism that relied on ontologically suspect 
entities, such as sense-data.  However, I shall concentrate on his discussion of 
revolutionary episodes in science.  While van Fraassen does discuss opinion change in his 
(1989), in his (2002) he goes into detail on how one can rationally change one’s opinion.  
The history of science provides a particularly interesting case of opinion change since the 
changes are so radical and asymmetric compared to everyday changes in opinion.  As 
shall be shown below, from the previous point of view of a scientific theory, the new 
position being put forth is absurd, and the transition to it impossible to justify.  Everyday 
opinion change (such as, changing one’s belief that the weather is rainy rather than 
sunny) does not involve a radical change in one’s worldview.   
 
 
3.2.1 The Seeming Incoherence of Scientific Theory Change 
 
 
 According to van Fraassen, scientific realists hold to epistemologies that see the 
current scientific picture of reality as being true, and past scientific pictures of reality as 
false.  However, scientific realists also maintain that they are open to their current 
scientific image of the world being false and overturned by an incompatible theory in the 
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future.  Van Fraassen notes that this style of epistemology cannot countenance radical 
conceptual change.  As we have seen in Chapter Two, Psillos’ causal-descriptive theory 
of reference is a scientific realist attempt to block radical conceptual change during 
scientific revolutions.  Incoherence arises if one assumes that they were rational to 
believe what is now seen as absurd.  To eliminate the threat of incoherence, scientific 
realists attempt to ameliorate or dissolve the threat of radical conceptual change during 
revolutions. 
The solution van Fraassen puts forth to this problem is to eschew the style of 
epistemology that assumes there is only one true way of viewing reality and that the 
epistemic position in question has acquired this one true way of seeing the world.  As 
shown above, in place of such an epistemology, van Fraassen adopts a permissive theory 
of rationality and a voluntarist epistemology.  The pursuit of epistemology is an 
enterprise with cognitive goals and a “volitional, intentional activity” (2002, 82).  The 
pursuit of knowledge is an “enterprise” because we are finite, imperfect beings.  While 
our knowledge on this account still depends on how the world is, this dependence relies 
on what we count as “successful”.  The criterion of success itself depends on what are our 
goals.  Only after we have set ourselves clear goals can we begin to measure how much 
our enterprise centers on how well we have done something, how badly, and how lucky 
we were.   
To illustrate how standards of adequacy apply he uses the example of 
mistakes in one’s checkbook arithmetic leading to bouncing checks.  Moreover, mistaken 
calculations can result in inaccurate weather predictions, with potentially greater 
consequences than bouncing checks.  Only after we have decided we want our bank 
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accounts to be solvent, or that we want to know what weather to expect in the future, can 
we see what methods will get us to these goals most effectively, and which shall not. 
 
 
3.2.2 Voluntarism and Scientific Theory Change 
 
 
 In terms of scientific revolutions, the standards for change become more 
complicated.  Since van Fraassen takes a liberal view of rationality he can show how 
previous views were rationally permitted in retrospect.  However, this liberal position on 
rationality still does not give an account of how revolutions take place.  The account 
given by Kuhn (1970) is that two conditions must be met for a scientific revolution to 
occur: (1) the old framework deteriorates, but (2) is not abandoned until a suitable rival 
arrives on the scene.  While van Fraassen accepts that the first condition for a revolution 
is often recognized at the time, in the form of disappointing empirical expectations, the 
latter condition is often not recognized at the time.  This is because the rival is often seen 
as absurd by many who are committed to the currently accepted theory.  For example, 
after the widespread acceptance of oxygen theory by the scientific community, Joseph 
Priestly was considered to be irrational and no longer a scientist because of his continued 
commitment to phlogiston theory (1970, 159). 
 The voluntarist approach to epistemology cannot help us to account for how 
scientists arrive at the second condition since we cannot choose to accept a new option 
unless it is seen as a genuine option.  Clearly, there must be a transition from seeing the 
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new view as absurd, to entertaining it, to seeing it as a plausible option, then finally 
renouncing the old view and accepting the new.  To be in a position to entertain the new 
one has to see the old view as deteriorating, and then a rival must appear.   
 For instance, Bohr’s new model of the atom was absurd in the context of classical 
physics.  However, his model could fit much of the recent experimental findings resistant 
to theoretical representation.  For example, this new model of the atom was able to 
explain the lines observed in the spectral line emissions of various chemical elements.  
The success of Bohr’s model raised many questions for the classical viewpoint: “When 
an electron passes from one stationary state to another, how does it choose which (lower 
energy) state to jump to?  How does it decide at what frequency it is going to vibrate?  
How does a photon, emitted during such a transition, choose the direction to move?” (van 
Fraassen 2002, 67).  If these questions could not be answered, then nature would appear 
to be indeterministic.  However, according to the classical view, a theory is incomplete if 
it cannot show that the theory is part of a deterministic process.  The reactions of top 
physicists such as Rutherford, Einstein, and Raleigh were “skeptical, dismayed, or 
dismissive” (2002, 67).  Yet, none of them could deny the incredible empirical success of 
the model.  Despite these initial reservations, this model was widely accepted, and 
questions of its intelligibility were mostly moot. 
According to probabilist epistemology, the way one must proceed in a time of 
crisis has been answered by Blaise Pascal in his famous wager.  Following van 
Fraassen’s permissive view of rationality, one is not compelled to believe any one 
answer, so reason cannot provide an answer.  Thus, one must weigh the available options 
and choose the option that provides the most value.  Clearly, before any of the options 
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can be weighed, the options have to be genuine to the person deciding.  Moreover, which 
decision one will make rests on her aversion to risk or willingness to take chances.   
In the scientific context, a framework deteriorates when more and more obvious 
anomalies appear, calculations become more difficult, predictions fail, and ad hoc 
explanations are put forth.  Then an alternative arises that seems absurd and transgresses 
common sense notions of what nature is like.  To change this evaluation one needs to be 
forced into desperation by the previous view’s anomalies enough to entertain alternative 
views.  This consideration takes place not just in the individual scientist’s mind, but 
within the scientific community.  The acceptance of a new view within the scientific 
community is a matter of negotiation, confrontations and reconciliations, and not merely 
one of logic.  The reason an individual scientist changes from one framework to another 
is that the stability of the old view is not worth the cost in anomalies, that the old 
framework’s cost overshadows the costs taken in adopting a radically different viewpoint.  
Such a change cannot be rationally compelled, but is based on emotion.  If the scientist 
can tolerate the frustration of increasing anomalies, then she can rationally hold to the old 
view.  Hence, those who choose to attempt to fix anomalies in the old view rather than 
accept the new view cannot be derided for their decision.  If she cannot handle these 
frustrations, then she can rationally move on to a radically new view as long as the new 
view fits the facts, and the new view provides novel experimental discoveries.  Thus, not 
just any consistent new framework can come along and derail the old framework.42  
 
                                                 
42 In Chapter Four, I shall argue that van Fraassen’s view of theory change relies on a criterion of success 
similar to the criterion of success that scientific realists use to defend the epistemic value of theoretical 
virtues.  Van Fraassen argues that the theoretical virtues are likely just pragmatic and not epistemic.  
However, I shall contend that his use of the criterion of success falls victim to the same criticism he aims at 
scientific realists, and that his view of theory change appears to be inconsistent. 
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3.3 Constructive Empiricism 
 
 
Constructive empiricism holds that the proper aim of science is to construct 
empirically adequate theories.  A theory is empirically adequate when everything the 
theory says about observable entities and events is true (1980, 12).  The constructive 
aspect of constructive empiricism is in the practice of building models in science that, 
van Fraassen contends, need only have true descriptions of the observable phenomena, 
while the truth value of the description of unobservable phenomena is false since only 
observable entities exist.  What is observable is what can be perceived with the unaided 
senses.  For instance, Newton’s model of the motions of the planets (with the exception 
of Mercury and the Moon) was empirically adequate because the model was predictively 
accurate and thus true.  However, whether or not the hidden force of gravity that was 
posited to account for this predictive accuracy was real or not was left undetermined.  
The empiricism in constructive empiricism refers to van Fraassen’s antagonistic stance 
towards explanation and analytic metaphysics, and his admiration for the scientific 
attitude of keeping an open mind.  Analytic metaphysics is a sub-division of western 
philosophy that seeks to uncover the nature of reality.  Different metaphysical theories 
posit different accounts of how reality is constituted.  For instance, materialists claim that 
all reality is composed of matter in space and time, while subjective idealists hold that 
reality is made up of nothing more than sensations and the minds that perceive them.  
Van Fraassen sees himself as carrying on the nominalist tradition in philosophy against 
the Aristotelian practice of positing unobservable causes, dispositions, qualities, and so 
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forth to account for why the observable phenomena behaved as they do.  The observable 
phenomena do not show a clear causal connection with any unobservable entities or 
processes.  Van Fraassen mentions Molière’s ridiculing of virtus dormitiva as an example 
of the superfluity of metaphysical explanations (1980, 2).  Furthermore, he contends that 
the inference to the best explanation may not be reflective of scientific practice since 
scientists may be looking for empirically adequate theories, and not theories that give a 
true description of an unobservable world.  Moreover, from a Bayesian standpoint the 
inference to the best explanation is incoherent.  These arguments against the inference to 
the best explanation will be discussed more thoroughly in the section on the inference to 
the best explanation below. 
 
 
3.3.1 Observability 
 
 
 As noted above, van Fraassen’s philosophy of science is a reaction against 
analytic metaphysics.  The motivation for this rejection of metaphysics stems from his 
epistemological commitment to empiricism.  Since empiricism claims that we can only 
know what we can perceive, a key difficulty for van Fraassen is to distinguish between 
what is observable and what is unobservable.  Van Fraassen notes that he is not marking 
out the boundary between observation terms and theoretical terms since all terms are 
theory-laden.  He concedes, “All our language is thoroughly theory infected” (1980, 14).  
As noted on page 49 of Chapter Two, Hanson illustrated how merely looking at the sun at 
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dawn cannot provide conclusive evidence in favor of terra-centrism or heliocentrism.  
Following Grover Maxwell’s (1962), van Fraassen takes the term “observable” to classify 
entities which may or may not exist.  For instance, a leprechaun is observable, and that is 
why we are so confident such a creature does not exist.  However, the number 72 is not 
observable, only the numeral 72.  Furthermore, an act of observation is an act of 
perception without the aid of instruments such as telescopes or microscopes.  A 
mathematical calculation is not an observation, as van Fraassen notes, “A calculation of 
the mass of a particle from the deflection of its trajectory in a known force field, is not an 
observation of that mass” (1980, 15).  Rather, the calculation is a representation of an 
observed regularity that is used to predict phenomena.  Thus, the calculation is not a 
representation of some unseen reality, but a device used to carry out experiments.   
 However, distinguishing calculations from perceptions is not enough to draw a 
sharp dichotomy between what is observable and unobservable.  The predicate 
“observable” is vague, but van Fraassen contends that it is still viable because it has clear 
examples and counter-examples.  For instance, a clear case of observation would be 
looking through a telescope at Mars, since astronauts would be able to see it very well 
from close up.  But, the alleged observation of micro-particles in a cloud chamber is not a 
case of direct observation of micro-particles, if what the theory says about the phenomena 
is correct.  The theory states that when a charged particle traverses a chamber filled with 
saturated vapor some atoms in the vicinity of its path are ionized.  When this vapor is 
decompressed, and thus becomes supersaturated, then it condenses in droplets on the 
ions, hence marking the path of the particle.  Van Fraassen compares the silver-gray line 
marking the path of the particle to the vapor trail left in the sky by a passing jet.  In the 
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latter case, we may notice the trail first, and then look ahead of it to see the jet producing 
the trail.  In the former case, we can observe the trail, but not the particle that purportedly 
produced it (1980, 16-17).  Furthermore, for van Fraassen, observability is not 
constrained by what we can in principle observe, but what we can and cannot observe is 
constrained by physics and biology.  Thus, he states, “It is these limitations to which the 
‘able’ in ‘observable’ refers—our limitations, qua human beings” (1980, 17).  For 
instance, certain wavelengths of light are not visible to the naked eye, such as infrared, 
because our eyes are not attuned to longer or shorter wavelengths outside of a certain 
range. 
While van Fraassen is an empiricist, he contends that this privileging of the 
perceptible is epistemic or pragmatic, depending on context.  Following Nancy 
Cartwright (2007), he argues that we have good reason to privilege the perceptible 
because the perceptible is what we experience and want to control in order to reach our 
goals.  Our sensations affect us against our wills and we must react to them to preserve 
ourselves.  He calls this position commonsense realism.  Commonsense realism is a 
metaphysical view, but it is not metaphysical in the analytic sense that van Fraassen 
rejects.  His understanding of metaphysics is that it supplies an interpretation of the 
world, rather than a true description of the world.  Different interpretations lead to 
different contexts from which to judge the truth of claims about the world.  43 
 
 
 
                                                 
43 In Chapter Four, I shall contend that van Fraassen’s epistemic voluntarism falls prey to the mode of 
hypothesis and his commitment is incoherent in light of his commitment to facticity. 
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3.3.2 The Inference to the Best Explanation 
 
 
The main rule of inference used by scientific realists to support their position is 
inference to the best explanation.  This rule states that when we are considering several 
hypotheses to explain the evidence we have, we should infer the hypothesis that is the 
best explanation of that evidence.  Scientific realists contend that we follow this rule in 
ordinary cases, and, if we are consistent, then we will be led to scientific realism.  For 
instance, if we hear scratching in the walls, the movement of little claws across the floor, 
and notice missing cheese, then we should conclude a mouse exists in the house with us.  
The scientific realist argues that this pattern of reasoning should also lead us to belief in 
unobservable entities.   
However, van Fraassen argues that the scientific realists’ supposition that we 
follow a certain rule of inference is a psychological hypothesis, and thus an empirical 
hypothesis to be tested.  He then offers a rival hypothesis that, “we are always willing to 
believe that the theory which best explains the evidence is empirically adequate (that all 
the observable phenomena are as the theory says they are)” (1980, 20).  Hence, van 
Fraassen can account for the many appearances of inference to the best explanation in the 
history of science.  Moreover, he objects that the scientific realist needs an extra premise 
for his argument.  This extra premise is that we are committed to the notion that every 
uniformity in nature needs an explanation.  Following in the empiricist tradition of 
eschewing explanation, van Fraassen denies this premise (1980, 21).   
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Furthermore, the range of hypotheses offered may all be bad hypotheses.  If we 
have only these hypotheses to choose from, then we do not have any reason to believe 
that the best among this bad lot is true.  Moreover, we have no reason to believe that we 
have some special power for differentiating true from false hypotheses.  Van Fraassen 
recognizes two arguments in support of the notion that humans have a unique faculty for 
the identification of true and false beliefs.  The first idea is that we have evolved to 
choose the theories that are most true based on certain characteristics of the theory (such 
as, simplicity).  However, there is no reason to think that true theories offered in the 
future will have the same characteristics as true theories stated in the past (a complex 
theory may be true and simple ones false).  The second notion is that God created us such 
that we can differentiate truth from falsity, but it is not clear that God would have created 
us to be able to distinguish truth from falsity in all circumstances.  Perhaps God only 
gave us the ability to distinguish moral truths from wickedness rather than truth from 
falsity in scientific matters (1989, 143-145). 
Perhaps the most damaging of van Fraassen’s criticisms toward the inference to 
the best explanation is that the inference is probabilistically incoherent.  He begins his 
critique using Bayesian probability theory as his starting point.  Following this theory, 
van Fraassen explains that an agent will assign a prior probability to some opinion and 
then correct the probability of the opinion in response to experience.  According to 
proponents of the inference to the best explanation, after fixing the posterior probabilities 
of hypotheses, greater weight should be given to the hypothesis that is the best 
explanation of the phenomena in question.  However, van Fraassen contends that if one 
follows this rule of belief revision, then one will rapidly encounter a situation where the 
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probability of the hypothesis that is the best explanation is not increased over other 
hypotheses.  Rather, the hypothesis that is the best explanation becomes as likely as the 
rival hypotheses.  Since assigning increased posterior probability to the best explanation 
does not increase the probability of that hypothesis van Fraassen argues that doing so is 
probabilistically incoherent.  Thus, the inference to the best explanation is 
probabilistically incoherent.44 
 
 
3.3.3 The Scientific Realist Demand For Explanation 
 
 
 Scientific realists hold that the supreme criterion for theory choice is explanatory 
power.  Explanatory power is the supreme virtue for the scientific realist because without 
it the regularities we observe in nature would be “miraculous”.  While van Fraassen 
agrees with scientific realists that explanatory power is a criterion in theory choice, he 
does not agree that it is the supreme criterion.  According to van Fraassen, the argument 
that a theory’s explanatory power is needed to dispel the miraculous nature of regularities 
leads to absurdity.   
Van Fraassen begins his argument against explanation by examining Hans 
Reichenbach’s (1958) principle of the common cause.  This principle states that if two 
                                                 
44 In Chapter Four, I shall give a sketch of Psillos’ response to van Fraassen’s argument that the inference 
to the best explanation is probabilistically incoherent.  Psillos’ argues against van Fraassen’s claim that 
scientific realists use Bayesian theory alone to fix the posterior probabilities of rival hypotheses.   Both 
Psillos and Bird’s counter-arguments to all of van Fraassen’s challenges to the inference to the best 
explanation rely on the epistemic value of theoretical virtues.  I will conclude that, since Psillos and Bird 
appear not to have shown that theoretical virtues are not merely pragmatic but epistemic, they seem to have 
failed to have defeated van Fraassen’s challenges to the inference to the best explanation.    
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observable events occur more frequently than they would independently of each other, 
then there exists a common cause for both events.  For instance, there is a high statistical 
correlation between frequent smoking and lung cancer.  To account for why smoking 
seems to be correlated to lung cancer it is necessary to posit an unobservable common 
cause for the cancer (1980, 25-26).  Reichenbach argued that an unobservable common 
cause must be posited to explain observable events since observable events do not often 
have the same observable cause.  For example, genes are posited to explain the 
unobservable transmission of observable traits from one generation to the next.  Thus, 
most scientific explanations would be impossible without unobservable entities, and since 
(for the scientific realist) explanation is the aim of science, then this aim can only be 
realized if these entities actually exist.  As shall be shown below, while van Fraassen 
does not believe that this principle should be universally applied in science, he does argue 
that it can be coherently applied in some instances without a commitment to scientific 
realism.     
The principle of the common cause cannot be applied as a general principle 
because it requires that the universe be deterministic.  With the advent of quantum 
mechanics such a view of the world is no longer viable.  According to the Heisenberg 
Uncertainty Principle, both the location and the velocity of a particle cannot be measured 
at the same time, thus definite values cannot be given in quantum physical experiments.  
Without definite values the trajectory of a particle can only be measured statistically and 
not deterministically.  In order to account for the lack of definite values in quantum 
physical experiments, and make physics deterministic again, hidden variables are posited 
by some physicists.  For instance, The De Broglie-Bohm theory posited a hidden guiding 
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wave that determined the motion of sub-atomic particles.  Since the waves are 
represented in multi-dimensional space instead of three dimensional space, they are 
considered to be abstractions and not as physically existing.  David Bohm concedes that 
he has not shown that these waves exist, rather he hopes that his posit will facilitate the 
discovery of an underlying reality behind quantum phenomena.  However, van Fraassen 
notes that hidden variables demand an explanation too, leading to a regress of explanation 
unless the demand is dropped.  Despite the lack of explanation for quantum phenomena, 
quantum mechanics is accepted as a successful branch of physics because of its 
impressive predictive power.  Therefore, the demand for explanation ceases to be the 
ultimate criterion for theory choice (1980, 30). 
 While van Fraassen concludes the principle of the common cause should not be 
used as a general principle, he argues that there are two ways it can be used in science.  
The first is where applying the principle aids in acquiring greater knowledge of what is 
observable.  For instance, when past frequent smoking is posited as the cause of lung 
cancer, this hints there is a further correlation between cancer and irritation of the lungs, 
or that chemicals such as nicotine are present in the bloodstream, or both.  The 
postulation will be justified if such hinted further correlations are discovered, and if the 
postulation aids the discovery of larger scale correlations among observable events.  In 
this sense, the principle is a tactical rule.  The second way the principle can operate is as 
advice for the construction of theories and models.  A model can be constructed for a set 
of observable correlations to posit hidden variables with which observed variables are 
specifically correlated.  The hidden variables in quantum mechanics are not taken to be 
actually existing entities, but as mathematical objects.  As van Fraassen states, “This 
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[positing of hidden variables] is a theoretical enterprise, requiring mathematical 
embedding or existence proofs.  But, if the resulting theory is then claimed to be 
empirically adequate, there is no claim that all aspects of the model correspond to 
‘elements of reality’” (1980, 31).  In this sense, the principle is a theoretical directive.  
Therefore, whether the principle is a tactical rule or theoretical directive it is not a 
demand for explanation.  A demand for explanation would create the superfluous 
metaphysical weight of hidden variables that provide no new discoveries (1980, 31). 
 
 
3.3.4 Putnam’s Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism 
 
 
What Psillos calls the “no miracles argument”, van Fraassen calls the “the 
Ultimate Argument” for scientific realism (Cf. Ch.2, pp.43-46).  Van Fraassen muses that 
perhaps Putnam’s argument is the final explanation that the scientific realists seek.  Since 
“the Ultimate Argument” claims that theoretical terms must refer to unobservable entities 
and processes, van Fraassen notes this argument’s claim that the structure of nature is 
mirrored by the structure of ideas is a traditional realist argument.  However, while he 
does not think that science operates as the result of “miracles”, he also does not accept 
the Ultimate Argument.  Instead, he reformulates the question as “why we have 
successful scientific theories at all” (1980, 39), and gives a “Darwinian” answer.  
Competition among scientific theories is analogous to biological phenomenon in which 
an organism (or theory) facilitates its interaction with the environment (1980, 39).  Those 
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organisms that do not correctly perceive dangers in their environment become extinct, 
and so it is with scientific theories.  Only those scientific theories that have discovered 
actual regularities in nature survive competition with rival theories (1980, 39).45 
 
 
3.3.5 The Empirical Content Of Theories 
 
 
 Constructive empiricism adopts the semantic approach to theories where a theory 
is a family of models.  This view is in opposition to the syntactic theories of models 
where a theory consists of a body of theorems stated in a language chosen to express that 
theory.  In the former approach, the language used to express a theory is not unique since 
the same collection of structures could be described in drastically different ways.  For 
example, the Bohr model of the atom does not refer to one specific structure, but to a type 
of structure, or class of structures, all with the same general characteristics.  Thus, the 
Bohr model is applicable to hydrogen atoms, carbon atoms, and so on.   
 To better illustrate the semantic approach to theories van Fraassen uses Newton’s 
attitude towards what he observed and the reality he posited in his Mathematical 
Principles of Natural Philosophy and System of the World.  For example, Newton 
distinguished between the true and apparent motions of bodies.  True motion is whatever 
                                                 
45 In Chapter Four, I shall argue that van Fraassen’s Darwinian explanation for the success of science does 
not succeed in defeating the challenge posed by the “no miracles argument”.  While his explanation 
putatively works within the framework of his empiricism, his explanation seems to fail because empiricism 
relies on the mode of hypothesis.  Moreover, he does not account for how past theories that seemed to be 
empirically adequate and successful, such as the Ptolemaic model of the universe, are now seen as false.  I 
shall argue that his likely response would rely on a distinction between reality and appearance similar to his 
scientific realist opponents.   
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the real motion of an object may be, and apparent motion is relative to an observer.  The 
apparent motions are defined by time intervals, angles of separation, and measuring 
relative distances.  These relational structures van Fraassen calls appearances.  
According to the mathematical model supplied by Newton’s theory, bodies are located in 
Absolute Space, where they have real or absolute motions.  Absolute Space is a posit and 
Newton did not believe it to be real.  As van Fraassen notes, “within these models we can 
define structures that are meant to be exact reflections of those appearances, and are, as 
Newton says, identifiable as differences between true motions” (1980, 45).  Newton’s 
theory has some model for every appearance that is isomorphic to motions in that model, 
and is thus empirically adequate.  
 According to the syntactic approach to theories there is an observational 
vocabulary and a theoretical vocabulary.  The empirical significance of a theory is 
matched with the set of its observational, or testable, consequences.  However, van 
Fraassen argues that this view of the empirical significance of a theory is mistaken since 
the empirical consequences of a theory cannot be isolated by delineating observational 
from theoretical terms.  If such a demarcation could take place, then the set of the 
theory’s theoretical terms could not be cashed out in observable terms since the 
theoretical term will differ from the observable term by the former’s lack of observable 
characteristics.  However, this is clearly not the case because a theory’s unobservable 
terms are described using the observational vocabulary.  Van Fraassen notes that, “The 
quantum theory, Copenhagen version, implies that there are things which sometimes have 
a position in space and sometimes have not.  This consequence I have just stated without 
using a single theoretical term” (1980, 54).  Moreover, he mentions that Newton’s 
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Absolute Space, which has neither position nor occupies a volume, can be imagined in 
terms of what is observable.  Thus, what counts as an observable term or a theoretical 
term is based on context.  The greatest mistake the syntactic approach made was 
assuming that there could be a pure observation language.  Such a language would have 
to be theoretically neutral, but even natural language has presuppositions that give a 
context through which to describe the world (1980, 54-56). 
 
 
3.3.6 Underdetermination 
 
 
 As noted in Chapter One on pages 19-20, underdetermination arises in quantum 
mechanics.  While underdetermination is a problem for a scientific realist, it seems not to 
be a problem for the constructive empiricist.  For example, the experimental results for 
both non-relativistic quantum mechanics and quantum field theory are the same.  
Underdetermination is not confined only to the foundations of physics, but to 
experimental physics.  For instance, depending on the convention codes for visual 
representation and the instruments used, a scanning tunneling microscope produces 
images of atoms that are conical in structure.  However, the same instrument using 
different convention codes will produce representations of atoms as spherical in structure 
(Bueno, forthcoming).  The observable phenomena are the same for each theory and 
constructive empiricism is not concerned with the truth or falsity of what a theory posits 
beyond the observable phenomena, but only with the theory’s empirical adequacy (1980, 
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64).  Thus, whether or not the world is fundamentally composed of particles or waves, or 
if instruments create or discover conical or spherical atoms, does not matter to a 
constructive empiricist.  Rather what matters is that a theory can account for all of the 
measurements and experimental results that are observed with our unaided senses.  If a 
theory meets this criterion, then the constructive empiricist will consider the theory to be 
a good one.  If one or more theories are equally empirically adequate but make different 
claims about unobservables, then they will be considered good theories too.  A 
constructive empiricist can choose which theory to use based on other considerations than 
empirical adequacy, such as simplicity or explanatory power. 
 
 
3.3.7 Unification and Conjunction 
 
 
 In practice scientists seem to strive for theories that can be applied in various 
domains.  These domains do not just include areas that are within the scope of one 
science, but also between scientific fields such as physics and biology.  The practice of 
applying the same scientific theory to disparate phenomena within or between scientific 
fields is called unification.  An example of unification within a scientific field is the 
search for a unified theory in physics that will combine a theory of gravity that does not 
break down at the quantum level.  The currently accepted theory of gravity, general 
relativity, works well to predict the motions of large objects, such as stars and galaxies, 
and medium sizes objects, such as cars and bullets, but not the movements of sub-atomic 
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particles.  An illustration of unification between scientific theories in different scientific 
fields is molecular biology which combines biology and chemistry to study the molecular 
basis, such as DNA, of biological activity, (e.g. inheritance).   
 According to classical logic, the conjunction of two true statements is true: 
A 
B 
Therefore, A & B.  (1980, 85) 
 
Scientific realists assume that theories that are true should be able to be unified following 
the rule of conjunction.  The successful unification of putatively true theories seems to 
confirm the scientific realists’ intuition that true scientific theories accurately represent an 
unseen reality.  The successful combination of theories covering disparate phenomena 
within or between different scientific fields seems to show that successful scientific 
theories reveal a unified underlying reality.  Furthermore, scientific realists, such as 
Hilary Putnam, argue that scientific anti-realism cannot account for why the conjunction 
of scientific theories is a standard scientific practice and why it is often successful.  
According to scientific realism, unification is evidence for their belief that the world is a 
coherent whole.  Clearly, the assumption that the world is a coherent whole is also what 
causes underdetermination to be a problem for the scientific realist.   
 Van Fraassen responds to the challenge that scientific anti-realism cannot give a 
coherent account of unification by noting that on his view successful scientific theories 
are empirically adequate, not true.  According to scientific realism, a successful scientific 
theory is comprised of discretely true statements.  However, on van Fraassen’s view, a 
scientific theory is a family of models and not composed of discretely testable sentences.  
To be empirically adequate only one model that purports to represent observable 
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phenomena needs to correspond to the observable phenomena, but the models that 
putatively represent unobservable phenomena do not correspond to anything.  While a 
theory may have syntactic content, the sentences in the theory are not separately testable 
for empirical adequacy.  Thus, the empirical adequacy of a scientific theory is defined by 
the correspondence of at least one of the theory’s models to all of the observable 
phenomena.  The model may represent the observable phenomena mathematically or 
visually and not necessarily syntactically.  Thus, the conjunction rule in logic does not 
apply to van Fraassen’s account of theories since scientific theories are not comprised of 
discretely testable sentences organized into arguments.  In order to successfully conjoin 
two incompatible theories all that is necessary, on van Fraassen’s account, is that the 
union of the two theories is empirically adequate.   
 Moreover, van Fraassen argues that the scientific realist account of conjunction as 
the combination of two true theories is simplistic and does not reflect scientific practice.  
Scientists do not assume that merely uniting two true theories will automatically deliver a 
true conjunction just because the rule of conjunction states this must be the case.  
Furthermore, the scientific realist view assumes that the goal of science is to pursue truth, 
but oftentimes the unification of theories occurs for practical reasons.  Van Fraassen uses 
the example of combining physiology and physics to illustrate his point.  To practice 
Earth-bound physiology successfully a physiologist must take into account the effects of 
gravity on the tensing of various muscles in various postures.  However, difficulties arise 
when a theory needs to be devised to account for the motion of a person in a spacesuit 
walking across the surface of the Moon.  Unless the physiological and physical theories 
have models in common that can be applied to this context, then one must either abandon 
 146 
the attempted conjunction or create a theory that can cover the inanimate suit and the 
living person inside the suit on the surface of the Moon.  The physical theory used is 
deterministic since relativistic corrections are not necessary for physiological phenomena.  
As van Fraassen states, “Physiologists need not make relativistic corrections in their 
mechanical calculations, and can treat almost all processes deterministically (and some 
stochastically which physics implies to be near deterministic” (1980, 87). 
Thus, our interests compel us toward unification, not necessarily a search for an 
underlying coherent whole.  Van Fraassen notes that, in practice scientists rely on many 
“mini-theories” rather than global theories.  While van Fraassen speculates that the world 
may not be a coherent whole, he does state that unification of mini-theories is an aim of 
empirical adequacy.  Moreover, in practice the theories are not combined wholesale.  
Instead, adjustments are made to both theories to make them fit together.  All that is 
needed to combine theories to reach our goals is to find some models in common, thus 
not every model in each theory must be compatible with each other to be successful.  
Hence, van Fraassen states that, “the process of unification is mainly one of correction 
and not of conjunction” (1980, 87).46 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 In Chapter Four, I shall describe how Psillos uses the conjunction of theories in science to argue against 
van Fraassen’s notion of acceptance.  The concept of acceptance will be sketched later in the section on 
pragmatic virtues.  Furthermore, Psillos contends, against van Fraassen, that belief in the truth of a 
scientific theory’s unobservable posits is preserved under conjunction while empirical adequacy is not.  
Moreover, Psillos argues that belief in the conjoined theories’ unobservable posits lead to greater empirical 
success.  He holds that the inference to the best explanation accounts for the success of conjunction.  Psillos 
then critiques van Fraassen’s arguments against the inference to the best explanation and concludes that 
these arguments lead to unintended skeptical consequences for van Fraassen.  If Psillos’ arguments are 
sound, then van Fraassen’s notion of acceptance is untenable, and his rejection of the inference to the best 
explanation leads to unwanted skepticism. 
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3.3.8 Metaphysical baggage 
 
 
 As mentioned earlier, van Fraassen holds to the semantic view of theories.  On 
this view, the models represent empirical phenomena in terms of experimental results and 
measurement reports called appearances.  For example in classical mechanics, to 
represent the appearances a theory lays down principles as to which mathematical 
operators will represent energy, momentum, position, and so on.  A theory is empirically 
adequate if it has a model that is isomorphic to the appearances represented by that 
model.  In the course of representing appearances idealization occurs, but empirical 
adequacy is preserved in the process of idealization.  For instance, as Cartwright (1983) 
has shown, Snell’s Law states only one ray of light is refracted through isotropic 
dielectric media, such as glass.  However, most media, such as crystals, are anisotropic.  
When light passes through anisotropic media two rays of light are refracted very close to 
each other.  Since the refracted rays are very close to each other accurate calculations can 
still be made using the law as stated despite the lack of isomorphism between what is 
observed and the law.  According to van Fraassen, ‘empirical adequacy, like truth, is 
“preserved under watering-down”’ (1980, 67).   
Since van Fraassen recognizes the need for idealization in theory building and 
claims that empirical adequacy can be preserved through idealization he does not hold 
that we should avoid idealization and the watering-down of empirical adequacy.  Rather, 
he argues that we should create theories that posit unobservable entities and processes 
because this practice often leads to further fruitful results.  Van Fraassen calls the posited 
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unobservable entities and processes metaphysical baggage.   Any theory without 
metaphysical baggage (i.e. non-observable claims) would not be sophisticated.  To be a 
sophisticated theory “metaphysical baggage” is necessary to allow for detours through 
theoretical variables to arrive at viable descriptions of the phenomena.  For instance, 
Newton’s gravity was considered “metaphysical baggage” during his lifetime, but this 
attitude was dropped because of the posit’s successes, such as the discovery of Neptune.  
However, when the detour leads to practical gain it is not considered “metaphysical 
baggage” anymore, rather the term is used only for those detours that do not yield any 
practical gain.   
Yet, even the useless baggage can be intriguing since it may be useful in the 
future.  For instance, the “hidden variables” theories in quantum mechanics may lead to 
fruitful results.  From a mathematical point of view hidden variable theories are 
equivalent to orthodox quantum theory in their representation of observables.  Considered 
in this way, theories in this sense are empirically equivalent.  Except that the hidden 
variable models have extra structure, now seen as “metaphysical baggage”, but which 
could be useful if radically new phenomena appear in the future (1980, 68).  For example, 
if hidden variable proofs could give a deterministic prediction of the trajectory of a 
particle, then hidden variables would no longer be considered “metaphysical baggage”.47 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 In Chapter Four, I shall contend that van Fraassen’s position on unobservable entities and processes as 
“metaphysical baggage” can be counterbalanced by Psillos’ arguments that unobservable entities and 
processes must exist to explain the success of science.  I will argue that the seeming strengths and 
weaknesses of these positions lead to a draw between the two views. 
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3.3.9 Constructive Empiricism and Skepticism 
 
 
One might assume that since constructive empiricism will not accept what a 
theory says about what is unobservable as true that, by parity of reasoning, constructive 
empiricism never allows evidence to warrant what goes beyond it.  Van Fraassen denies 
this claim.  As shall be discussed in detail in the section on van Fraassen’s epistemology, 
he abandons traditional epistemology’s project of justifying the beliefs we already have 
and allows us to hold onto our prior opinions as long they are consistent with our other 
beliefs.  Moreover, if our prior opinions do not fit the world, then they must be discarded 
otherwise the subject holding the opinion is irrational.  For instance, if one held that 
mountain gorillas were mythical creatures, then one would be irrational to hold that 
opinion after being shown a mountain gorilla at the zoo or in the wild.  Thus, van 
Fraassen contends that since in everyday life we infer conclusions beyond the evidence 
we have (such as inferring that footsteps in the sand were made by an unseen person), 
and will defend this practice against any philosophical theory that labels us irrational only 
for that reason.   
 Another assumption one may make is that van Fraassen considers observable 
objects and processes to be posits, to be believed because they do the best job of 
explaining and systematizing the sense-data which is ultimately the only evidence for the 
world that we have.  He rejects this assumption since the notion of sense-data has been 
refuted.  Moreover, he remarks that sense-data are not our most fundamental evidence, 
but are themselves posits.  As van Fraassen states, “such events as experiences, and such 
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entities as sense-data, when they are not already understood in the framework of 
observable phenomena ordinarily recognized, are theoretical entities” (72).  However, has 
been noted earlier in this chapter, van Fraassen (2006) claims that the privileging of the 
perceptible may be epistemic or pragmatic in different contexts.48   
  
 
3.3.10 Empiricist Methodology 
 
 
 According to van Fraassen, “The real importance of theory, to the working 
scientist, is that it is a factor in experimental design” (1980, 73).  This view is in 
opposition to the scientific realist approach where the aim of science is to know the 
structure of the world, particularly the unobservable structure that is the putative cause of 
observable phenomena.  Thus, the main effort for the scientific realist is to construct 
theories that describe this structure.  Experiments are designed to test theories for their 
truth or falsity.  However, for van Fraassen, scientists aim to discover regularities in the 
observable part of the world, not to find truth.  In order to make these discoveries 
experiments are necessary, not mere reasoning.  These regularities can be complex and 
far from obvious, hence experimental design can be extremely difficult.  Therefore, 
theories are required to help with experimental design.  
 Theories are used in experimental design in two ways.  The first is that of 
formulating and answering questions raised about the observable phenomena.  The 
                                                 
48 In Chapter Four, I shall argue that van Fraassen’s contextualist privileging of the perceptible is 
inconsistent with his commitment to objectivity and to facticity.   
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second is where background theories are used to facilitate the design of an experimental 
apparatus.  Van Fraassen emphasizes the second aspect.  Experimentation is significant in 
the construction of theories in two ways.  The first is testing the empirical adequacy of a 
theory.  The second is answering questions about the observable phenomena such that 
this activity guides the further construction and completion of the theory (1980, 73-74). 
 To illustrate his view, van Fraassen notes episodes in the history of science where 
 
experimentation was used to test the empirical adequacy of a given theory: 
 
 Dominic Cassini’s attempt to measure the curvature of the earth in order to 
 adjudicate between Newtonian and Cartesian physics, Halley’s prediction of 
 the comet’s return and its observation, the famous watch at the eclipse that  
 bore out Einstein’s theory implying the deflection of light rays in the  
 gravitational field.  This sort of experimental activity fits neatly into the 
 empiricist’s scheme, for clearly it is designed to test claims of empirical 
 adequacy.  (1980, 74) 
 
However, this sort of experimentation is not the kind used when we speak of discovery.  
In some cases a theory states that there must be some entity or value, answering to certain 
conditions, and that entity’s nature is discovered by experimental scientists.  For instance, 
Darwin’s theory implied that there were “missing links” in the evolutionary chain.  A 
search for these links commenced which led to surprising discoveries, such as Java man 
and Peking man, which were still in agreement with the theory.  Clearly, missing links 
are observable entities, so the question remains how the “discovery” of unobservables 
works in physics if constructive empiricists will not believe in them. 
 To answer this question, van Fraassen cites the measuring of the charge of the 
electron by Robert Millikan.  Using the theory of electricity as his background for 
developing his experimental apparatus, Millikan connected brass plates to a battery and 
switch arrangement, which could be used to create an electrical field of strength between 
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3,000 and 8,000 volts per centimeter between the plates.  Van Fraassen is quick to note 
that when he is using the terminology of the background theory of electricity he is doing 
so on the macro-level.  Hence, he interprets “this field is created” as meaning a reading 
on a voltmeter.  Dropping oil onto the lower plate in the apparatus, Millikan observed 
that when the field was on, some of the droplets would rise to the upper plate.  When he 
short-circuited the plates just before the drop hit the roof, the droplet would fall.   
 The background theory stated that we could expect some droplets to rise when the 
field was switched on, since some of the droplets would receive a charge due to friction.  
The theory also states that there may be variations in the speed of rising, and that this 
speed will sometimes be zero (in this case, the droplet hovers over one place).  According 
to the background theory, the droplet hovers because it may catch an ion from those 
already existing in the air.  Thus far, the experiment is empirically adequate, as van 
Fraassen states, “what is happening fits well into various models provided by the theory, 
since all these variations are observed in some droplets” (1980, 76). 
 Now we can use the established part of the theory and observations on the speed 
of rising, to calculate the charges on the droplets.  Van Fraassen shows how this 
experiment filled in the value for a variable in an established theory: 
 But we can furthermore use the established part of the theory, and the  
 observations on the speed of the rising, to calculate the charges on the 
 droplets.  The apparent mass of the droplet is the difference between the 
 actual mass and the buoyancy of the air; call this m.  Let its charge at a  
 given time be e, its speed under gravity v, and its speed when the electric 
 field F is on w; the relation among these quantities are given by the  
 equation 
                                                         
mgFe
mg
mg
v
−
=   
                                                                                                                          (1980, 76) 
Because all of the other variables except e are known, we can calculate e. 
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Van Fraassen describes how Millikan measured the charge of the electron below: 
 When a variation in rising speed occurs, this must then be attributed to a 
 change in the charge, from e to e’, say.  If electrical charge comes only in 
 multiples of a unit u, the charge on the electron, there must be a number k 
 such that e’—e = ku.  Gathering sufficient data of this sort, Millikan arrived  
 at the mean value for u, which is very close to the one at present accepted.   
                                                                                                                               (1980, 77) 
  
 In van Fraassen’s telling of the story, Millikan was filling in a value for a quantity 
which had thus far been left open in the construction of the theory.  As van Fraassen 
states, “Hence, in this case, theory construction consists in experimentation” (1980, 77).  
One could use the terminology of discovery for Millikan’s results, but the constructive 
empiricist position on this episode is that he was writing theory through his experimental 
apparatus.  In cases such as these van Fraassen asserts, “experimentation is the 
continuation of theory construction by other means” (1980, 77). 
 I have included van Fraassen’s position on experimentation to describe his 
alternative to the scientific realist claim that science discovers an unseen world through 
experimentation.49 
 
 
3.3.11 The Pragmatic Virtues 
 
 
Empirical adequacy is not the only criterion one has for choosing a theory.  Other 
virtues a theory can have are mathematical elegance, scope, consistency, simplicity, 
explanation, and unification.  For the scientific realist, judgments concerning simplicity 
                                                 
49 In Chapter Four, I shall use van Fraassen’s view on experimentation as a counterbalance to the scientific 
realist take on experimentation as an activity of discovery. 
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and explanatory power are epistemic virtues because they are considered the most 
intuitive avenues for the expression of epistemic evaluation.  Van Fraassen sees the value 
placed on these latter two judgments as evidence of our interests, and not as criteria for 
gauging the truth content of a theory.  Thus, all of these virtues reflect our interests and 
are pragmatic virtues, and not epistemic virtues. 
For van Fraassen, pragmatic virtues are often sought in theory choice because 
they lead to empirically adequate theories.  Often the theory with the most pragmatic 
virtues is the one that best fits the observable phenomena.  For example, Darwinism had 
more pragmatic virtues than Natural Theology and thus supplanted the latter.  Natural 
Theology assumed that the Earth was created 6,000 years ago by an omniscient, 
omnipotent, omnibenevolent God.  However, geological findings, such as the slow rate of 
geological change and the fossil record revealing the existence of extinct species, 
contradicted the Biblical account.  The Earth’s mountains, valleys, coastlines, etc. could 
not have formed in the short timeframe given by the Bible.  Furthermore, the extinction 
of species contradicts the notion of an all-loving God who creates all creatures with a 
purpose.  Darwin was able to do away with these inconsistencies by abandoning the Bible 
as a starting point of scientific investigation.  With the removal of God, Darwin could 
create a theory was empirically adequate because it could be unified with observed 
phenomena in geology and had greater explanatory power than Natural Theology. 
As noted in the first paragraph of this section, van Fraassen considers the 
putatively epistemic virtues of simplicity and explanation as being pragmatic virtues.  He 
does not see why the world should be assumed to be simple rather than complicated, thus 
van Fraassen does not consider simplicity to be an indication of truth.  Rather, we choose 
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simple theories because they are easier to understand and to use.  For instance, 
Newtonian mechanics was used instead of Einsteinian mechanics to send astronauts to 
the Moon because the former has simpler equations than the latter.  Yet Newtonian 
physics is regarded as false in terms of Einsteinian physics.  Moreover, van Fraassen sees 
our drive to seek explanations as an expression of our desire to have a certain kind of 
question answered more than another, but we have no reason to think that the theory that 
can answer that question is closer to being fully true than the theory that cannot provide 
an answer. For example, Newton’s theory of gravity was adopted because of its 
predictive accuracy though Newton could not explain what gravity is, especially within 
the framework of mechanistic philosophy.  According to mechanistic philosophy, 
causation only occurred when two objects physically came into contact with one another. 
However, as Newton’s theory became more entrenched the notion of action-at-a-
distance was taken on as a legitimate explanation for how gravity operates.  Since the 
notion of action-at-a-distance fit the observed phenomena the mechanistic view was 
abandoned, and a new view was adopted that allows for action-at-a-distance.  But, current 
physics does not accept the Newtonian description of gravity as true or even 
approximately true.  According to Einsteinian physics, gravity is a curvature in space-
time caused by the mass of an object, not a force separate from space and time.  Thus, 
while scientists in the 18th and 19th centuries had a satisfactory explanation for what 
gravity is, this explanation is now seen as false. The Newtonian explanation for gravity 
led to the cessation of wonder among its adherents, but did not show that the theory was 
true. 
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 Thus, theoretical virtues do not lead to true theories, rather theories are chosen on 
the basis of these virtues because they help facilitate scientists’ interests.  As shown 
above, a theory can provide a satisfactory explanation and later be found to be false.  
Explanatory power is no guarantee of the truth of a theory.  Furthermore, a theory that is 
considered false may still be used because it is simpler to use than the reigning theory.  
The more a theory has these virtues, the more useful it will be.  If it unifies phenomena, 
then it has a wider scope of application.  Simple theories require less cognitive effort to 
apply than complex theories.  Clearly, if a theory has both of these qualities, then it will 
be more desirable than a theory that lacks one or more of these qualities.  Therefore, 
those theories that include a greater number of pragmatic virtues will be more attractive 
than those that lack them.   
 According to van Fraassen, the combination of empirical adequacy and pragmatic 
virtues does not show we should believe the unobservable parts of a theory are nearly 
true, rather this combination shows that we should accept the theory.  Acceptance 
involves believing what a theory states about the observable world to be true, but not 
what the theory states about a putatively unobservable world as being true.  Moreover, 
acceptance is a commitment to use the theory to account for, manipulate, and predict new 
phenomena.  For example, the application of Newtonian theory was expanded beyond the 
movement of planets and projectiles to the movement of water in hydrodynamics.  Those 
scientists committed to Newtonian mechanics bet that the theory could be applied 
successfully to predict and manipulate the movement of water.  To put one’s faith into a 
theory’s ability to account for and control new phenomena is not a matter of truth or 
falsity.  Rather, accepting a theory means having an optimistic attitude that the theory one 
 157 
is committed to will be successful when applied in new domains.  Optimistic or 
pessimistic attitudes are not true or false; instead they are vindicated or not vindicated by 
future events.   
 Therefore, theoretical virtues may not be, as the scientific realist claims, 
indicators of truth of the entire theory and reasons to believe in the truth of all parts of a 
theory.  Instead, they are reasons to accept a theory as being true of what is observed and 
as useful in attaining our goals.  Hence, the theoretical virtues are not always epistemic, 
but they are pragmatic.50  
 
 
3.3.12 Explanation 
 
 
 For the scientific realist, explanation is the supreme virtue of a theory.  As shown 
in Chapter Two, scientific realists assume that the inference to the best explanation 
uncovers a hidden world beneath the appearances that causes observable phenomena.  
Hence, when a successful scientific theory has explanatory power then the scientific 
theory has accurately represented the world.  The accurate representation of the world is 
synonymous with truth and, according to scientific realism, uncovering what is true of the 
world is the goal of scientific inquiry.  Since the attainment of truth or knowledge is the 
goal of science, and explanation acquires truth, then explanatory power is the highest 
virtue of a theory.  Thus, those theories with the greatest explanatory power should be 
                                                 
50 In Chapter Four, I shall use van Fraassen’s view to counterbalance the scientific realist position that 
theoretical virtues are not merely pragmatic, but epistemic. 
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believed rather than competing theories with less explanatory power.  Clearly, scientific 
realism has a straightforward criterion for rational theory choice. 
 However, van Fraassen argues that the explanatory power of a scientific theory is 
not an indicator of the theory’s truth.  In his (1977) he contends that scientific realists 
hold to three false ideals of explanation in the philosophy of science.  In his account of 
explanation, van Fraassen (1977) attacks three false ideals of explanation in the 
philosophy of science.  The first is that explanation is simply a relation between a theory 
and phenomena.  This view of explanation is similar to the correspondence theory of 
truth, which is an ideal of truth.  Van Fraassen seems to hold to this ideal of truth when 
he points out that, “a statement is true exactly if the actual world accords with this 
statement” (1980, 90), however, as shown above, he claims to hold to a disquotational 
theory of truth.  Just as a statement’s truth consists in its “mirroring” the world, a theory’s 
explanation “mirrors” the phenomena.   
The second false ideal is that explanatory power cannot be logically detached 
from other virtues of a theory, particularly truth and acceptability.  For instance, Darwin 
recognized that his theory of natural selection was false, but was still explanatory, “It can 
hardly be supposed that a false theory would explain, in so satisfactorily a manner as does 
the theory of natural selection, the several large classes of facts above specified” (1977, 
143-44).  Furthermore, van Fraassen notes that acceptability is not the same as truth.  For 
example, Newton’s theory of gravity was accepted though it could not account for the 
perihelion of Mercury.  The inability to fit this anomaly with the theory is a failure of 
empirical adequacy of the theory, and thus the theory is false.  Yet, the theory was still 
accepted.  Moreover, ‘Huygens theory explained the diffraction of light, Rutherford’s 
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theory of the atom explained the scattering of alpha particles, Bohr’s theory explained the 
hydrogen spectrum, Lorentz’s theory explained clock retardation’ (1980, 98 in Monton 
2014).  All of these theories are now seen as being false.   
The third ideal, mentioned in the paragraph above, is that explanation is the 
supreme virtue of science and the end of scientific inquiry.  Rather than rely on 
explanation as the supreme virtue of theory, van Fraassen maintains that empirical 
adequacy is the supreme virtue of a theory.  A virtue, he argues, can be dominant in one 
of two ways.  The first is that it is the basic criterion of acceptability.  For example, the 
theory is consistent with the facts in the domain of application.  Explanation does not 
work that way, otherwise a scientific theory would not be acceptable at all unless it 
accounted for all facts in the theory’s domain.  The second way is that of being necessary 
when this can be accomplished.  In other words, if two theories succeed in terms of other 
virtues (simplicity, empirical adequacy) equally well, then the one which accounts 
explains more must be accepted.   
However, quantum theory is an extremely successful theory and has enormous 
explanatory power.  The latter seems to be a virtue except that in explaining so much 
hidden variables must be introduced to correct the indeterminism.  The indeterminism 
appears because the more exactly the position of a particle can measured, the less exactly 
can one measure the particle’s momentum and vice versa (Hilgevoord and Uffnik, 2006).  
The introduction of hidden variables was attempted by many physicists, including 
Einstein, to give quantum theory deterministic laws and increased explanatory power.  
Yet, according to the received Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, hidden 
variables are an ad hoc hypothesis.  Thus, van Fraassen concludes, “…hidden variables 
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are rejected in scientific practice as so much ‘metaphysical baggage’ when they make no 
difference in empirical predictions” (1977, 144).51   
 
 
3.4 Empiricist Structuralism 
 
 
In his (2008), van Fraassen introduced empiricist structuralism.  Structure in the 
philosophy of science refers to the mathematical content of scientific theories.  Structural 
Realism holds that the only theoretical knowledge possible is to be found in the 
mathematical structure of scientific theories.  Hence, this view is not committed to belief 
in the unobservable entities and processes, such as atoms and genes, as they are described 
in scientific theories.  Empiricist structuralism rests on two theses:    
1. Science represents the empirical phenomena as embeddable in certain abstract 
structures (theoretical models). 
2. Those abstract structures are describable only up to structural isomorphism  
(2008, 238). 
The abstract structures van Fraassen refers to are mathematical structures.  The 
mathematical structures that represent the empirical phenomena are chosen and used by a 
particular person.  Thus, the only relation between the model and the phenomena is what 
the person using the model in question has chosen the model to represent.  For example, 
mathematical models used to represent the structure of harmonic motion can be used in 
                                                 
51 In Chapter Four, I shall use van Fraassen’s account of explanation as a counter-balance to the scientific 
realists’ view on explanation as the supreme virtue of a theory.   
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relation to vibrations in electromagnetic radiation and vibrations in a diatomic gas 
molecule.  Furthermore, van Fraassen introduces a distinction between appearances and 
phenomena.  Phenomena are observable entities, objects, and processes.  Appearances 
are how the phenomena appear from different perspectives, such as from different 
instruments or different locations.  An example of phenomena is the orbit of Mars around 
the Sun, while Mars’ occasional retrograde motion is the appearance.  In Ptolemaic 
astronomy the retrograde motion is represented as an epicycle.  In the Copernican model, 
Mars only appears to have occasional retrograde motion, while in reality Mars’ motion is 
uniformly circular.  Thus, Mars’ real motion is unobservable. 
 While constructive empiricism takes a semantic realist approach to reference, 
empiricist structuralism does not.  In the former case, terms purporting to refer to 
unobservable entities were taken as possibly referring to entities that may or may not 
exist.  Constructive empiricism seems to take an agnostic stance on the existence of 
unobservable entities and regards the truth value of these terms as neither true nor false.52  
According to empiricist structuralism everything that can be spoken of is observable, 
what is unobservable does not exist.  As he states, “If appearances are what appear to us, 
then by definition, we never do see beyond the appearances…!  This insight, clear 
enough in Locke and Berkeley,…could be the slogan for our entire discussion” (2008, 
99).  When scientists see entities that are putatively made observable through 
instrumentation, as when a paramecium is said to be observed through a microscope, 
empiricist structuralism avers that they are observing an image created by the 
microscope, in this case a paramecium image.  Thus, under empiricist structuralism, talk 
of the existence of imperceptible entities is simply false.   
                                                 
52 Though van Fraassen denies this (Cf. 2007, 343). 
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 Van Fraassen (2008) notes that, in the past, a scientific theory was considered 
incomplete unless it could show a process by which an appearance is produced.  He calls 
this completeness condition the appearance from reality criterion.  While historically this 
requirement has been honored in practice since the Scientific Revolution, it has recently 
been abandoned in quantum mechanics.  Quantum theory is unable to meet the demand in 
the following question, “Does this scientific theory specify, explicitly or implicitly, a 
process, whether deterministic or stochastic, by which this appearance is produced?” 
(2008, 299).  Any theoretical description of any quantum measurement process “does not 
seem to provide a place for the specific outcome in question” (2008, 300).  He is not clear 
on whether or not this criterion is to be expanded beyond the quantum realm to all of the 
sciences, but in light of his stance against analytic metaphysics, this seems to be the case.  
Thus, the image of a paramecium, or whatever else we see through the use of an 
instrument, does not need to be accounted for once the appearance from reality criterion 
has been abandoned. 53    
 
 
3.5 Conclusion: van Fraassen and Knowledge 
  
 
 In this chapter, I have attempted to sketch van Fraassen’s epistemology and 
philosophy of science and how they relate to his account of knowledge.  I chose to 
examine van Fraassen’s philosophy since he is the foremost scientific anti-realist and 
                                                 
53 In Chapter Four, I shall contend that van Fraassen’s distinction between appearance and phenomenon 
mirrors the scientific realist’s metaphysical distinction between appearances and the unseen reality that 
causes the appearances.   
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because his account of knowledge is based on Blaise Pascal’s often overlooked 
epistemology.  While van Fraassen develops an epistemology that does not include 
justification, I have endeavored to show that he is as committed to facticity as those, such 
as Psillos, who adhere to the traditional justified true belief analysis of knowledge, and 
those, such as Bird, who do not.  Rather, van Fraassen accounts for our ability to acquire 
truth through a commitment to commonsense realism.  Thus, despite his claim that he 
follows the empiricist tradition of eschewing metaphysics, he seems to be reliant on 
metaphysics to explain how it is that we can know anything about the world.54   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 In Chapter Four, I shall argue that van Fraassen’s account of knowledge seems to fall short of facticity.  
Moreover, I will use his arguments against scientific realism as a counter-balance to the scientific realist 
arguments of Psillos and Bird.  By doing so, I hope to show that no one account of scientific knowledge so 
far examined has met the facticity criterion and thus we should suspend judgment on them.   
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Chapter 4. 
 
A Pyrrhonist Examination of Psillos, Bird, and van Fraassen 
 
 
 How would a Pyrrhonist approach the scientific realism debate?  The Pyrrhonist 
will critically investigate the claims made by each side of the debate using representative 
samples and by comparing and contrasting arguments for and against their respective 
claims.  The Pyrrhonist will note that there is significant disagreement among the claims 
made by both sides of the debate—one side argues that truth (and ultimately knowledge) 
can be acquired through induction and the inference to the best explanation; the other 
denies this claim and argues that knowledge comes through our senses.  The Pyrrhonist 
will investigate this disagreement to see if they can decide which of the two views gives 
the true account of scientific knowledge.  Both scientific realists and scientific anti-
realists give seemingly persuasive reasons for their respective accounts of scientific 
knowledge, but what their accounts are incompatible.  Since their accounts cannot both 
be true, how is one to choose between these views? 
 In the previous chapters, I have endeavored to sketch the skill set the Pyrrhonists 
use to test truth claims, and to describe representative accounts of scientific knowledge.  
As noted in Chapter One, this skill set includes the modes of hypothesis, relativity, 
circularity, and infinite regress.  In this chapter, I intend to do the following: 
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(1) Describe the conflict between the sides in the debate to show that it seems an 
incontrovertible choice cannot be made between these views.   
 
(2) Instill doubt in the reader’s mind by recounting the criticisms made by both sides 
against their opponents, identifying which mode these criticisms fall under.   
 
(3) Put forward an original argument against Psillos’ causal-descriptive theory of 
reference.   
 
(4) Attempt to argue that both sides of the scientific realism debate fall prey to the mode 
of hypothesis because they explicitly or implicitly rely on stances as the bases for their 
accounts of scientific knowledge.   
 
(5) Conclude that it seems none of the accounts of scientific knowledge examined can 
meet the facticity criterion, and thus they all appear to fail. 
 
 
4.1 Psillos 
 
 
 In the subsections that follow, I shall: 
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(1) Use the Pyrrhonist modes to criticize Psillos’ philosophy of science and his account of 
scientific knowledge.  I will begin with his three stances of scientific realism since these 
stances are the assumptions from which Psillos develops the rest of his philosophy of 
science.   
 
(2) Criticize his defense of the “no miracles argument”.  Since the stances and the defense 
of the “no miracles argument are meta-level justifications for the rest of his philosophy of 
science if the stances and his defense fail, then the rest of his philosophy cannot even get 
off the ground.   
 
(3) However, if these critiques are not powerful enough to instill doubt in the reader, I 
then describe the objections that I and others raise against the components of his 
philosophy of science, such as the semantic component detailed in his causal-descriptive 
theory of reference.   
 
(4) Endeavor to contend that his account of scientific knowledge appears to fall short of 
the facticity criterion. 
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4.1.1 Psillos’ Three Stances of Scientific Realism 
 
 
While Psillos never openly commits himself to voluntarism, he begins his defense 
of scientific realism with the intuition that it the best generator of knowledge about the 
natural world. Ultimately, Psillos’ defense of this putative form of knowledge rests on the 
problems of epistemic risk versus epistemic security.  He states that he is willing to risk 
more epistemically when he claims that background theories are approximately true since 
this increase in risk is necessary in order to move away from ignorance.  By taking on an 
extra epistemic risk, the scientific realist aims to know more about scientific theories than 
their empiricist colleagues.  He concludes that the risk is worth the expense.  This 
intuition leads to the claim that scientific realism is the incorporation of three theses: the 
metaphysical thesis, the semantic thesis, and the epistemological thesis.  The first thesis is 
the fundamental metaphysical presupposition that the world is made up of natural kinds, 
that this structure has definite characteristics, and is mind-independent.  The second 
thesis is crucial to scientific realism, it is that scientific theories are to be taken literally in 
the descriptions of their intended domain, both observable and unobservable, and that 
these descriptions are truth-conditioned.  The third thesis is the epistemically optimistic 
stance that mature and genuinely predictive scientific theories are approximately true of 
the world.  Rather than defend his intuition or the adoption of these assumptions, Psillos 
attempts to show that, once these assumptions are adopted, they can do a better job of 
explaining the empirical success of science than any epistemically pessimistic 
competitor.   
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Although Psillos’ intuition that science is the best generator of knowledge of the 
natural world may be true, it is unjustified.  Moreover, he does not give an argument for 
why this intuition is properly followed or for why it is not in need of justification.  This 
intuition leads, not only to the three assumptions he thinks are the basis of scientific 
realism, but to assumptions about the desirability of explanation and of our current state 
of scientific knowledge.  Without a justification for Psillos’ intuition and his epistemic 
optimism he cannot show why we should value explanation.  Furthermore, if Hasok 
Chang (2003) and P. Kyle Stanford (2003) are correct, Psillos’ epistemic optimism may 
bias him towards thinking that current scientific theories are closer to the truth than past 
theories, especially successful, though abandoned theories.  This bias leads to Psillos’ 
privileging those theories that most resemble current theories as being truer than those 
that do not.   
Moreover, as described in Chapter Three, van Fraassen argues that one can be just 
as disposed to think that science is not the generator of knowledge of an unperceived 
world and that explanation is not desirable.  If Psillos cannot show why one we should 
follow one intuition over another, it is unclear why we should take seriously his defense 
of scientific realism.   
Furthermore, even if one were to agree with Psillos that science is the best 
generator of knowledge of the natural world and Psillos’ three stances, this would not 
compel them to adopt Psillos’ version of scientific realism.  For instance, Psillos contends 
that his theory of reference shows how we can identify natural kinds and block the 
pessimistic meta-induction.  However, as will be shown in a subsequent section, Psillos’ 
epistemic and metaphysical voluntarism allow for one to adopt his theory of reference 
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and come to very different metaphysical conclusions than Psillos.  Chang and Stanford 
make this clear in their examination of Psillos’ mistaken take on 19th century scientists’ 
attitudes toward now abandoned theoretical terms.   
In a subsequent section, I shall attempt to argue that Psillos’ voluntarism can be 
consistently extended to his theory of reference leading to referential and ontological 
voluntarism, and thus relativity.  Since Psillos sought through his theory of reference to 
identify natural kinds, these last two forms of voluntarism should be blocked from his 
theory of reference, but I will argue this does not seem to be the case.  If my contention is 
correct, then his voluntarism undermines his goal of objectively identifying natural kinds.  
Thus, he has not presented a compelling defense of scientific realism, but a detailed 
account of how he identifies natural kinds.  Therefore, his stances fall prey to the modes 
of hypothesis and relativity. 
 
 
4.1.2 The “no miracles argument” 
 
  
Psillos defends against the charge that the “no miracles argument” is circular by 
relying on an externalist justification for the reliability of the argument.  However, he 
recognizes that the “no miracles argument” seems to belie externalism since the argument 
gives reasons for the reliability of abduction.  In response to this challenge against 
externalism, Psillos claims that the “no miracles argument” does not add anything to the 
reliability of abduction, rather it simply produces a new belief about the reliability of 
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abduction, which is justified if the latter is reliable in the first place.  But, even if the “no 
miracles argument” did purport to defend the reliability of the inference to the best 
explanation, then this move would not be blocked by a commitment to externalism.  
Instead, this move would just be optional.  The justification would be rule-circular, but 
this is rationally acceptable.  If rule-circularity were not justifiable, then there would be 
no defense for any of our basic inferential practices (such as, modus ponens).  Even 
internalists have to rely on rule-circularity to defend our ampliative and deductive 
practices.  Psillos claims that if rule-circularity is not permitted for the justification of 
these practices, then these practices cannot be justified. Lewis Carroll noted this dilemma 
in “What the tortoise said to Achilles” where it was shown that any deductive rule, such 
as modus ponens, needs a deductive rule at the meta-level to demonstrate that the first 
deductive rule is sound.  However, the deductive rule at the meta-level needs yet another 
deductive rule at the meta-meta-level to show that the meta-level rule is sound, and so on.  
Clearly, the mode of infinite regress threatens to arise if Carroll is correct. 
 In answer to this objection, Psillos argues that we should trust deductive rules, 
such as modus ponens, because we have no reason to distrust them.  We can test the rule 
through examining various instances of the rule and see that we cannot create a situation 
where all the premises are true and the conclusion false.  Psillos claims that ultimately 
“no justification of modus ponens is possible which does not rest on some 
presuppositions.  All we can do is engage in a process of explanation and defence” (1999, 
87).  To explain and defend modus ponens (and other deductive rules), Psillos suggests 
that we systematize the rule(s), give an account to ourselves of how we should use it, and 
demonstrate that, from the meaning assigned to the logical connectives and truth-tables, 
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the rule(s) are truth-preserving.  A similar approach is employed in the defense of 
induction.  Induction is not truth-preserving, but, if one is disposed toward the use of 
induction, then one can still learn from experience.  Hence, in defense of both deductive 
and inductive experience, Psillos relies on a disposition to accept these rules in the first 
place.  He admits that he cannot attempt to persuade those without this disposition that 
these rules are reliable without using the rules to show their reliability (1999, 88). 
In his defense of deductive and inductive practices, Psillos’ view falls prey to the 
mode of circularity because he answers the question of why we have these practices by 
stating we have a disposition to reason in these ways.  Moreover, by rejecting the need to 
account for why we should accept logic merely on the basis of our putative disposition, 
Psillos makes logic into a “black box”.  Even if our apparent disposition to accept logic 
leads us to rules that preserve truth or reliably generate true beliefs, we cannot show how 
it is that these rules preserve or generate truth.  Psillos stops further inquiry on this matter 
when he claims that logic requires a disposition to accept logic.    Furthermore, he does 
not explicitly allow for the search for an explanation to continue, hence he falls prey to 
the mode of hypothesis again.  Considering Psillos’ commitment to naturalistic 
explanations, he would be more consistent if he suspended judgment on the matter and 
deferred responsibility for an account of our reasoning onto cognitive psychology.  
However, he could attempt to defend his response by appealing to the reliability of 
inductive and deductive practices.  If he took this approach, then Psillos has to show that 
reliability is a mark of truth.  In the sections below shall describe how the criticisms of 
Chang and Stanford seem to show that what Psillos would count as reliability applies to 
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theories he considers false.  Moreover, van Fraassen’s arguments against the view that 
reliability has epistemic value shall be sketched.   
 
 
4.1.3 Chang and Stanford contra Psillos 
 
 
 Chang (2003) and Stanford (2003) challenge Psillos’ understanding of the “no 
miracles argument” by attacking his causal-descriptive theory of reference.  Since the 
causal-descriptive theory of reference is designed to block the challenge from the 
pessimistic meta-induction, I shall use this section as a bridge between the sections on the 
“no miracles argument” and my criticisms of the causal-descriptive theory of reference.  
Thus, this section shall serve as an introduction to those criticisms.  Moreover, Chang and 
Stanford’s respective arguments also seek to undermine the inference to the best 
explanation.   
In the course of their criticisms of Psillos’ treatment of revolutionary episodes in 
the history of science, Chang and Stanford show that past scientists held theories that are 
now discredited as being the best explanation for the phenomena in the theory’s domain.  
In particular, both implicitly challenge Psillos’ causal-descriptive theory by criticizing the 
latter’s treatment of the history of science.  I shall describe Stanford’s criticisms first 
since he deals with Psillos’ main example of the transition from the “luminiferous ether” 
to the “electromagnetic field”.  However, Psillos does devote enough attention to the 
history of caloric that Chang’s detailed examination of caloric will addressed as well.  
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Chang’s discussion of caloric shows in greater detail than Stanford how selective Psillos’ 
history of this particular posit seems to be. 
Stanford contends that scientific realists employ a strategy of selective 
confirmation in response to challenges to the historical record posed by successful but 
abandoned scientific theories.  Selective confirmation is the practice of putatively 
identifying those parts of successful but discarded theories that were involved in the 
success from those that were superfluous.  Stanford calls Psillos’ version of selective 
confirmation “Trusting Scientists” (2003, 918).  Rather than devise an explicit criteria for 
selecting confirmation, Psillos appeals to the judgment of the scientists themselves to 
identify the successful parts of theories.  He claims that the judgment of scientists is often 
reliable in these circumstances.  However, Stanford claims that Psillos’ reading of the 
historical actor’s judgments in the historical examples Psillos uses is “highly selective” 
(2003, 919).   
 Stanford notes that the scientists themselves can be greatly mistaken in their 
ontology.  He states that the embryologists and physiologists of the 19th century argued 
for the existence of vital forces on the basis of the inherently teleological nature of 
biology.  Furthermore, it was the 19th century physicists who claimed that the existence 
of the ether was well-established by the numerous successes of the wave theory of light.  
Stanford contends that if a leading scientific expert such as Maxwell could be wrong 
about the existence of the ether “in so spectacular a fashion”, and then this instance 
should show how dubious scientist’s ontological judgments can be (2003, 919).  Stanford 
concedes that Psillos rightly notes the agnosticism many ether theorists had concerning 
the constitution of the ether, and of the doubt these theorists cast on the details put forth 
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in various mechanical models of the ether.  Stanford claims that Psillos takes these 
theorists’ agnosticism regarding the constitution of the ether as agnosticism regarding the 
existence of the ether.   
However, As Stanford notes, Green’s statement that ether theorists were 
“perfectly ignorant of the mode of action of the elements of the luminiferous ether on 
each other” is evidence that the ether theorists believed ether existed, but that they simply 
did not know how it was constituted (2003, 919 in Psillos 1999, 132).  Moreover, 
Stanford contends that Psillos is assuming that scientists’ judgments are homogenous.  
Yet, such homogeneity cannot be found in the historical record, or in contemporary 
accounts of science.  Bueno’s (forthcoming) example of the disagreement on the shape of 
atoms is similar to the disagreement shown by ether theorists on the constitution of the 
ether (11).  Thus, Stanford concludes that the historical record contains enough 
superseded posits that were crucial to the genuine success of past mature scientific 
theories that the scientific realist strategy of selective confirmation has failed. 
Chang attacks what he calls preservative realism in the philosophy of science.  
Preservative realism is the view that there are key characteristics of successful scientific 
theories that are preserved through revolutionary changes in science, and those preserved 
key characteristics are what the scientific realist is committed to accepting as true of the 
world.  In particular, Chang challenges various problems with Psillos’ treatment of the 
caloric theory of heat.  He chooses to address Psillos specifically since the latter attempts 
to seriously examine episodes in the history of science to support his theory of reference.  
However, Chang shows that Psillos’ treatment of these historical episodes appears to be 
seriously flawed.  Although Psillos’ principal example of theory change is the transition 
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from the luminiferous ether to the electromagnetic field, Chang concentrates on Psillos’ 
discussion of the caloric theory of heat since Chang knows it well, and because it 
deserves more historical scrutiny. 
Psillos claims that he can differentiate between those parts of scientific theories 
that are crucial to the success of the theories and those that are not.  With regards to the 
caloric theory of heat, Psillos contends that the laws of the caloric theory of heat can be 
shown to be approximately true without a commitment to the existence of caloric.  
Against this claim, Chang shows that the successes of the caloric theory of heat were the 
result of certain (now seen as mistaken) assumptions about the nature of caloric as the 
material substance of heat.  In beginning his examination of the successes of the caloric 
theory, Chang notes that Psillos selects only those successes that seem to be clear 
antecedents to contemporary beliefs.  However, even if such an effort were successful, it 
would only show that those elements of past science which have survived into 
contemporary science have survived.   
Chang employs Psillos’ definition of success for scientific theories: theory that 
explains phenomena, and generates better accounts than alternative theories can, is 
successful (2003, 906).  Using this measure of success produces a record of the caloric 
theory’s successes that diverges greatly from Psillos’ list.  Psillos only mentions 
calorimetry, the law of adiabatic expansion of gases, the calculation of the speed of 
sound, and Sadi Carnot’s theory of heat engines.  This list of successes only mentions 
those successes where the beliefs and practices involved were not central to caloric 
theory, and where theoretical beliefs in caloric theory were later abandoned (2003, 905-
906).  However, As Chang states: 
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The highlights of success in the actual history include the explanations 
of the following: the flow of heat toward equilibrium, the expansion of 
matter by heating, latent heat in changes of state, the elasticity of gases 
and the fluidity of liquids, the heat released and absorbed in chemical  
reactions, combustion, the radiation of heat, and the gas laws.  (2003, 907) 
 
He then uses Psillos’ strategy of paying attention to what parts of caloric theory the 
scientists of the time considered as being responsible for its successes.  The most 
significant theoretical assumption was that heat was a ‘self-repulsive’ material substance 
that was attracted to normal matter (2003, 907).  This assumption, when added to the 
notion that temperature was the density of caloric, produced elegant explanations for the 
flow of heat from warmer to colder places, and for the expansion of most things when 
heated.  The chief competitor to caloric was the idea that heat was a form of motion, and 
this theory could not give explanations that were seen as equally elegant (2003, 907). 
 Furthermore, the postulation that caloric existed in a sensible and latent state 
produced further significant successes.  The latent state of caloric meant that the 
substance was undetected by our senses or a thermometer.  This particular postulation led 
to Joseph Black’s most salient achievement in the theory of heat was his explanation for 
changes of state as the addition or withdrawal of latent heat.  Changes of state are the 
changes in physical properties of certain substances.  Examples of changes of state are 
freezing, boiling, melting, and condensation.  This notion of latent heat accounted for 
why the addition or subtraction of heat did not cause temperature changes during changes 
of state.  Moreover, it explained the fundamental changes of physical properties (such as 
fluidity and elasticity) as a result of the chemical combination (or dissociation) of matter 
with sizeable quantities of caloric (2003, 907).  The postulation of the sensible and latent 
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states of caloric was not a superfluous metaphysical fancy, but a notion that was seen as 
being crucial to Black’s explanations (2003, 907). 
 The assumption that caloric existed in these two states was integral to the 
materialistic conception of caloric in Lavoisier’s Traité élémentaire de chemie.  
According to Chang, this work marks that maturity of caloric theory.  Lavoisier 
confidently identified caloric as a chemical element, so much so that he placed it in his 
table of chemical elements.  The notion that caloric was a chemical element served as a 
direct and compelling framework for the explanation of the heat absorbed and released in 
assorted chemical reactions.  During this period, the dynamical theory of heat could not 
account for these phenomena.  According to Lavoisier, latent heat was caloric when 
chemically combined with matter.  If the chemical bond was broken, then free caloric 
was produced and this free caloric appeared as perceptible heat.  The most famous case of 
this was the generation of heat in combustion.  In combustion, the oxygen ‘base’ mixes 
with inflammable substances, leaving behind the large amount of caloric with which it 
had mixed.  Lavoisier’s notion of oxygen gas as a chemical compound composed of 
oxygen and a large amount caloric was securely founded in the overall calorist 
conception of the three states of matter.  According to this conception of caloric, the 
addition of latent caloric changed solids into liquids, and liquids into gases.  Hence, as 
Chang notes, “his explanation of combustion constituted a particularly satisfying 
synthesis” (2003, 908). 
 Caloric was central to accounting for the phenomenon of radiant heat.  Radiant 
heat was simply caloric being tossed about between objects at very high speeds.  Those 
who were not committed to the existence of caloric did not have an explanation for why 
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heat radiated.  The scientific consensus of the day accepted that caloric theory explained 
radiant heat, and did so better than any other competitor. 
 The height of theoretical sophistication for caloric theory came from Laplace in 
the 1820s.  Psillos does not address Laplace’s work during this period instead Psillos 
claims that this omission will not affect his argument.  Chang disagrees with Psillos’ 
claim and contends that Laplace’s caloric theory accounted for a large number of 
significant phenomena, such as, “(the speed of sound, the adiabatic gas law, and the 
regularities that are summarized by the ideal gas law), and it explained these things better 
than any other competing theory did” (2003, 909).  Not until the molecular-kinetic theory 
of gases in the latter half of the nineteenth century did any serious contenders to the 
Laplacian theory of gases appear.   
 Chang contends that, contra Psillos, the claims about the material composition of 
heat were assumed to be a critical function in accounting for many significant 
phenomena.  Chang notes, “Laplace’s central premises were that the caloric fluid was 
made up of point-like particles of caloric, and that the caloric particles, most of which 
were contained within molecules of matter, repelled each other with a force that was a 
function of distance only,” (2003, 909).  Temperature was identified as the density of 
‘free caloric space,’ which was a small quantity of caloric moving about in intermolecular 
spaces, removed from the molecules by intercaloric repulsion (2003, 909).  Because 
Laplace did not know the exact form of the intercaloric form function, he needed the 
following additional assumptions: “the force is negligible at any sensible distances; each 
molecule in a gas in equilibrium contains the same amount of caloric; in equilibrium, the 
caloric-filled molecules are spherical and stationary; and so on,” (2003, 909).  Chang 
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claims that it is unlikely that Laplace’s derivation of the gas laws could be understood in 
an approximately true sense by contemporary theories.  The Laplacian ontology of 
mutually repelling caloric particles has been entirely abandoned by contemporary 
science.  The gas laws are now derived by completely different assumptions. 
 According to Chang, the review of the most important and uncontroversial 
successes of the most mainstream line of the caloric theory shows what Psillos has all but 
ignored in his alleged refutation of the pessimistic meta-induction.  The assorted 
assumptions regarding the nature of caloric and its relationship with ordinary matter did 
carry out crucial work in creating successful explanations, and they were unambiguously 
abandoned by later science.  Furthermore, the assumption of the materiality of caloric 
was critical to the explanatory success of the theory since the many auxiliary assumptions 
concerning the nature of caloric cannot be interpreted into terms that do not rely on the 
supposition of its materiality except with great difficulty. 
 Moreover, while Psillos accurately quotes the scientists of the period, Chang 
contends that he is taking these quotes out of context.  The scientists seemed not to have 
been committed to the reality of caloric even though they did usually favor the caloric 
theory over its rivals.  Psillos quotes Black and Lavoisier as being reluctant to accept the 
reality of caloric theory for certain.  However, Chang claims, Lavoisier and Black were 
only displaying an insincere commitment to the epistemic caution toward all theories 
which was popular at the time.  This apparent caution is difficult to take seriously when 
Lavoisier put caloric into his table of elements.  Yet, Chang’s main point is that the 
materiality of caloric was necessary for the accounts given of the phenomena that were 
accepted, and not the epistemic modesty of the scientists themselves (2003, 910).   
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Employing Psillos’ own strategy of taking what the scientists had to say about 
caloric, Chang has seemingly shown that Psillos’ own strategy cannot support his 
scientific realist conclusions.  Specifically, Chang showed how crucial “caloric” was to 
the explanatory and empirical success of that now discarded theory.  In the final section 
of his (2003), Chang discusses the scientific realist preservationist strategy, reviewing 
what it is that is preserved in theory change and examining whether this review supports 
scientific realism or not.  He claims there are four features that are preserved in scientific 
theory change.  First, much observational data is retained, though in rare cases even the 
data can change.  Chang does not give an example of this kind of change; however the 
retrograde motion of Mars would be one example.  Second, phenomenological laws, the 
mathematical representations of the data, are also largely immune to change.  Chang is 
careful to note that phenomenological laws do not identify causes, mechanisms, or “far-
reaching theoretical principles” (2003, 911).  However, these features of scientific 
theories are uncontroversial, many anti-realists (such as, constructive empiricists) 
recognize the preservation of observable phenomena and regularities in theory change.  
The third and fourth features are the techniques of representation and well-entrenched 
metaphysical systems.  Chang contends that these two features will not help the scientific 
realist since they do not rely on how the world actually is.  Chang notes that metaphysical 
systems, as Quine argued, ‘can be held true come what may,’ (2003, 911).  While certain 
representational techniques and metaphysical commitments have been consistently held 
through the centuries in Europe does not, by itself, speak to how the world is. 
 Chang concludes that the above list of four features is all that is maintained in 
theory change.  Structural realists claim that they have discovered something more than 
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data, mere regularities, oft employed representations, and entrenched metaphysical 
commitments that have survived theory change.  Yet, Chang argues, the structural realists 
“structures” are only particular data-sets represented mathematically in 
phenomenological laws, and (maybe) extremely abstract mathematical structures.  
According to Chang, the foregoing discussion illuminates what it is about preservative 
realism that fails: the elements that are preserved do not make clear what can be inferred 
from them about the world.  Since certain features of science may be preserved for 
different reasons it is unclear if these features work because they correspond to nature, 
because we like them, or because of our cognitive limits.  If the latter two possibilities 
can be excluded, then an inference from preservation to truth can be properly made 
(2003, 911).   
At the end of his (2003) Chang uses the following metaphor to argue against the 
“no miracles argument”: 
 I conclude with a metaphor designed to express this last point.  The  
            metaphor sees the development of scientific knowledge as a process  
            of putting up a building.  A building will collapse if its design goes  
against the laws of nature in certain crucial ways; however, if we  
always work certain features into the buildings we build (such as  
external decoration, or even certain structural aspects), that does not  
necessarily mean that those constant features are linked to laws of  
nature in any straightforward way.  Likewise, in building scientific  
knowledge the systems we construct will collapse if they disagree  
with nature in certain crucial ways; however, certain features being  
constantly present does not mean that we can read off anything 
 inherent about nature from them.  Even if our cognitive activities are  
stable, we may not be able to fathom the reasons for that stability.     
                                                                                                      (912) 
Chang’s conclusion seems to present a serious challenge to the “no miracles argument” 
as understood by scientific realists, but he stops short of calling the success of science a 
miracle.  However, he casts significant doubt on the scientific realist claim that 
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theoretical terms refer to unobservable entities, and that this accounts for the success of 
science.   
 While Stanford and Chang do not employ the Pyrrhonist modes against Psillos, 
they implicitly employ the mode of relativity since they respectively give alternative 
interpretations to Psillos’ history of science.  In particular, Chang seems to show that 
Psillos strategy for identifying superfluous posits in past scientific theories is self-
defeating since the latter’s definition of success can be applied to posits which Psillos 
identifies as superfluous.  Moreover, Stanford and Chang appear to show how Psillos’ 
strategy for identifying crucial posits is post hoc.  In the section below, I shall endeavor 
to show that his strategy seems to be more generally ad hoc as well. 
 
 
4.1.4 Voluntarism and Psillos’ Causal-Descriptive Theory of Reference 
 
 
 In the above section, Chang and Stanford contend that Psillos’ reading of the 
history of science in support of his theory of reference is mistaken.  While Psillos’ 
treatment of the history of science does seem flawed, I attempt to argue that even if his 
retelling of historical events was less controversial, his theory of reference does not have 
the normative power that he claims that it has.  Stanford uses the history of science to 
show that scientists do have a consensus on ontological matters.  In this section, I hope 
to: 
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(1) show that on philosophical grounds Psillos does not compel one to adopt his method 
of identifying natural kinds.   
 
(2) contend that Psillos’ implicit epistemological voluntarism leads to metaphysical and 
referential voluntarism.   
 
In particular, I endeavor to argue that Psillos’ voluntarism, when consistently 
applied to his theory of reference, cannot compel one to accept a certain set of 
descriptions as being fundamental.  Rather, his voluntarism allows one to choose, within 
a certain range, what properties are fundamental.  The range of “fundamentals” one can 
choose is constrained by whether or not the referent seems to exist, and the referent can 
only be said to exist if at least one core description, or core descriptions, fit with the 
world.  Thus, what is considered fundamental seems to be at least partially intentional.   
Using the example of the electro-magnetic field, Psillos notes that one may object 
to his theory of reference by stating that there is an ad hoc element in deciding which 
descriptions are to be considered as core causal descriptions.  He responds that “in 
principle” one can identify and delineate the descriptions associated with an entity and to 
examine them in terms of importance for the causal role attributed to the posited entity.  
The most important descriptions, according to Psillos, are those that pick out the causal 
role a putative entity plays.  If the descriptions ascribed to the entity are not necessary for 
it to fulfill its causal role, then they are not as fundamental or important.  For the 
luminiferous ether, the less fundamental descriptions are those involving its possible 
constitution, such as Green’s elastic-solid model and McCullagh’s rotational elasticity 
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model.  The fundamental aspects of the luminiferous ether are its dynamic and kinematic 
features. 
Psillos stresses that the identification of core causal descriptions is not ad hoc.  
The choice of which properties are taken to be core causal descriptions is determined by 
examining what properties are necessary for the posited entity to play its causal role with 
regards to a certain range of phenomena.  Furthermore, he notes, “It is certainly 
constrained by the way in which the scientists who posited the entity described it” (1999, 
298).  For instance, Psillos argues that “phlogiston” could not refer to the same entity as 
oxygen since the former does not fit the same core causal descriptions as the latter.  
James Conant (1948) notes the following properties of phlogiston: when combined with 
metallic ore it produced metal, it combined with the air, when it saturated the air it 
combustion was no longer possible and the air would no longer support life since 
respiration removed phlogiston from the body (1948, 70).  Lavoisier showed through his 
“doctrine of gases” that combustion involved chemical combination with some part of the 
air, and that part of the air is oxygen.  Moreover, oxygen clearly has different properties 
than phlogiston, such as when the former saturates the air combustion is facilitated, not 
impossible.  According to Psillos, since the “luminiferous ether” possesses the same core 
causal description as the electromagnetic field and “phlogiston” does not share the same 
core causal characteristics as oxygen, he concludes, “although it may be reasonable to 
argue that the term ‘luminiferous ether’ refers, it is not equally reasonable to maintain 
that the term ‘phlogiston’ does” (1999, 298).          
 Niiniluoto (1997) objects that there are a number of actual cases where the core 
causal descriptions are mistaken in some way.  He uses the example of the HI-virus 
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where the first assumptions of its causal properties were simplified.  Psillos responds that 
the initial assumptions of the putative entity’s causal properties may be “exploratory or 
speculative” (1999, 299) and should not be taken seriously until the term becomes part of 
a well-established theory which links it with a core causal description.  When discussing 
why it is that a term such as “luminiferous ether”, despite being linked to firm theories, 
was dropped, Psillos responds that this is a question for sociology.   
Psillos concludes that if the luminiferous ether/electromagnetic field case is 
typical, then scientific realism is on solid ground.  However, if future investigation shows 
that all or most core causal descriptions linked with theoretical terms are false, then 
scientific realism faces a major difficulty.  In order for his theory of reference to work, he 
notes that the determination of the core causal properties must be neither too broad nor 
too narrow.  If too broad, it may include properties that are not necessary for the putative 
entity to fulfill its attributed casual role.  If too narrow, then reference is too easily had 
and becomes trivial.    
 However, as Stanford appears to have shown, Psillos misrepresents the attitude 
ether theorists had toward the luminiferous ether.  The former contends that ether 
theorists believed that the ether existed although they did not know how it was 
constituted.  Thus, Psillos has only shown that he thinks knowledge of the core causal 
properties of an entity are necessary for belief in its existence, but that the entities 
constitution is superfluous.  This, as noted by Chang, is a function of Psillos’ 
precursoritis since the kinematic and dynamic properties of the luminiferous ether are to 
be found in the electromagnetic field.  Since the constitutive features were not carried 
over, then they must not have been important.  Moreover, Chang seems to have shown 
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how the constitution of caloric played a vital role in the explanations of the empirical 
success enjoyed by that theory.  Furthermore, as Stanford observed, the scientific 
community is not homogenous in their judgments.  For instance, as Bueno illustrates, 
there is still a lack of consensus on the shape of the atom in the physics community 
(forthcoming: 11).  These points blur the boundaries Psillos set down to stipulate what 
counts as too narrow or too broad a determination of the relevant properties necessary to 
fix reference. 
The above examples of the lack of consensus concerning ontological matters rely 
on historical and current scientific practice.  But, I shall argue that Psillos’ causal-
descriptive theory of reference is implicitly voluntarist.  This elaboration on Psillos’ 
theory of reference shall be called the voluntarist theory of reference.  The voluntarist 
theory of reference expands on Psillos’ theory of reference by allowing one to choose 
what is to be considered a fundamental description for the fixing of reference.  The 
voluntarist theory of reference fits within the three stances Psillos set down for scientific 
realism.  For example, as Chang appears to have shown of the caloric theorists, their 
attitudes seem to have fallen within the bounds of these three stances.  They believed that 
caloric was an independently existing element with a definite structure (or, according to 
the metaphysical thesis, a natural kind).  Caloric theorists assumed that the term “caloric” 
had factual reference and that what the theory said about it should be taken literally (all of 
which is compatible with the semantic thesis).  Whether or not caloric theorists believed 
in the full truth of caloric theory, there seems to be enough evidence to show that they 
were very confident that it existed.  Moreover, these beliefs were generated through 
ampliative-abductive methods.  This last facet fits within the epistemic stance.  Thus, for 
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these scientists, the constitutive features were considered crucial to establish the entity’s 
existence, not just its dynamic and kinematic properties.  Furthermore, all of these beliefs 
are compatible with Psillos’ three stances of scientific realism.  These historical examples 
seem to show that it is possible to agree with Psillos’ three stances of scientific realism, 
but not thus be compelled to agree with him on what constitutes a natural kind. 
According to William James (1948), objective rules alone (such as, the law of 
non-contradiction) cannot determine what we believe.  According to James’ we are 
pulled in opposite directions in our search for knowledge: we wish to pursue truth and to 
avoid error.  Those who are more referentially liberal are those who are more inclined to 
avoid error than pursue truth.  Clyde L. Hardin and Alexander Rosenberg’s (1982) 
“sameness-of-causal-role” account of reference is an example of a referentially liberal 
view since this position allows causality alone to fix reference.  Psillos gives the 
following sketch of their account, “For instance, Aristotle’s natural place, Newton’s 
gravitational action-at-a-distance, Einstein’s space-time curvature can all be said to have 
played the same causal role vis-á-vis gravitational phenomena” (Psillos 1999, 292).  
Hardin and Rosenberg’s account is a response to Laudan’s (1981) which argues that 
scientific realists must adopt a theory of reference where the central terms in a scientific 
theory must be referential for the scientific theory to be, at least, approximately true.  
They claim that there is no theory of reference that one must commit themselves to in 
order to be a scientific realist.  Rather, one can be a scientific realist and hold to any 
theory of reference, or suspend judgment on the matter.  Laudan uses the example of 
“gene” to argue that one cannot be a scientific realist and believe in the approximate truth 
of genetic theory since the central term “gene” is non-referential: “If there were nothing 
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like genes, then a genetic theory, no matter how well con-firmed it was, would not be 
approximately true. [A] necessary condition—especially for a realist—for a theory being 
close to truth is that its central explanatory terms must genuinely refer" (Laudan 1981, 33 
in Hardin and Rosenberg 1982, 606).  In response to Laudan, Hardin and Rosenberg 
claim to show how one can be a scientific realist and not consider Mendel’s concept55 of 
“gene” as referential:  
It is, however, by no means clear that this thesis must be embraced by a realist, and the  
concept of the gene together with its theories provides an excellent example of why it  
need not. Thus, Mendel's 1866 theory, embodying its laws of segregation and assortment,  
clearly constitutes the first in a sequence of successive theories which are held by life  
scientists to constitute a series converging on the truth. Mendel's theory is often credited  
with approximate truth and still taught because of its simplicity, and the ease with which  
it can be complicated in the direction of presumably more accurate and more complete  
genetic theories, theories more nearly approximate to the truth. Yet it may plausibly be  
reported by a realist that there is nothing like genes, or phenotypes, as Mendel or his  
immediate successors construed them. The particular properties of whole organisms,  
which they construed as phenotypes, and the kinds of particulate units that are transmitted  
between generations and generate these properties, which they construed as genes, can  
reasonably be asserted not to have existed. This is because all of the functions indicative  
of the Mendelian gene are now credited to widely different amounts, highly complex 
combinations, and incredibly diverse sequences of DNA; indeed in some areas of genetics  
the term 'gene' has pretty much dropped out of sophisticated presentations of the theory in  
favor of terms that more accurately discriminate between the units of hereditary functions. 
Accordingly it might be said, by a realist, that there is nothing, no one thing, like the gene.  
The claim is even clearer in the case of Mendelian phenotypes, which have been superseded  
by the immediate polypeptide products of DNA expression. Notwithstanding these facts, 
Mendelian genetics is still represented as an approximately true theory, even though its  
central theoretical terms can, on this account, plausibly be said not to refer. The causal role 
Mendel accorded to genes is parceled out to other entities. In brief, this is done by showing  
that the diverse units of genetic functions—of mutation, of replication, of expression— 
work together often enough to give a false impression of unity and to yield an approximately  
true set of predictions about the distribution and transmission of paradigmatically heritable 
properties, which Mendel mistakenly took to be phenotypes. The units of function, the  
'muton', 'recon', 'cistron' do not "add up" to the 'gene'. This is what makes for the problem 
of reductionism in genetics. To insist that they have jointly the same referent as the term  
'gene' is a proposition on which the realist need not take sides. The scope for according  
Mendel's laws approximate truth, while denying that there is "anything like the gene", is  
even broader in the light of discoveries at the molecular level. These discoveries multiply  
the entities relevant to the explanation of the approximate truth of Mendelian genetics so 
much that they render the greatest plausibility to the view that there is nothing like a gene  
in the sense envisioned by Mendel. The role of the single nucleotide, the non-coding  
intervening sequences and their eliminators, the orders of ribosomal, messenger,  
                                                 
55 Hardin and Rosenberg note that Mendel did not use the term “gene”, nor did he trouble himself with how 
hereditary characteristics were represented in germ cells (1982, ftnt. 3).  However, Mendel’s theory does 
mention particulate units that are transmitted across generations, and this is what is meant by subsequent 
scientists when they speak of Mendel’s concept of “gene” (Hardin and Rosenberg 1982, 606). 
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transcribing RNA, the epistatic and redundant biosynthetic pathways to the simplest  
peptide expressions which constitute their phenotypes, all these make it plain that the  
realist account of the approximate truth of Mendel's laws need make no appeal to  
anything Mendel or his first half century of successors would recognize as a gene. 
                                                                                   (1982, 606-607) 
 
And how one can be a scientific realist and consider this term to be referential: 
On the other hand, the changes in genetic theory in the last century can be presented  
in a manner which suggests that the central theoretical terms of Mendel's theory do  
successfully refer. They may be taken to refer to configurations of DNA and their  
polypeptide products, even though of course neither Mendel nor any other geneticist  
before the 1950's realized that it was these sorts of things to which the terms refer.  
Here reference is severed from detailed beliefs of the theorist, and its success is  
accorded retrospectively in the light of subsequent further approximations to the truth.  
The realist can accept either account of the matter. If he accepts the first he must be  
(and is) able to trace out the relations between Mendel's theoretical claims and currently  
accepted ones in a way that shows why his laws were approximately correct, even  
though they failed to secure reference. If the realist accepts the second construction of  
what happened in the history of genetics, he must buy into a somewhat different account  
of reference, at least for the nonce. Since no theory of reference is as yet fixed in the  
philosophy of science, the realist may avail himself of several alternative accounts of the  
referential success of particular theories, and can demand that his claims about these  
theories' referential successes be judged on a case by case basis, and not in the light of a  
univocal account of reference that he must establish and justify ab initio. Similarly, he is  
in a position to credit theories with approximate truth even where he considers it more  
accurate to say that the theories did not secure reference to what, with hindsight, we now  
hold to constitute the fundamental ontology of their domains.   
                                                                                 (Hardin and Rosenberg 1982, 607-608) 
 
  Hardin and Rosenberg’s desire to avoid erroneous descriptions leads to their 
arguing that sameness of causal role is all that is necessary to fix reference since the 
pessimistic meta-induction shows that the explanations for phenomena based on their 
descriptions seem to be regularly abandoned.  Psillos does not address their treatment of 
“gene”.  If Hardin and Rosenberg’s take on the history of the term “gene” is correct, then 
presumably Psillos would take the first option described by Hardin and Rosenberg above 
and he would deny that Mendel’s “gene” is referential.  However, if he took the second 
approach suggested by Hardin and Rosenberg in the quote above, then it is not clear how 
Psillos would fill in the details of referential continuity from Mendel’s usage of the term 
to today’s usage.  Yet, to connect Mendel’s usage to today’s usage reference he would 
have to be “severed from the detailed beliefs of the theorist” (Hardin and Rosenberg 
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1982, 608).  If they are correct, then Psillos’ notion of core causal descriptions will fail 
here and thus his account of reference fails.  Moreover, today’s usage of “gene” is not 
clear.  As Jan Sapp describes:  
The complexity of genetic information and modifications with RNA editing greatly  
complicated the definition of the gene.  The gene was first defined simply as a unit  
of inheritance, then as a locus on a chromosome, and then as a specific nucleotide  
sequence of DNA, but the “gene” has become increasingly abstract.  As [Philip]  
Sharp noted in his Nobel lecture of 1994, what exactly the gene is has become  
somewhat unclear.  (2003,204-205) 
 
Psillos again faces the challenges presented by Chang and Stanford.  If Psillos 
choose the first approach, then he must carefully choose which of Mendel’s posits most 
closely match the posits used by biologists today.  But, if follows the second approach, 
then he will have to carefully choose which of Mendel’s descriptions of “gene’ best 
match the description given by contemporary biology.  However, whichever approach he 
chooses his account will fall victim to Chang’s charge of precursoritis.  Furthermore, if 
he looks to the scientists themselves to guide him in his search for core causal 
descriptions, then he will discover the lack of consensus Stanford observes in the 
scientific community.  Seemingly, the last resort for Psillos is to accept that the gene 
exists as an abstract entity that must exist due to his commitment to the explanatory 
criterion.  However, a subsequent section shall aim to cast doubt on the explanatory 
criterion and the existence of abstracta.   
Although Psillos does not deal with the gene in his account of reference, he does 
discuss the luminiferous ether.  Hardin and Rosenberg argue that a scientific realist is free 
to choose whether or not the term “ether” is referential.  They argue that a scientific 
realist could see the incompatible models of the ether as referentially significant and, 
because they all failed to refer, as reason to believe “luminiferous ether” does not refer.  
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However, Hardin and Rosenberg regard “luminiferous ether” as referential since it shares 
the same causal role as the electromagnetic field.  Thus, their causal account of reference 
is more cautious than Psillos’ theory of reference because it does not claim that the 
descriptions attributed to scientific terms are true, or nearly so.  Furthermore, those 
scientists, such as Green and McCullagh who regarded the constitution of the 
luminiferous ether to be fundamental to fixing the reference of the term “luminiferous 
ether” were willing to risk error in their pursuit of truth.  Hence, they abandoned the term 
“luminiferous ether” when the descriptions posited did not fit the empirical evidence.  By 
choosing a middle ground between these two extremes all Psillos has shown is how much 
he tries to balance the pursuit of truth with the avoidance of error.    
In arguing for his theory of reference, Psillos does not directly address how it is 
that the term “luminiferous ether” was abandoned.  Rather, he merely states that this can 
be explained sociologically and not philosophically.  The argument he does give for the 
abandonment of the constitutive properties of the luminiferous ether are that they were 
“heuristic devices for the possible constitution of the carrier of light-waves” (1999, 140).  
Moreover, he states that since no solid account of the constitution could be carried over 
into the subsequent theory of electromagnetism, then the alleged constitutive properties 
were not fundamental.   
The term was dropped, or so the standard story goes, because ether drag could not 
be detected in the famous Michelson-Morley experiment.  If the luminiferous ether had 
the same properties as, for example, a liquid or elastic solid, then the light travelling 
through it would displace the luminiferous ether and this displacement could be detected.  
Clearly, the physics community of the 19th century considered the detection of this entity 
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to be important, and that the constitution of the entity would lead to observable 
phenomena.  When the expected phenomena could not be produced, the entity was 
considered to be non-existent and the term abandoned.     
As noted above, Psillos argues that referential continuity was maintained because 
the dynamical and kinematic properties of the terms “luminiferous ether” and 
“electromagnetic field” overlap.  However, if one considered constitutive as well causal 
properties to be fundamental to an entity, then the referential continuity between these 
two terms could not be warranted.  The electromagnetic field does not have a liquid or 
elastic-solid constitution.  According to the voluntarist theory of reference, the 
abandonment of “luminiferous ether” as a term that refers is as permissible as holding 
that this term denotes the same entity as “electromagnetic field” as long as the properties 
held to be fundamental can be observed.  He claims there is referential stability between 
the two terms since the kinematic and dynamic properties of these terms overlap.  Those 
who held that the constitutive properties are fundamental to the reference of a term were 
correct to abandon “luminiferous ether” when no such evidence could be discovered of 
these properties.  Furthermore, if anyone wanted to continue using the term “luminiferous 
ether”, then they were justified in doing so if the dynamic and kinematic features of an 
entity count as central to its reference.  If one is to be consistent, then what is not 
permitted is the continued use of a term when what is considered a fundamental property 
for a term cannot be observed.  For instance, those who maintain that combustion is 
impossible when the air is saturated with “phlogiston”, and who hold that this 
characteristic is a fundamental causal description of the entity picked out by that term, are 
not permitted to use the term since no such entity seems to answer to that description. 
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4.1.5 The Voluntarist Theory of Reference and Scientific Realism 
 
 
The implications for scientific realism of a voluntarist theory of reference are that 
it weakens the force of any kind of robust scientific realism, especially of the kind that 
Psillos wants.  Scientific realism cannot be compelled since there seems to be no stable 
ontology upon which to rest scientific realist claims that science discovers natural kinds.  
The criteria for what constitutes a natural kind, or whether or not natural kinds exist, can 
also be subject to a voluntarist approach.  As we have seen, some scientists will claim an 
entity exists even if its constitutive properties have not been discovered, but will stop 
seeking an entity, and using a term, if its constitutive features cannot be detected.  They 
are not willing to be mistaken about such properties.  But, for Psillos the dynamic and 
kinematic features of an entity are what are required for referential continuity through 
theory change.  Still others, such as Hardin and Rosenberg, allow the same term to be 
used no matter how radical a change in the description of its constitutive properties.  This 
occurred in the cases of “atom” and “Earth”.  An atom was by definition indivisible, 
while the Earth was by definition immobile.   
All these different approaches show is, within certain boundaries, different 
scientists have taken different features as being more important than others when 
deciding whether or not to believe in a given entity.  But all of these approaches are 
permissible since they do not violate any of the three basic scientific realist theses.  Thus, 
whether or not there is continuity of reference across theory change for theoretical terms 
is mainly a matter of risk assessment.  Furthermore, whether or not one is to be a 
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scientific realist is also mainly a matter of epistemic risk assessment.  The only 
impermissible approach is the one that allows for the continued use of a term after one or 
more of the crucial descriptions fail to fit the world.  Which description(s) are crucial for 
deciding this criterion will differ from person to person and depend on how much the 
person in question prizes pursuing truth over avoiding error. 
Clearly, if one does not share Psillos’ scientific realist intuitions and, thus does 
not accept his three stances, then one will adopt different basic stances or no stances at 
all.  For instance, a constructive empiricist would deny that natural kinds exist, hold to 
the semantic stance, but not to the epistemological optimism of realism.  A constructive 
empiricist holds that a good theory does not require any explanatory power to be 
acceptable, nor do they accept ampliative-abductive methods.  Thus, their choice as to 
what is fundamental to the identity of an entity would vary radically from a scientific 
realist of the semantic stripe.  For instance, van Fraassen notes that the ontological status 
of theoretical terms is indeterminate because they may be mere equations or 
imperceptible independently existing entities (1980: 11).  Furthermore, if there is a lack 
of homogeneity in the scientific community about the existence of various theoretical 
entities, then, following Psillos’ suggestion of taking scientists seriously and following 
his implicit voluntarism, we should be allowed to pick which scientists to take seriously.  
For instance, one who has empiricist intuitions may choose to adopt Ernst Mach’s take on 
unobservable entities as a way of systematizing sensations. 
Psillos may object that he has arguments which show that the success of science 
can be better accounted for by belief in the inference to the best explanation, and that he 
has refuted global versions of the pessimistic meta-induction and underdetermination.  
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However, as I shall show below, his arguments against these positions falter without the 
support of the causal-descriptive theory of reference as he understands it.  If my 
examination of his implicit voluntarism and theory of reference are correct, then Psillos 
cannot put the kind of restraints on his ontology that he seeks.  Since natural kinds are 
characterized as existing independently of the human mind, then Psillos must want his 
identification of them not to be reliant on one’s intuitions.  Rather, if natural kinds exist, 
then they are the type of entity that exists no matter our intuitions.  For example, in the 
ontology of non-relativistic quantum mechanics the world is ultimately composed of 
particles, but in the ontology of quantum field theory the world is fundamentally 
composed of fields.  In this case, if the participants in the debate are scientific realists, 
there is nothing about scientific realism that helps them come to a consensus on what 
form of natural kind the world takes.  Furthermore, if dynamic and kinematic effects are 
enough to establish that something is a natural kind, then scientific realists should agree 
that various quantum entities and processes exist.  However, Psillos suspends judgment 
on problems in the philosophy of quantum mechanics (2009: xxii).  Thus, he has not 
shown how our intuitions about what counts as fundamental can be blocked.  If Psillos 
cannot block these intuitions, then his theory falls prey to the modes of hypothesis and 
relativity.  In the first instance, he merely claims the world has a natural kind structure 
without argument.  In the second instance, his implicit stance voluntarism leads to 
relativity.   
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4.1.6 The Pessimistic Meta-Induction 
 
 
Psillos argues that his causal-descriptive theory of reference allows scientific 
realism to overcome the challenge posed by the pessimistic meta-induction.  While he 
acknowledges that past mature and genuinely successful scientific theories are false, and 
hence discarded, some of the theoretical constituents which were empirically supported 
and played a part in their success were retained in the successor theories.  As shown 
above, Psillos example of such an enduring theoretical constituent is the entity that is 
denoted by both “luminiferous ether” and “electromagnetic field”.  Although, this 
continuity across theory change is what grounds his epistemological optimism, Psillos 
concedes that we cannot access the whole truth in science.  But, he does argue that 
approximate truth can be had in science.  Hence, he claims that the entity denoted by 
“luminiferous ether” exists since science has latched on to its dynamical and kinematic 
properties, but was mistaken about its constitution.   
However, there are still clear cases of the pessimistic meta-induction.  For 
instance, leeching (or the use of leeches to suck “bad blood” out of an ailing patient) was 
prescribed for a variety of ailments, such as pneumonia, scurvy, jaundice, and 
indigestion.  This procedure was largely abandoned when the loss of blood seemed to be 
ineffective.  However, leeches are now employed to relieve some patients of 
hemochromatosis and polycythemia.  Moreover, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s theory of the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics seems to have been resurrected in the form of 
epigenetics.  Lamarck claimed that characteristics acquired by parents are inherited by 
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their offspring.  For example, he held that giraffes acquired their long necks over many 
generations of stretching their necks to reach high branches on tall trees.  Contemporary 
biology does not maintain that giraffes acquired their necks in the manner Lamarck 
claimed.  However, in the branch of biology known as epigenetics, which studies 
variations in gene expression that are not due to the underlying DNA sequence, evidence 
has been found to support Lamarck’s claim that acquired characteristics can be passed on 
to offspring.  For example, a Swedish study showed that the paternal grandsons of men 
exposed to famine as preadolescents were less susceptible to heart disease (Pembrey ME, 
Bygren LO, Kaati G, Edvinsson S, Northstone K, Sjöström M, Golding J, 2006). 
Furthermore, neo-Lamarckism is being taken seriously again by researchers in Australia 
who claim that their study of obesity may be the “first report in mammals of non-genetic, 
intergenerational transmission of metabolic sequelae of a HFD [high fat diet] from father 
to offspring” (Sheau-Fang Ng, Ruby C.Y. Lin, D. Ross Laybutt, Romain Barres, Julie A. 
Owens & Margaret J. Morris, “Chronic high fat diet in fathers programs ß-cell 
dysfunction in female rat offspring”, Nature 467, 963).  Thus, epigenetics is seen in 
biology as neo-Lamarckian.   Both the effectiveness of bloodletting and neo-Lamarckism 
can be explained with existing theoretical resources.  These examples show that, if 
history is accurate, then we should be cautious when declaring a “confirmed” scientific 
theory true or an apparently refuted scientific theory false.   
Psillos would likely reply that the pessimistic meta-induction is only a threat at 
the local level, but not globally.  The rediscovery of bloodletting as an effective 
treatment, or of the inheritance of acquired characteristics does not count as revolutions.  
If the latter refuted current genetics rather than complemented it, then this would be a 
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global case of the pessimistic meta-induction.  However, the voluntarist theory of 
reference shows that the pessimistic meta-induction can work globally.  Some theories 
that are seen as false in certain areas are seen as approximately true in other domains.  
For example, Newtonian physics is seen as an approximation to Einsteinian physics when 
applied to medium sized objects.  In terms of the accuracy of prediction for such objects 
this seems to be true.  Psillos argues that for objects that are very small or large, 
Newtonian mechanics is no longer approximate with Einsteinian physics or quantum 
mechanics.  While Psillos may argue that these concepts have overlapping core causal 
properties that allow for these terms to be used interchangeably in this case, he does not 
make this claim.  As shall be shown above, what counts as a core causal property seems 
to rely on one’s epistemic stance.  Thus, Psillos has not conclusively shown that these 
theories share the same ontology.   
For instance, as Thomas Kuhn notes in his (1970) that one of the characteristics of 
Newtonian mass is that it is conserved while Einsteinian mass is convertible with energy 
(102).  As Kuhn states, “Only at relatively low velocities may the two be measured in the 
same way, and even then they must not be conceived to be the same” (1970, 102).  Psillos 
seems to be confusing similarity of measurement with similarity of ontology.  The 
overthrow of Newtonian theory and the acceptance of Einsteinian theory is an example of 
the pessimistic meta-induction on a global scale.  If Kuhn is correct, then Psillos will 
have to show how it is that his theory of reference works in this case.  Moreover, if 
Stanford and Chang are correct, then Psillos’ own examples fail to show how his theory 
of reference blocks the pessimistic meta-induction.  Lastly, if my argument is sound that 
Psillos’ implicit voluntarism undermines the normative force of his theory of reference, 
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then his theory of reference cannot objectively block the pessimistic meta-induction.  
Thus, the mode of relativity seems to defeat Psillos’ arguments against the pessimistic 
meta-induction. 
 
 
4.2 Underdetermination  
 
 
Psillos contends that he has refuted the empirical equivalence thesis and the 
entailment thesis, two premises necessary to argue for underdetermination.  He argues 
that history shows the former is not diachronic.  Psillos seems to claim that when a rival 
theory has been refuted it has been refuted for good.  However, the previous section 
noted leeching and neo-Lamarckism as instances where seemingly refuted practices and 
theories have been resurrected.  Thus, while Psillos seems to have shown how the 
empirical equivalence thesis can be overcome temporally, he has not shown that the 
threat of this thesis can be permanently banished.  Psillos attacks the second thesis by 
maintaining that many of the examples of auxiliary hypotheses used by the proponents of 
the Duhem-Quine thesis are likely just trivial.  He thus dismisses this thesis as a 
“promissory note” (1999, 165).   
Moreover, Psillos’ thinks that he has found a way, through the causal-descriptive 
theory of reference, to distinguish between trivial and non-trivial hypotheses.  However, 
as I have argued above, Psillos seems only to have shown how it is that he distinguishes 
trivial from non-trivial hypotheses.  Following the voluntarist theory of reference, what is 
 200 
considered trivial and non-trivial differs from one person to the next.  Returning to 
Psillos’ example of the luminiferous ether and the electromagnetic field, he regards the 
proposed constitution of the luminiferous ether to be trivial, non-fundamental, and 
expendable.  Yet, those scientists who ceased to search for the luminiferous ether did so 
because the constitution of this proposed entity was supposed to create certain 
phenomena (in this case, ether drag).  Clearly, the constitution of the luminiferous ether 
was a fundamental, and not a trivial, hypothesis to these scientists.   
 Moreover, Psillos uses examples of underdetermination that he can easily dismiss 
as trivial since the differences between the underdetermined theories seem to be ad hoc 
additions to both theories.  For example, he examines the following instance taken from 
van Fraassen in his (1980) where the latter putatively seeks to support the empirical 
equivalence thesis: 56 
Let NM stand for Newtonian Mechanics, R be the postulate that the centre 
of mass of the solar system is at rest with respect to absolute space, and V 
be the postulate that the centre of mass is moving with velocity v relative to 
absolute space.  Then NM & R and NM & V will be empirically  
indistinguishable given any evidence concerning relative motions of bodies 
and their absolute accelerations.  (Psillos 1999:166) 
 
Psillos claims that NM & R and NM & V use the same ontology and ideology for space, 
time, and motion.  He agrees with Earman (1993) that there is no significant difference 
between R and V.  Thus, this example does not support the empirical equivalence thesis. 
 While the above example employed seemingly trivial ad hoc additions to create 
underdetermination between theories, there are historical cases of underdetermination can 
be found involving theories of the physical structure of space.  These theories of space do 
                                                 
56 According to Maarten Van Dyck (2007), this example is not an instance of underdetermination but meant 
illustrate how empirical content can be isolated from non-empirical content.  Van Fraassen (2007) agrees 
with Van Dyck’s characterization of this example. 
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not appear to be ad hoc additions to the theories in which they are a part, but these 
theories of space are not directly testable.  Poincaré’s conventionalism is often cited as an 
example of this kind of underdetermination.  However, as noted in Chapter Two, Psillos 
dismisses underdetermination involving theories of space since they are beyond the reach 
of science to test them.  Hence, Psillos concedes to underdetermination in these cases, but 
is more concerned with historical cases of underdetermination where one theory was 
accepted over its empirically equivalent rival on empirical grounds (such as the 
acceptance of the Copernicus’ theory over Ptolemy’s theory).   
Yet, Psillos’ attitude toward theories of space is not consistent with his position 
on abstracta.  Psillos holds that the abstracta featured in scientific models must exist to 
explain how it is that the models can be approximately true of the entities and processes 
they represent.  He is committed to the explanatory criterion as the criterion for 
establishing the real existence of an entity.  Yet, it would seem that one’s theory of space 
is as necessary for the explanatory success of a theory as any idealization or abstraction 
in science.  Psillos concedes that there are several problems that accompany the 
commitment to the existence of abstract entities.  Psillos does not enumerate them, but 
perhaps he has in mind such problems as explaining how these entities could be 
discovered if they do not occupy time and space or have any causal powers.   
 However, theories of space are necessary to provide a framework from which 
physical theories can be constructed and tested.  For example, Michael Friedman notes 
that when Carl Friedrich Gauss attempted to empirically determine the curvature of space 
by measuring the angle sum of a terrestrial triangle determined by three mountain tops, 
Gauss failed (Friedman 1999, 7).  The triangle Gauss employed implicitly presupposes 
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that light rays travel in straight lines, thus the concept of “straight line” is already well 
defined as the path taken by a ray of light.  However, Arthur Eddington’s 1919 
experiment seemed to show that light travelled along a curved path.  Yet, the results of 
Eddington’s experiment could be interpreted as showing that light travels in a straight 
line, but in Riemannian space where space is curved (Berlinghoff, Grant, and Skrien 
2001, 121).  Thus, there is no way that is independent of the geometrical and optical 
principles being assumed in the above examples to test these same principles (Friedman 
1999, 6-7).  Since there is no direct way to connect sensory experience to physical 
geometry, non-empirical factors, called conventions, must mediate between sensory 
experience and geometrical theory.  For instance, the concept of a straight line is a 
convention mediating between the representation of a finite segment between two objects 
in the world (say, two telephone poles) and the distance between the objects being 
represented.  Friedman concludes, “The upshot is that it is in no way a straightforward 
empirical matter of fact whether space is Euclidean or non-Euclidean” (1999, 7).  As 
noted in the paragraph above, according to the explanatory criterion, the indispensability 
of theories of space as frameworks from which to construct theories should make them 
explanatorily more crucial than the abstracta that represent observable phenomena.  If 
Psillos is to consistently apply the explanatory criterion, then he must believe in the 
existence of all of the theories of space that fit this criterion.  
Furthermore, abstracta are as untestable as theories of space yet Psillos remains 
agnostic about theories of space, and believes that the explanatory indispensability of 
abstracta shows that abstracta must exist.  While he concedes that some areas of inquiry 
are beyond our ability to grasp, Psillos does not remain agnostic about the existence of 
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abstracta though the former are as necessary for the explanation of scientific phenomenon 
as the latter.  If Psillos is to be consistent, then it seems he must believe in one or more 
theories of space.  For example, he could rely on the theoretical virtue of simplicity to 
choose between theories of space in different contexts.  Euclidean geometry works best 
for medium sized objects, such as cars and parking lots, while Riemannian geometry 
works best when dealing with large scale objects, such as galaxies.  Thus, Psillos could 
commit himself to an ontically pluralist view of physical space.  However, if he chooses 
this option, then he will fall victim to the mode of relativity.  If he believes in only one 
theory of space, then he must show how he has escaped the underdetermination among 
them or fall victim to the mode of hypothesis.  Or, Psillos can abandon the explanatory 
criterion upon which he bases his belief in abstracta, and thus consistently remain 
agnostic concerning theories of space.  But, he if chooses the latter option, then Psillos 
will lose what he claims is fully true of scientific theories and, implicitly, will lose the 
objects of scientific knowledge.   
 
 
4.2.1 Theoretical Virtues 
 
 
 Psillos appeals to the epistemic character of the theoretical virtues to help 
putatively undermine the threat posed by the underdetermination of theory by evidence.  
The theoretical virtues, such as coherence with other established theories, unifying 
power, lack of ad hoc features, and the capacity to generate novel predictions” comprise 
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the explanatory power of a theory (Psillos 1999: 171).  While one or more theories may 
fit the empirical evidence equally well, it seems unlikely that more than one theory will 
also have equal explanatory power to another.  The theory with that is empirically 
adequate and has the greatest explanatory power is the best theory. 
However, as described in Chapter Three van Fraassen has putatively shown in his 
(2008) many paradigm cases of great scientists who have eschewed the scientific realist’s 
requirement that a good theory must explain.  In the following quotation, van Fraassen 
argues against what he calls the “Aristotelian ideal” that science must give explanations, 
“Galileo, Gassendi, Boyle, Descartes, and Newton consciously and explicitly refuse to 
take on this Aristotelian task for science, or to accept it as a criterion of success for 
science.  Indeed, they claim that the modern era’s scientific success derives largely from 
their rejection of that tradition” (van Fraassen 2008: 278).  For example, Newton refused 
to give an account of gravitation in his mechanics, but his theory was still seen as 
successful because of its predictive power.  Moreover, quantum phenomena cannot be 
given causal explanations, but quantum mechanics is also considered successful because 
of its predictive accuracy.  Furthermore, as sketched in Chapter Three, van Fraassen 
appears to have shown how theoretical virtues are used to generate pragmatic results 
rather than for their putative epistemic virtues. 
 Psillos contends that the theoretical values, which together constitute a theory’s 
explanatory power, are the same values that meet the criteria for calling a statement true.  
He notes that the challenge is to show which explanatory virtues are related to the 
likelihood of a theory’s truth.  As shown in Chapter Two, he contends that the virtues 
which constitute the explanatory power of a theory are indirectly evidential.  The 
 205 
background theories, which scientists use to gauge the theoretical plausibility of new 
theories, are those with the greatest evidential support and theoretical virtues.  The 
background theories’ evidential support and theoretical plausibility are preserved, and 
appear in, the new theories which they warrant.  Thus, the virtues which make up 
explanatory power become evidential because they appear in theories which have 
achieved theoretical plausibility and evidential support.    
Psillos recognizes that, though the best theory we have now may be replaced by 
another that possesses more comprehensive and superior evidential support, this 
possibility does not undermine the nearness to the truth of the overthrown theory.  Rather, 
such an occurrence only shows that we cannot attain the truth all at one time, and that our 
conclusions from the empirical evidence to verisimilitude can become more polished and 
that we should be more cautious.  Furthermore, “they should commit us only to the 
theoretical constituents that do enjoy evidential support to the successes of the superseded 
theory” (1999, 175).  The theory of justification Psillos invokes to support his claims is 
reliabilism.  This method of justification rests on naturalism, and hence, reliabilism itself 
is judged empirically by its ability to produce and maintain true beliefs.  However, Psillos 
has not shown that reliabilism is epistemic.  As sketched above in the section of Chang 
and Stanford, both have indirectly argued that theories that are now seen as false would 
have been considered true by reliabilist standards.  Both do directly contend that these 
discarded theories fit the theoretical virtues that Psillos claims are epistemic.  If Psillos 
has failed to show how these theories could have been reliable but false, then he has not 
shown that theoretical virtues are epistemic.   
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In the quote in the paragraph above, Psillos implicitly argues that there is 
referential continuity among certain key terms during theory change.  He makes this 
implication based on his causal-descriptive theory of reference.  Based on this theory of 
reference, Psillos claims certain terms in the theory are explanatorily necessary and the 
reference of these terms is carried over into the theories that supersede them in 
revolutions.  Yet, following the voluntarist theory of reference, Psillos cannot compel us 
to believe that underdetermination has been defeated.  As shown above, using the 
examples of the change from Newtonian to Einsteinian mechanics and from the 
luminiferous ether to the electromagnetic field, what counts as a fundamental constituent 
of a theory has a voluntarist aspect to it.  In the former case, the similarity of the 
measurement of mass is similarity enough for Psillos and Earman, but for those, such as 
Kuhn, who attach fundamental importance to the constitutive description of mass, the 
similarity of measurement is not enough to allow for referential continuity.  As argued by 
Stanford, the same applies in the example of the luminiferous ether and the 
electromagnetic field.  In the case of the Einsteinian revolution, for those who do not 
accept referential continuity between the Newtonian and Einsteinian theories, the 
impressive number of theoretical virtues that Newtonian mechanics possesses does not 
make it true.  Therefore, the theoretical virtues do not appear to make a theory true, or 
even nearer to the truth.  While Einsteinian mechanics superseded Newtonian mechanics 
because it possessed more of the theoretical virtues, if referential continuity is not 
allowed, then the theoretical virtues do not show an accumulation of nearness to truth.  If 
an increase in nearness to truth is blocked, then the theoretical virtues are not epistemic. 
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4.3 Truth 
 
 
Psillos is committed to a correspondence theory of truth.  He holds that if we do 
not have to be certain of the truth of a claim to warrant its belief, then we can judge the 
truth of the claim.  Psillos claims that there is a certain point at which there is sufficient 
evidence to warrant a belief.  Furthermore, if the warrant for the belief is based on a 
reliable method, then no extra assurance for the belief is required.  He concedes that the 
belief warranted by a reliable method could be false, but this is to be expected since 
reliable methods do not guarantee certainty.  For instance, sight is regarded as a reliable 
method for obtaining true information about the world, however sometimes our sight 
tricks us, as with the apparent retrograde motion of Mars.  Moreover, he contends that 
once a certain threshold of evidence has been reached, then belief in the claim in question 
is rational, despite the logical possibility that the belief could be false.   
 However, Psillos does not tell us how much evidence is necessary before a 
sufficient amount of evidence has been accumulated to warrant belief.  If I have 
successfully shown that Psillos is implicitly committed to a voluntarist epistemology, 
then, (following a voluntarist epistemology) the amount of evidence to warrant a belief 
depends on the interests of the inquirer.  Furthermore, the judgment of how fallible 
reliable methods are for obtaining true beliefs also relies on the interests of the inquirer.  
In the both cases, the threat of underdetermination and the pessimistic meta-induction 
vary with the amount of risk an inquirer is willing to take in being wrong.  In the latter 
case, the voluntarist theory of reference becomes salient.  Psillos seems to suggest that 
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the fallibility of reliable methods is something remote since his causal-descriptive theory 
of reference claims to show ontological stability in successful theories during scientific 
revolutions. 
But, as I have attempted to show in this chapter, which descriptions are crucial to 
warrant belief in an entity varies with the interests of the inquirer.  As Stanford has 
putatively shown, for some inquirers the constitutive properties are crucial to the 
reference of a term, for others (such as Psillos) they are not.  Thus, if a putatively reliable 
method cannot give the correct description of a posited entity, and this happened often in 
the history of science, then the pessimistic meta-induction is more than a mere logical 
possibility, but a genuine threat to truth claims.  If the transition from the luminiferous 
ether and caloric are to be considered test cases for the viability of Psillos’ epistemology 
and theory of reference, then Stanford and Chang have presented seemingly serious 
challenges to Psillos’ claim that he has refuted the pessimistic meta-induction.  Moreover, 
as noted in the example of the theorists and experimenters in quantum mechanics, there is 
a lack of agreement in ontology even within the contemporary community of physicists.  
As this instance appears to have shown, the two groups of inquirers different interests 
shapes their ontology, and, despite their incompatible ontologies, they are still able to 
reliably produce predictions.   
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4.3.1 Psillos’ Success Argument 
 
 
As noted in Chapter Two, Psillos responds to two challenges to the ability of 
science to acquire objective truth about the world.  The first challenge is that the world 
cannot be independent of us since we causally interact with it; the relation we have with 
the world is a reciprocal one.  The second challenge is that, because of this reciprocal 
relation, all of the information we receive from interaction with the world is 
contaminated.  The upshot for the correspondence theory of truth is that we cannot have a 
correspondence relation between statements and a world that is independent of us.   
Psillos’ response to these challenges is that our causal interactions provide us with 
our knowledge of the world, and that our knowledge is thus of interacted with objects.  
Whatever truth we acquire of them is not logically dependent on methods of verification, 
justification, and so on.  These objects are independent of us in a logical, not causal 
sense, they are not the result of our theorizing and conceptualizations.  Psillos concludes 
that, accepting that we acquire truth about entities causally, these challenges can be 
defeated by the scientific realist.      
Bolstering his response to these challenges is Psillos’ success argument which 
states that, “an appeal to truth-conditions is essentially involved in the explanation of why 
successful actions are successful.  This explanation is based on the claim that the truth-
conditions of the belief(s) on which successful actions were based have been realised” 
(1999, 247).  Thus, what makes an action based on certain beliefs successful is that the 
belief’s truth-conditions are realized.  The beliefs that are systematically successful are 
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those whose truth conditions are the realization of “referred-to entities standing in the 
referred-to relations” (1999, 248).  This reference relation is the correspondence relation 
between beliefs on which successful actions have been carried out and the world.     
Psillos’ responses seemingly do not refute these challenges.  Psillos has not 
address the odd results of quantum mechanics where the very act of observation seems to 
affect an experiment’s outcome.  For instance, in Wheeler’s delayed choice experiment, 
the measurement of the particle seems to determine how the particle passes through the 
double slits, hence also determining its state as a wave or particle.  Moreover, Psillos’ 
argument against these challenges is based on nothing more than the metaphysical stance.  
Psillos claims that the “basic philosophical presupposition of scientific realism” is that 
there is a natural-kind world independent of our minds (1999, xix).  Hence, his argument 
that the truth we acquire about natural kinds presupposes there are natural kinds for us to 
discover the truth about.  Since he does not argue for this claim his commitment to the 
metaphysical stance falls prey to the mode of hypothesis.  He relies on the causal-
descriptive theory of reference to show how natural kinds can be identified and how the 
terms that putatively refer to them does so.   
However, if my argument that the causal-descriptive theory of reference is 
implicitly voluntarist is correct, then Psillos has not presented an objective method for 
accomplishing these tasks.  Rather all Psillos has shown is that he assumes the existence 
of natural kinds and his theory of reference shows what he considers to indicative of 
natural kinds.  Moreover, if Stanford and Chang are correct, then Psillos has not refuted 
the pessimistic meta-induction.  In particular, Chang describes how Lavoisier went so far 
as to include caloric in his table of elements.  Therefore, Lavoisier seems to have 
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regarded caloric to have been what Psillos describes as a “natural kind”.  While Psillos 
claims that his epistemology is fallibilist, Chang and Stanford chose examples of 
discarded theories that Psillos is confident are clear instances of non-referential, non-
explanatory, and trivial theoretical terms.  Thus, Psillos’ theory of reference appears not 
to have shown how we can know that a scientific theory is false, much less that science 
can acquire truth about a mind-independent world.  If Psillos cannot show that science 
acquires truth about a mind-independent world, then scientific realism fails. 
Psillos’ success argument rests on his argument that reliability is an epistemic 
value.  However, predictive success and control of nature can be had with beliefs that are 
now seen as false, or false by a certain community.  Chang has apparently shown how it 
is that the caloric theory, though now seen as false, was successful.  Stanford seems to 
have to have shown that the constitutive properties of the luminiferous ether were crucial 
in the abandonment of this concept in favor of the electromagnetic field.  If my argument 
that Psillos’ theory of reference is implicitly voluntarist is sound, then whether or not 
entities referred-to stand in the referred-to relations depends on the interests of the 
inquirer.   
In response to Psillos’ argument that we gain true beliefs about the objects we are 
manipulating when we manipulate them, I contend that it is not clear what it is that we 
are apparently manipulating.  If the pessimistic meta-induction is cogent and the 
underdetermination thesis is sound, then successful experiments do not give us 
knowledge of what is being manipulated to create successful scientific outcomes.  If 
Chang and Stanford are correct, then Psillos has not defeated the challenge posed by the 
pessimistic meta-induction.  If Peter Galison (1997) is correct, then there are many 
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instances of underdetermination that do not pose a problem for the acquisition of reliable 
results.  Psillos may respond to this latter objection that cases of underdetermination are 
eventually settled.  However, this is a promissory note.  As noted earlier in this chapter, 
the ontological status of the gene has gone from being an abstract entity early in the 
twentieth century to being a locus on a chromosome, then a specific nucleotide sequence, 
and now back to being an abstract entity (Sapp 2003: 204-205).  Thus, if we cannot settle 
once and for all what it is that we are manipulating (especially concerning posits as 
explanatorily crucial as the gene), then we do not seem to gain propositional knowledge 
of what we are apparently manipulating.   
To counter the above objection, Psillos may rely on instrumentation to argue that 
we now have greater knowledge of the imperceptible world because we can observe it 
through instruments.  Yet, van Fraassen (2008) contends that when we employ 
instruments to “aid” our senses we seem to be creating phenomena instead of uncovering 
a hidden world of natural kinds.  For instance, the microscope creates new phenomena, 
such as paramecium, to be accounted for by our theories.  These phenomena are also 
created by nature as optical phenomena on a par with rainbows and reflections in the 
water.  These phenomena are spoken of as if they were things, but we are wrong to do so 
since they are not material objects.  For example, the rainbow is not a material arch 
though it looks that way.  Moreover, the rainbow seems to be in different locations, but 
with respect to the different visual fields of two different people since “we would see the 
colors ‘attached’ to the same part of the cloud, modulo parallax” (2008, 102).  If the 
people say they are seeing two rainbows, then they are not counting the same thing, 
especially since what they would be counting is not a thing.  Furthermore, they are not 
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hallucinating since the former are subjective and private experiences while the experience 
of seeing a rainbow is public.  However, seeing a rainbow is akin to a subjective 
hallucination because the people who see them do not see real things.  A rainbow is a 
public hallucination created by nature.  As van Fraassen states, “So public, in fact, that 
the camera captures them as well!” (2008, 103).   
The images a microscope produces can be considered of real things.  The 
scientific realist will use the inference to the best explanation to conclude that 
unobservable entities are responsible for the images being seen in the microscope.  Van 
Fraassen claims to agree with the core of their argument, but not with its conclusion.  He 
contends that, while the success of the microscope does partly derive from their potential 
to represent the images they produce as things that exist independently of the instruments 
that produce them, they are like the rainbow in that they can be examined publicly and 
are produced optically.  However, unlike the rainbow (which is not real), the phenomena 
produced by the microscope need not be regarded as real (there is an element of choice 
that does not exist with the rainbow).  The image we see in the microscope may be a copy 
of a real thing invisible to the unaided eye, or a public hallucination.   
Adopting an agnostic stance on this topic does not stop us from gathering 
empirically presentable evidence through a microscope, or to base our practice (e.g. 
medical practice) on what the microscope shows us.  In particular, the significant 
correlations between the products of different instruments in like situations, and between 
the products of the same instrument in a situation which can vary, do not need to be 
accounted for by unobservable external causes to be coherent or useful.  We can make 
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images in predictable ways since we are capturing regularities in the phenomena between 
the objects and events being examined, and the relations between them (2008, 109).   
Psillos would object that the inference to the best explanation shows that 
unobservable entities are necessary to account for the cause of what we are seeing under 
the microscope.  However, the pessimistic meta-induction and underdetermination are 
two challenges to this form of inference.  In the first instance, there have been theories 
(such as Newton’s) that were seen as the best explanations of some phenomena (e.g. the 
orbits of the planets) that are radically different from the theories used to explain the 
same phenomena now.  Moreover, the underdetermination thesis shows that the same 
phenomena can be explained by two or more theories.  Galison has described how 
different sub-communities within physics can be committed to different ontologies since 
one ontology works better in one context rather than another.  As argued earlier, Psillos’ 
use of the inference to the best explanation relies on his theory of reference.  However, 
his theory of reference is a voluntarist theory of reference, where what counts as a 
fundamental description of a posited entity relies significantly on the interests of the 
person positing the entity.  Depending on the interests of the inquirer, different 
explanations will arise based on different fundamental descriptions of posits.  Hence, 
what counts as the best explanation for a given phenomenon relies on the interests of the 
inquirer. 
For instance, as Mara Beller (1999), in her examination of quantum physics, 
notes: “The proliferation of opinions, or perspectives, on the wave-particle issue was 
connected with the ambiguity of designating terms.  There was no agreement on the 
necessary and sufficient attributes of a particle” (1999, 232).  For example, Erwin 
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Schrödinger thought the concept of the particle was obsolete since particles could no 
longer be distinguished from one another under the new quantum statistics.  Thus, he 
adopted the wave ontology.  Niels Bohr saw this phenomena as a limit on the classical 
concept of “particle”, not a reason to abandon the concept altogether.  According to 
Richard Feynman, the electron was neither a wave nor a particle (1999, 233).  As Beller 
states, “Difficulties in the discussion of the wave-particle issue were further aggravated 
by disagreement about which (wave or particle) attributes are ‘essential’ and which are 
merely artifacts of interaction” (1999, 233).  She goes on to note that this ambiguity has 
been theoretically fruitful from the beginnings of quantum theory until today.  For 
example, William Duane, Pascual Jordan, and other physicists did not see the diffraction 
of light (or matter) to indicate that it had a wave nature.  Rather, diffraction was simply 
an artifact of the quantized structure of the grating used in the experiment. 
Thus, from the examples given above, Psillos has seems not to have given sound 
arguments in favor of science’s ability to acquire objective truth.  In particular, the 
arguments of Chang and Stanford appear to undermine Psillos’ success argument.  Van 
Fraassen seems to give a compelling for suspending judgment on whether or not 
instrumentation provides a window into an unseen world.  Galison describes how 
different ontologies are useful in different contexts.  Beller describes the lack of 
consensus among physicists regarding wave/particle duality.  As with Galison, she 
appears to show that this lack of consensus does not affect the empirical success of 
quantum physics.  All of these examples support the voluntarist theory of reference’s 
claim that reference is fixed by the interests of the inquirer.  Therefore, Psillos has seems 
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not to have successfully argued that we can gain knowledge of entities through our 
interactions with them. 
 
 
4.3.2 Truth-likeness 
 
 
Psillos argues that, thus far, formal accounts of truth-likeness are untenable, since 
the truth-likeness of scientific theories can only be measured in relation to each other.  
Hence, a non-relative measure of a theory’s truth-likeness cannot be obtained.  However, 
if Psillos’ causal-descriptive theory of reference is voluntarist, and thus relative, then his 
intuitive approach to truth-likeness, which relies on his theory of reference, is also 
plagued by relativism.  I shall argue, following Psillos’ arguments against existing formal 
accounts of truth-likeness and my arguments against his intuitive account, that there does 
not seem to be a viable account of truth-likeness.  If there is no tenable account of truth-
likness, then scientific realism fails. 
As sketched in Chapter Two, Psillos recognizes that scientists idealize and 
abstract away from the phenomena in their theoretical representations making the 
theoretical representations of the phenomena false.  But, Psillos claims false descriptions 
can be cognitively significant, and thus truth-likeness is achievable because the false 
descriptions specify the degree to which their representations diverge from the 
phenomena.  Moreover, Psillos contends that if truth is considered to be fittingness, then 
approximate truth is “approximate fittingness: a description, statement, law, theory are 
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truth-like if and only if there are respects and degrees to which they fit with the facts” 
(1999, 276-277).  Furthermore, Psillos claims that the intuitions behind his theory are that 
“a theory is approximately true if the entities of the general kind postulated to play a 
central causal role in the theory exist” (1999, 277).  The justification for the theory’s 
approximate truth relies on the inference to the best explanation.   
Psillos seems to assume that his intuitions are shared by all scientific realists.  
However, as shown in the section on his causal-descriptive theory of reference, one may 
be committed to Psillos’ three stances of scientific realism, but understand what these 
stances mean in ways that are different from Psillos.  Hence, while Psillos has attempted 
to show why we should adopt his intuitions regarding approximate truth and approximate 
fittingness, because of the incompatible ways that his three stances can be interpreted, he 
seems only to have succeeded in described his own version of scientific realism.  
Therefore, his intuitions and his intuitive account of approximate truth both fall prey to 
the mode of relativity.  For instance, using the causal role of entities as the criterion for 
claiming their existence is not a compelling criterion.  Depending on the interests of the 
inquirer, detection of the constitutive elements of the postulated entity may be the 
deciding factor in whether or not an entity can be said to exist.  For some, if the 
constitutive elements cannot be shown to exist, then the entity does not exist. 
Moreover, specifying to what degree the theoretical descriptions differ from the 
phenomena will not convince an inquirer with criteria for truth that are more demanding 
than Psillos’ criteria.  Again, following the example of the “luminiferous ether” this term 
was abandoned when the constitutive characteristics of the posited entity could not be 
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detected.  Thus, the same argument used against Psillos’ casual-descriptive theory of 
reference can be applied mutatis mutandis to his intuitive account of truth-likeness.  
 
 
4.3.3 Background Knowledge 
 
 
 Chapter Two discusses how Psillos counters van Fraassen’s attacks on 
background knowledge.  Ultimately, Psillos’ defense of this putative form of knowledge 
rests on the problems of epistemic risk.  He states that he is willing to risk more 
epistemically when he claims that background theories are approximately true since this 
increase in risk is necessary in order to move away from ignorance.  By taking on an 
extra epistemic risk, the scientific realist aims to know more about scientific theories than 
their empiricist colleagues.  He concludes that the risk is worth the expense.   
 However, as I have argued above, Psillos does not initially provide arguments for 
why he holds the intuitions he holds, and in this respect he succumbs to the mode of 
hypothesis.  By allowing voluntarism to inform his epistemology and philosophy of 
science, Psillos falls prey to the mode of relativity.  However, once Psillos has laid bare 
his intuitions, he seems to seek arguments that support his intuitions while arguing 
against those that challenge his intuitions.  For example, he supports the inference to the 
best explanation because his intuitions tell him that the success of scientific theories 
requires an explanation.  Moreover, he assumes that good scientific theories are ones that 
explain, rather than those that empirically successful.   
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However, if van Fraassen is correct, then many scientific theories that have been 
predictively successful were not explanatory but still accepted as good scientific theories.  
Hence, if Psillos did not have the intuition that scientific theories must be true to be 
successful, then perhaps he would not believe in the inference to the best explanation.  
Thus, by beginning his defense of scientific realism with intuitions unsupported by 
arguments, seeking arguments that support his intuitions, and then using these arguments 
to justify his intuitions Psillos is undermined by the mode of circularity.  Furthermore, if 
the arguments presented above against his causal-descriptive theory and his use of the 
inference to the best explanation are sound, then Psillos has fewer resources to justify his 
epistemic optimism.  If Psillos’ epistemic optimism is enervated, then he should not hold 
that background knowledge is approximately true.  
 
 
4.4 Psillos’ Account of Scientific Knowledge and The Facticity Criterion 
 
 
In Chapter Two, it was noted that Psillos’ account of scientific knowledge seems 
to be modeled after John Pollock’s account of knowledge.57  However, Psillos has not 
established that his account of scientific knowledge meets the facticity criterion because 
he has not shown that his intuitions about science as a generator of knowledge are true.  
His three stances of scientific realism are merely his opinion that science arrives at true 
beliefs on a reliable basis.  Thus, the foundation for his philosophy of science falls prey to 
the modes of hypothesis and relativity.  His defense of the ‘no miracles argument” fails 
                                                 
57 Pollock’s account of knowledge is that knowledge is justified true belief with no ultimate defeaters. 
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because his defense of our use of induction and deduction are undermined by the modes 
of relativity and hypothesis.  His defense of these logical practices is also used to block 
challenges to the inference to the best explanation.   
However, van Fraassen appears to have shown that the inference to the best 
explanation can be seen in a purely pragmatic light, along with the theoretical virtues.  If 
van Fraassen’s argument that we cannot be in a position to know that we have arrived at 
the best explanation is sound, then we cannot know that we have a belief that can be 
undefeated.  Moreover, Psillos’ success argument is meant to be a defense of the 
epistemic value of scientific theories, but Chang and Stanford show that the constituents 
of a theory that played a crucial role in the empirical and explanatory successful of past 
theories, are now seen as false.  Furthermore, the criterion of success used by Chang and 
Stanford is Psillos’ own criterion.  Galison also indirectly undermines the success 
argument when he shows the indeterminate ontological status among physicists of 
entities that are putatively crucial to the success of quantum mechanics.  Thus, Psillos 
appears not to have safeguarded ampliative-abductive reasoning.  Hence, his theory of 
justification seems to fail.  According to his own account, without a theory of justification 
Psillos cannot show how it is that we can acquire true beliefs, and why we should believe 
one belief over another.  Therefore, his account of scientific knowledge seems to fail.   
The inference to the best explanation, the theoretical virtues, and the success 
argument are all used to justify the ability of Psillos’ theory of reference to objectively 
pick out natural kinds.  According to Psillos’ version of scientific realism, what are real 
about the world are natural kinds.  Natural kind terms are made true by their reference to 
entities and processes that answer to the core descriptions given by the terms that 
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putatively represent them.  Yet, as argued earlier, Psillos’ implicit voluntarism leads to 
referential relativity, and thus he cannot claim that his theory of reference picks out 
natural kinds in a non-ad hoc fashion.  Thus, Psillos has not shown that scientific theories 
represent the world in a true, or nearly true, fashion since his implicit voluntarism falls 
prey to the mode of relativism.  Therefore, since relativism makes objective truth 
indeterminate, his account of scientific knowledge fails to meet the facticity criterion.    
If Psillos’ theory of reference fails, then he has not blocked the challenges from 
underdetermination and the pessimistic meta-induction.  If the argument against his 
theory of reference is sound, then we cannot know which of two or more rival theories is 
undefeated.  If the latter challenge is true, then we cannot know whether or not our 
current theory is true.  Thus, Psillos’ response to the challenges of underdetermination 
and pessimistic meta-induction fail to meet the facticity criterion.   
Moreover, as discussed in the section on underdetermination, Psillos allows for 
the existence of abstracta based solely on the explanatory criterion.  Abstracta are so 
crucial to explanation in scientific theories that Psillos holds the full truth of scientific 
theories is not about the world, but about the abstract entities used to represent the world.  
If his account is true of abstracta and not the world, then his account fails the facticity 
criterion  He recognizes that his view is extremely problematic due to many problems 
that come with showing how it is that we can know, independently of the explanatory 
criterion, such entities exist.  Psillos mentions these challenges, but does not address 
them.  It appears that, since existence is widely seen as being established by a putative 
entity’s causal powers, we cannot know if abstract exist in this manner because they do 
seemingly cannot cause anything.  By ignoring this challenge, and whatever problems he 
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admits to be significant, Psillos’ commitment to the existence of abstracta is undermined 
by the mode of hypothesis.  If Psillos cannot show that abstracta exist, then his account of 
scientific knowledge cannot show what is fully true.  If his account of scientific 
knowledge cannot show what is fully true, then it cannot meet the truth condition of the 
justified true belief or true belief accounts of knowledge.  If his account of scientific 
knowledge cannot meet the truth condition, then his account fails. 
Further problems arise for Psillos’ account of scientific knowledge is terms of 
what he counts as truth-likeness and background knowledge.  In the former case, he states 
that his account of truth-likeness is intuitive.  However, it is not clear that everyone 
shares his intuitions as to what constitutes truth-likeness.  Thus, his notion of truth-
likeness falls prey to the modes of relativity and hypothesis.  Moreover, Psillos relies on 
his intuitions to describe background knowledge.  He employs the inference to the best 
explanation to justify his belief in background knowledge, but concedes that he is 
committed to the inference to the best explanation because he is an epistemic optimist.  
Psillos’ defense of background knowledge rests merely on his optimism and not upon a 
sound argument.  Thus, this view too is undermined by the modes of relativity and 
hypothesis.   
Therefore, the arguments and claims Psillos’ presents to support his account of 
scientific knowledge appear not to meet the facticity criterion.  Hence, his account of 
scientific knowledge seems to fail in several respects since Psillos’ arguments appear not 
to meet the facticity criterion.  If the facticity criterion is a sound criterion by which to 
measure accounts of scientific knowledge, then Psillos’ account of scientific knowledge 
fails.     
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4.5 Alexander Bird 
 
 
 In the subsections below, I will employ the Pyrrhonist modes to raise objections 
to Bird’s account of scientific knowledge:   
 
(1) First, I shall use the mode of hypothesis to challenge Bird’s commitment to 
Williamson’s primitivist account of knowledge.   
 
(2) If this argument is not strong enough to arouse doubt, then I will attempt to instill 
equipollence in the reader by objecting to Bird’s notion of what is “scientific”.  Since 
Bird uses Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental drift as a clear example of what is not 
scientific, I shall use Naomi Oreskes’ (1988) description of Wegener’s theory to in an 
effort to show that Bird’s notion of “scientific” seems to be untenable.  I shall endeavor 
to contend that if his notion allows for Wegener’s theory to count as “scientific”, then 
Bird’s notion is untenable.  If his notion is untenable, then it seems he cannot have an 
account of scientific knowledge without first identifying what is scientific and what is 
not.   
Bird seems to share the same views with Psillos on to the inference to the best 
explanation and the correspondence theory of truth.  Thus, to avoid redundancy: 
 
(1) I shall not discuss these features of Bird’s philosophy of science.   
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(2) However, Bird includes a stronger form of inference than the inference to the best 
explanation in his philosophy of science.  This stronger inference form he calls “the 
inference to the only explanation” which shall be discussed in a subsection below.  I shall 
attempt to argue that this inference appears to fail.   
 
(3) Furthermore, both Bird and Psillos have a very similar take on the causal-descriptive 
theory, but I shall discuss it in a subsection below because Bird’s version gives fewer 
details on what counts as a core casual description. Since Bird’s lack of clarity is different 
kind of objection to his causal-descriptive theory I have included it in this section. 
 
(4) Moreover, I will discuss his distinction between full truth and approximate truth since 
he does not seem to be committed to the view, adopted by Psillos, on abstracta as being 
what is fully true of scientific theories.   
 
(5) I shall attempt to contend that Bird’s position of truth and approximate truth appear to 
fail, and thus his account cannot meet the facticity criterion and fails also. 
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4.5.1 The Primitive Account of Knowledge and The Mode of Hypothesis 
 
 
 As noted in Chapter Two, Bird follows Williamson’s primitivist account of 
knowledge where knowledge is not defined, but is assumed to be a fundamental term not 
in need of definition.  Williamson contends that every attempt to analyze knowledge into 
component parts has met with failure because of Gettier cases.  From this history of 
failure Williamson concludes that knowledge is unanalyzable because it is a fundamental 
concept.  Since knowledge is a fundamental concept it is not in need of explanation in 
terms of component parts.  While Williamson seems to have sound arguments against the 
analyzability of the concept of knowledge, his solution falls prey to the mode of 
hypothesis.   
 
 
4.5.2 Bird and Scientific Methodology 
 
 
In this subsection, I hope to generate equipollence in the reader by giving what 
seem to be plausible alternative accounts of Bird’s notion of what is “scientific”.  Bird 
contends that the methods of science cannot allow for the acquiring of a true belief by 
accident.  He claims that Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental drift is a theory that hit 
upon the truth accidentally since the method Wegener used is not recognized by Bird as 
rigorous enough to be considered scientific.  Bird (1998) standard historical reason given 
 226 
for the initial rejection of Wegener’s theory is that it lacked a causal mechanism (88).58  
However, as shall be shown below, Wegener’s theory was as scientific as Newton’s 
theory of gravity and quantum mechanics, both of which lack causal mechanisms.   
Bird describes Wegener’s theory of continental drift as a lucky guess since it was 
not supported by enough evidence and faced strong counter-evidence.  However, Naomi 
Oreskes (1988) contends that Wegener’s theory was supported by sufficient evidence, 
and that the alternative theory of land bridges was ad hoc.  For example, Wegener’s 
theory could explain why fossil assemblages were alike in distant lands since the same 
species occupied land that was directly connected before breaking off.  Moreover, his 
opponents could not explain this phenomenon and relied on ad hoc adjustments to their 
theories of static continents, such as the positing of land bridges between continents that 
had since sunk into the ocean (Oreskes 1988, 315).  Furthermore, the continents were 
discovered to be made of less dense material than the ocean basin, and the denser 
material that composes the ocean floor also underlies the continents (Oreskes 1988, 318).   
Thus, the continents could float on the material that makes up the ocean floor, as 
“Ices floes in water” (Oreskes 1988, 317).  These discoveries together are known as 
isostasy.  Isostasy was widely confirmed when Wegener presented his theory.  Moreover, 
Wegener included in his theory the long standing geological notion that the continents 
could move through the underlying denser material because the latter acts over geological 
time as an extremely viscous fluid (Oreskes 1988, 318).  From isostasy and this latter 
notion, Wegener hypothesized that major geological formations—mountain ranges, 
islands, rift valleys, and so on—were created by the horizontal movement and collisions 
                                                 
58 Cf. Oreskes, N.  (1999) The Rejection of Continental Drift: Theory and Method in American Earth 
Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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of continents.  Furthermore, he proposed that the entire surface of the earth was once 
covered by one continental layer which eventually broke apart to form separate 
continents. 
Wegener developed his account by comparing the similar coastlines of South 
America and Africa, and Europe and North America.  He assumed that these similarities 
were to close to be mere coincidences.  To show how the continents may have fit together 
into one contiguous continent, Wegener did not match the coastlines of the continents, 
but the edges of the continental shelves since the coastlines would have changed more 
through erosion and fluctuating sea levels (Oreskes 1988, 319).  Well-established 
geological evidence supported Wegener’s theory: 
The stratigraphic successions of South America and Africa were strikingly similar  
throughout the nearly 200 million years of the Mesozoic era. Likewise, certain igneous  
complexes occurred in both places, and folds ran continuously when the continents  
were reunited. Comparable continuities could be achieved by uniting North America  
with Europe, and India with Africa.  (Oreskes 1988, 319). 
 
Further evidence from Philip Sclater’s observations showed that the island of 
Madagascar possessed nearly none of the animals common to Africa, such as giraffes and 
lions, but did have a host of lemur species common to India.  Many of the lemur species 
found on Madagascar were almost identical to those found in India.  To explain these 
observations, Sclater postulated the sunken continent of Lemuria as a land bridge 
between Madagascar and India.  Darwin’s theory of evolution supported Sclater’s notion 
that Madagascar’s lemurs originated in India since the lemurs were too alike to have 
evolved independently (Oreskes 1988, 319).  While other zoological similarities were 
observed between fauna across the oceans, the most compelling evidence in favor of 
Wegener’s theory came from earthworms, as Oreske notes: 
Wegener pointed not only to Sclater's lemurs, but also to Glossop teris flora,  
Mesosauridae reptiles, lumbricidae earthworms, and many other species as  
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indicators of continental contiguities. The earthworm's distribution seemed to be  
particularly significant since earthworms can neither swim nor fly, nor do they have  
resilient seeds or a dormant stage that might permit passive distribution. Further more,  
in many cases the species could be found only on the coastlines on either side of oceans, 
suggesting a fragmented habitat. (If the continents had not moved, the required connections 
would have been extremely long and crossed several climatic zones: It seemed unlikely that  
a species would persist, morphologically unchanged, over such a distance only to stop its 
migration precisely at the other end of the land bridge.)  (Oreskes 1988, 321)  
 
Thus, Wegener’s theory of continental drift is supported by non-ad hoc evidence from the 
independent science of biology.  If Oreskes is correct, then the geological and biological 
evidence that Wegener used to advance his theory were well-established.  Furthermore, 
his theory seems to have been confirmed independently by well-confirmed biological 
observations.  Moreover, the alternative theory of sunken continents acting as land 
bridges could not explain phenomena, such as the distribution of earthworms, in a non-ad 
hoc fashion.  The ad hoc character of this latter hypothesis appears in the lack of 
evidence for sunken continents and for the failure to be supported by well-confirmed 
biological observations.  Since the ad hoc hypothesis appears to be the only competitor 
against Wegener’s theory, it would seem that the later theory is an instance of the 
inference to the only explanation.  Therefore, there seems to have been sufficient 
evidence for Wegener’s theory to count as an item of scientific knowledge by the 
standards of E=K.  Thus, a fortiori, Wegener’s theory is scientific by Bird’s standards. 
According to Oreskes, the standard story as to why continental drift was not 
rejected in Wegener’s lifetime is because his theory lacked a causal mechanism.  Oreskes 
denies that Wegener did not present a causal mechanism in his theory, but I shall not 
describe it here since it is not relevant to the argument against Bird that Wegener’s theory 
is not scientific knowledge.  However, Bird may believe the standard story to be true and 
that is why he does not consider Wegener’s theory to be scientific knowledge.  If this is 
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the case, then he will have to explain why he uses certain scientific theories that do not 
posit causal mechanism as examples of scientific knowledge. 
For instance, the scientific status of Newton’s mechanics was suspect since it 
could not explain how objects influenced each other at a distance.  Newton called this 
mysterious influence “gravity” but remained agnostic as to its nature.  However, 
Newton’s theory was well-supported by background theories, such as Kepler’s laws and 
by the empirical success of the theory, such as its accurately predicting the motions of 
celestial bodies (except Mercury).  If Newton could not explain a key component of his 
theory, then it would seem that Newton’s theory does not count as scientific knowledge, 
but as a lucky guess.  Moreover, many quantum phenomena lack causal explanations, but 
Bird seems to think that quantum field theory is scientific (Bird 2007, 75).  If a theory 
needs causal explanations to be scientific then, these two theories seem, by Bird’s 
standards, to be lucky guesses.  Thus, Bird seems to have failed to have blocked lucky 
guesses as being instances of scientific progress.  If he cannot block such instances 
(especially in revolutionary cases such as those mentioned above), then his account of 
scientific knowledge does not accurately describe how scientific progress occurs.  If Bird 
has given the wrong description of scientific progress, then he cannot claim that scientific 
progress is the accumulation of scientific knowledge.    
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4.5.3 The Inference to the Only Explanation   
 
 
If the previous subsection failed to achieve equipollence in the reader, then I shall 
hope to instill it here and the subsequent subsection on Bird’s take on the causal-
descriptive theory of reference.  While Bird assumes that he has refuted the pessimistic 
meta-induction and underdetermination, his inference to the only explanation and the 
mechanism that supports seem to be defeated by both of these challenges.  For instance, 
there are cases where the only explanation had seemingly been decided upon, but has 
since been overthrown.  An example of the pessimistic meta-induction is the theory of 
inheritance of acquired characteristics.  According to Jan Sapp, the standard history of 
biology states that this theory was refuted by Darwin’s alternative account of natural 
selection.  However, Darwin used this theory in his theory of evolution (Sapp 2003, 7).59  
Moreover, in the 20th century the inheritance of acquired characteristics was dismissed as 
unscientific Stalinist dogma because of its having been adopted by the Soviet biologist 
Trofim Denisovich Lysenko.  Since Lysenko and his followers put forward a vague 
theory that was not scientifically testable Western scientists charged the theory with 
being unscientific (2003, 171-173).   
Since the inheritance of acquired characteristics was thought to have been refuted, 
genetic determinism was regarded by the mainstream of biologists to be the only 
                                                 
59 If the positing of a causal mechanism is necessary for Bird to consider a theory to be scientific, then 
Darwin’s theory of evolution may not fit this criterion.  If the theory of the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics is the causal mechanism behind natural selection, then Darwin’s theory of evolution is in 
danger of being unscientific since the former theory is considered to be unscientific.  If Darwin’s theory is 
true despite its lack of a scientifically acceptable causal mechanism to account for natural selection, then 
what is often regarded in the history of science as a scientific theory would not be scientific according to 
Bird’s criterion.  If Bird does consider Darwin’s theory to be scientific, then he must explain how it is 
despite its commitment to the inheritance of acquired characteristics.   
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explanation for the inheritance of traits across generations.  Genetic determinism states 
that the expression of genes is not effected by the environment.  Rather the genes 
expressed in an organism will either allow the organism to survive and reproduce or to 
die without offspring.  Those organisms fortunate enough to survive and reproduce will 
pass on the genes that allow for survival onto their offspring.  However, if the 
environment changes or the offspring express different genes, then the offspring with not 
survive and reproduce.  Since genetic determinism was seen as the only explanation for 
the inheritance of traits across generations the mapping of the human genome was 
thought to be the ‘holy grail’ of genetics (2003, 201-202).  It was thought that mapping 
the human genome would allow humanity to identify those genes that are desirable and 
those that are not.  Once these genes were identified then geneticists would be able to 
control which genes would be expressed and which would not.  For example, genetic 
defects such as cystic fibrosis and sickle cell anemia could be eradicated along with 
depression, alcoholism, and impulsivity (2003, 202).   
However, the successful mapping of the human genome seems to have shown that 
genetic determinism is false.  Instead of discovering one gene that expresses a given trait, 
geneticists appear to have discovered that one gene can express many different traits 
since the gene is modified by RNA (2003, 204).  However, as noted in subsection 4.1.6 
of this chapter, the theory inheritance of acquired characteristics is now known 
recognized as a genuine alternative to genetic determinism.  Because earlier the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics seems not to have been scientific by Bird’s 
standards it appears that genetic determinism would be the only explanation for 
biological inheritance.  Yet, as has been shown, genetic determinism seems not to be the 
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only explanation available for biological inheritance, and the putatively refuted theory of 
the inheritance of acquired characteristics now seems to be a plausible candidate as the 
best explanation for how inheritance occurs in certain contexts.   
If genetic determinism fits the criteria for being the only explanation, then it 
seems that epigenetics undermines this inference.  Bird may reply that this case is not 
typical, but if other cases can be found, then it seems the inference to the only 
explanation fails.  Other possible cases are Aristotle’s theory that the Earth is stationary 
and the notion that space is absolute.  In the former case, Aristotle noted that we do not 
feel the Earth moving beneath us, nor do we feel the movement of air around us as we 
would if we were moving (say, on a galloping horse).  It seems that with the means for 
testing these hypotheses available to Aristotle he had the only explanation for why the 
Earth is not moving.  Moreover, Newton’s mechanics seemed to refute the notion that 
space was relative since his theory’s empirical predictions seemed to be empirical support 
for the hypothesis that space is absolute.  Again, it seems that Newton’s explanation was 
the only explanation.  If the above cases seem plausible, then Bird’s inference seems to 
be false.   
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4.5.4  Bird and The Causal Theory of Reference 
 
 
 Similar to Psillos, Bird employs a causal-descriptive theory of reference.  
However, he does not give as much detail as Psillos as to how the causal-descriptive 
theory preserves reference through revolutions.  Given the sketch of the causal-
descriptive theory he gives, it is not clear how he would deal with the challenges to the 
causal-descriptive theory put forth by Stanford and Chang.  For instance, Bird does not 
deal with the historical actors and their attitudes toward the putative entities in their 
theories.  Thus, while it appears Bird would claim referential continuity from the 
“luminiferous ether” to the “electromagnetic field”, he does not discuss why the change 
in terminology took place.   
As noted earlier in this chapter, Stanford seems to show that the scientists who 
believed in the “luminiferous ether” believed that the constitutive descriptions of this 
putative entity were crucial to the referential success of the term.  To avoid the charge of 
precursoritis, it seems Bird would do well to explain why the scientists of the time 
thought that the constitutive properties of the “luminiferous ether” were important to the 
referential success or failure of the term.  Since Bird does not mention voluntarism in his 
philosophy of science perhaps his version of the causal-descriptive theory will not fall 
victim to the charge of relativity.  However, Stanford’s description of the historical 
scientists’ attitude toward the constitution of the ether should be explained.  By 
accounting for this feature of the historical record Bird can explain why the description of 
a putative entity’s causal role is crucial to a term’s referential success. 
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Furthermore, it would appear a more damning criticism comes from Chang’s 
treatment of how the explanation for the caloric theory’s successes fundamentally relied 
on the descriptions of the causal role of “caloric”.  As shown earlier in this chapter, 
Chang seems to have shown how the descriptions of “caloric” were the best explanation 
of the phenomena in the theory’s domain.  Moreover, Bird follows Kuhn’s take on 
exemplars as primary examples for how the puzzles that arise within a paradigm are to be 
solved.  Bird considers exemplars to be a form of know-how and he considers know-how 
to be translatable into knowing-that.  He does not clarify how this translation would be 
carried out nor how it fits in with his apparent commitment to the correspondence theory 
of truth.  However, if the truth of an exemplar relies on its empirical success, then Bird 
would seem to be relying on a pragmatic theory of truth.  To criticize the pragmatic 
theory of truth here would be redundant as I have done so in the section on Psillos.  
Nevertheless, an account of how it is that empirically successful scientific theories could 
be false would help to clarify Bird’s scientific realism since it would clarify how what is 
putatively true of a scientific theory explains a theory’s success.  However, until Bird’s 
causal-descriptive theory can meet this challenge and the others mentioned in this 
subsection, it is unclear if his theory of reference is tenable or not. 
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4.5.5 Full Truth, Approximate Truth, and Facticity 
 
 
Bird argues that, from the approximate truth given to us by the idealizations and 
abstractions from the phenomena used in the construction of scientific theories, we can 
trace our steps back to the full truth necessary for knowledge.  His argument for arriving 
at the full truth from approximate truth seems to be untenable since the path from 
approximate truth to full truth is not always visible.  Many approximations in science 
cannot be traced back to their complicated truth.  Many scientific conclusions are based 
on models that deviate wildly from the phenomena.  For instance, as noted in Chapter 
Two, Elgin notes that experimental design deviates substantially from what is found in 
nature, since the laboratory is an artificial setting.  She appears to show how experimental 
results that allegedly represent nature are manipulated into being realized.   
For instance, the mice that are used in cancer experiments are bred to be 
susceptible to contracting cancer.  Such breeding apparently does not occur naturally, and 
thus is not an approximation that can be traced back to the full truth as observed in the 
wild.  Experimentation involves creating conditions that do not exist in the natural world, 
and using the findings from these artificial conditions to make claims about the natural 
world.  Hence, if Elgin is correct, then experimentation relies on falsity.  Moreover, 
Psillos accepts that the approximate truth science putatively acquires about the natural 
world is strictly false, while the abstracta of scientific theories is what is fully true.  If 
Psillos is correct, then we do capture full truth by retracing our steps from idealization 
and abstraction back to the concrete phenomena.   
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According to E=K, the evidence that is used to support an item of knowledge 
must be an item of knowledge itself, and hence, cannot be false.  However, if Elgin and 
Psillos are correct, then the empirical evidence used in science is only approximately true 
and strictly false.  Thus, it seems much of the “evidence” that is the “background 
knowledge” for all significant scientific conclusions cannot be evidence or knowledge by 
Bird’s own standards.  If the evidence has to be knowledge and knowledge is true, then 
Bird’s notion of scientific knowledge appears not to fall short of the facticity criterion.  
 
 
4.6 Bas van Fraassen 
 
 
 In this section, I shall endeavor to show that van Fraassen’s account of knowledge 
appears to fail.  Throughout the subsections below I will: 
 
(1) employ the arguments against views held by van Fraassen, as well as the Pyrrhonist 
modes, in an effort to instill doubt in the reader as to the tenability of van Fraassen’s 
account of knowledge.   
 
(2) In particular, I shall use Psillos’ arguments as a counter-balance to van Fraassen’s 
empiricism and voluntarism. 
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4.6.1 van Fraassen and The Empirical Stance 
 
 
 As with Psillos, van Fraassen assumes the empirical stance as the starting point 
for his epistemology and philosophy of science.  Because a stance is an assumption 
unsupported by argument, the only dialectical support for his taking a particular stance is 
his permissive view of rationality and his observation that the inescapability of sense 
experience makes this experience a natural place to start our inquiries.  I first discuss the 
former justification in this paragraph and the latter justification in a subsequent paragraph 
in this subsection.   
According to voluntarism, we are as justified in choosing to pursue truth and 
avoid error to whatever extreme since these dispositions are not irrational.  Van 
Fraassen’s take on rationality is that one is permitted to believe what one wants as long as 
it is not contradicted by the world.  However, as shall be discussed in a subsection to 
follow, because of van Fraassen’s commitment to voluntarism and the theory-ladeness of 
language, it is unclear what counts as being true.  Distinguishing truth from falsity is 
crucial to van Fraassen’s position if he is to avoid irenic relativism and skepticism.  
According to van Fraassen, irenic relativism holds that there is no objective truth only 
truth for someone, while skepticism maintains that if there is objective truth, then it 
cannot be acquired and that rational opinion is impossible.  Yet, van Fraassen apparently 
recognizes that different theories have different interpretations of the same observations.  
He seems to claim that the appearances of everyday objects, such as trees and snow, are 
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veridical.  Moreover, he assumes that these appearances are not dependent on our minds 
for their existence.   
However, according to van Fraassen’s take on rationality, Berkeley’s 
sensationalist idealism or Cartwright’s agnostic sensationalism are rational.  If these 
positions are rational, then there is a significant difference in what constitutes an 
appearance.  In the Berkeley’s case, they are mind-dependent sensations produced by the 
Mind of God, in the Cartwright’s case, their ontological status is indeterminate.  If these 
positions are permitted to be rational, then van Fraassen seems to fall prey to the irenic 
relativism and skepticism he hopes to avoid since these incompatible stances are allowed 
as long as they are consistent, and there seems to be no way to judge which stance is true.  
Hence, it seems van Fraassen boldly accepts the mode of hypothesis since he argues that 
we can choose a given position although we do not (and perhaps cannot) know if the 
choice we have made is true or not.        
Furthermore, van Fraassen’s voluntarism and permissive rationality seem to lead 
him into the following contradictory position: while he embraces metaphysics as a field 
which interprets the world in many, sometimes incompatible ways, van Fraassen does 
think that the world plays an important role in telling us which interpretation works and 
which does not.  For example, he claims that scientific theories latch onto regularities, or 
they do not, and that is how we know whether or not scientific theories are successful.  
Furthermore, his commonsense realism seems to be the standard for judging the truth of 
statements and of theories.  However, as noted in Chapter Three, van Fraassen claims he 
is not committed to commonsense realism on epistemic grounds, but on pragmatic 
grounds.  This ambiguity between the epistemic and pragmatic threatens to undermine his 
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theory of rationality since what counts as true depends on the stance one takes.  This 
ambiguity shall be discussed in detail in the subsection below in James Ladyman’s 
(2007) objection to van Fraassen’s epistemic contextualism.  
 
 
4.6.2 Ladyman’s Dilemma 
 
 
James Ladyman (2007) argues that using a position adopted on pragmatic grounds 
to come to an epistemic conclusions leads to a dilemma.  The dilemma is that if a true 
belief can be considered knowledge even if it was accepted for pragmatic reasons, then 
scientific realists’ claims to knowledge about unobservables seems to be equal to the 
empiricists’ claims of knowing a theory is empirically adequate.  Yet, if epistemic 
reasons are a necessary condition for a true belief to count as knowledge, then the only 
scientific knowledge we have is of what has been so far observed (2007, 345).  Van 
Fraassen’s reply to this dilemma is that he adopts a contextualist view of knowledge 
where in a specific context, following David Lewis’ (1996), after all relevant alternatives 
have been eliminated one can make a knowledge claim.  For instance, in a specific 
domain the classical gas theory is empirically adequate and useful but beyond that 
domain it is neither empirically adequate nor useful (van Fraassen 2007, 349).  Van 
Fraassen notes that whether or not something is really true cannot be answered in a 
context neutral sense. 
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However, van Fraassen claims that we can have objective knowledge.  If 
“objective” means free of any particular perspective and a context is a particular 
perspective, then van Fraassen’s position seems to be self-contradictory. In Chapter 
Three, I attempted to argue that van Fraassen seems to be committed to facticity, 
especially since he asserts that, in spite of his relativism, truth is something objective and 
accessible.  Furthermore, because van Fraassen concedes that all of our observations are 
theory-laden (and thus contextual) it would seem that what counts as true is contextual 
too.  Despite this, van Fraassen argues as if everyday objects and events are observed 
non-contextually and that these observations can be used to judge the truth of a particular 
context.  According to van Fraassen, a context is false if it does not fit the world in the 
way that is alleged.  Phlogiston theory is one example of a context that does not fit the 
world.  Moreover, van Fraassen claims that successful scientific theories are successful 
because they have discovered genuine regularities in world.  Yet, what counts as a 
regularity may change with time.   
For example, the retrograde motion of Mars and the flat, stationary Earth were 
both considered regularities, but now are now only appearances.  The inheritance of 
acquired characteristics appeared to have been refuted, but now seems to be accepted by 
epigeneticists as a genuine regularity.  As described in Chapter Two, van Fraassen relates 
how we can move beyond the appearance of retrograde motion to the phenomenon Mars’ 
true orbit.  As shall be discussed in a subsequent subsection, van Fraassen relies on a 
distinction between appearance and reality that seems much like the distinction employed 
by his scientific realist opponents.  However, before discussing van Fraassen’s distinction 
between appearance and reality I shall discuss a seemingly deeper problem for van 
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Fraassen’s empiricism, viz. what counts as experience according to his version of 
empiricism.  If van Fraassen cannot clarify this notion, then it is unclear how his 
empiricism is supposed to work as method of inquiry.  
 
 
4.6.3 Nagel on What Counts as Experience 
 
 
Jennifer Nagel claims that van Fraassen does not give an account of how we can 
tell what an experience is (2000 in van Fraassen 2007, 370).  The latter argues that her 
objection does not count against him because he does not hold that experience is the sole 
source of our knowledge.  Rather, he adopts experience as the starting point for our 
epistemic queries.  Thus, he is not making a metaphysical claim about how knowledge is 
obtained, instead this is his stance.  However, Nagel notes that skeptical challenges of 
how van Fraassen can distinguish reality from hallucinations and dreams still arise.  Van 
Fraassen answers that experience is to be understood in the commonsense way of our 
being aware of what is happening to us.  Sometimes he wonders if he is dreaming, but he 
dismisses such concerns, stating that he can rely on other people around him to let him 
know if he is dreaming or not.  Van Fraassen states that such skeptical concerns are 
unanswerable by design and can be safely ignored.  He again emphasizes that we are 
sailors aboard Neurath’s boat and dependent on our own memories, the testimony of 
others, and new experiences to test our opinions.  Furthermore, he notes that our 
experience includes the collective experience of our predecessors just as the ancient 
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empiricist school of medicine included the accumulated experience of their profession 
(2000: 371).  Thus, he concludes such radical skeptical worries can be safely ignored.   
However, seemingly unanswerable skeptical doubts cannot so easily be 
dismissed.  Van Fraassen’s response that he can rely on others to tell if he is dreaming (or 
sane) relies on the fallacious mode of circularity.  If asked how he knows he is not 
dreaming, van Fraassen will reply that the people around him assure him he his not 
dreaming.  If asked how he knows that they are not characters in his dream, presumably 
he will reply that the people around him have assured him he is not dreaming.  Thus, he 
does not show in a non-circular manner that he is not dreaming.  If experience is to be our 
starting point, then it seems subjective experience should be included in this starting 
point.  If subjective experience is included in this starting point, then the old skeptical 
conundrums of how we know we are not dreaming become salient again. 
 
 
4.6.4 van Fraassen and Observability 
 
 
As noted in the subsection above, van Fraassen’s view on the contextual nature of 
observability leads to the mode of hypothesis because of his reliance on the empirical 
stance to justify the verity of our senses.  In this section, I describe Psillos’ arguments 
against van Fraassen’s notion of observability.  These arguments seem to show that, even 
if van Fraassen can show how the contextual nature of observability is coherent, he 
cannot show that the verity of observation is tenable in the epistemic context.  As 
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mentioned in Chapter Three, van Fraassen claims that the distinction between observable 
and unobservable entities is an empirical one.  Our current scientific theories regarding 
the perceptual abilities of humans in the world decide for us which entities are observable 
and unobservable.  Moreover, our ability to construct scientific theories also hinge on our 
physiological states.  Thus, what is observable and unobservable is to be determined by 
our best theories of human biology, physiology and psychology (Psillos 1999, 195).  
These theories dictate that humans cannot use their senses to observe electrons, but can 
observe tables and could observe remote celestial objects.   
Psillos counters van Fraassen’s view by arguing that the biological and 
physiological theories van Fraassen relies on must be regarded as true to make his 
distinction between observability and unobservability work.  However, these biological 
and physiological theories are committed to the existence of unobservable entities.  
Hence, van Fraassen will, “have to accept that what is observable is delineated by 
theories whose empirical adequacy can be judged only if they know in advance which 
entities (and phenomena) are observable” (1999, 195).  Observability depends on 
empirically adequate theories, yet whether or not these theories are empirically adequate 
depends on a prior theory of observability.  Hence, van Fraassen’s account of 
observability seems to be viciously circular (1999,195). 
Additionally, as noted in a previous subsection, the observable-unobservable 
distinction serves an epistemological function for van Fraassen, it shows what is 
epistemically acceptable and what is not.  As Psillos notes, 
all statements about the unobservable world are undecidable in that no 
evidence can warrant belief in theoretical claims about the unobservable 
world.  If correct, this point would least motivate a (radical) empiricist 
epistemology: belief in theoretical assertions can never be justified  
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because no evidence can sway the epistemic balance in their favor. (1999, 198). 
 
Van Fraassen seems to presuppose that unobservability is equivalent to epistemic 
inaccessibility, while observability is equivalent to epistemic accessibility.  Psillos 
contends that these assumptions are untenable.  Unaided senses have a poor 
epistemological track record.  They are unable to adjudicate claims involving the 
empirical adequacy of theories.  For example, our theories hold the temperature of Pluto 
is extremely low, yet no one can verify this by being sent to the surface of Pluto since no 
human being can survive such low temperatures.   
Psillos further argues that it is mistaken to suppose that beliefs about observables 
are either immediately justifiable, or in no need of justification in a manner in which 
theoretical beliefs are not.  As Psillos states, “Any plausible reason to think that a 
different kind of justification is always required for non-observational beliefs (e.g. beliefs 
based on instruments) would end up requiring this very kind of justification for 
observational beliefs as well” (1999, 199).  For instance, one could argue that for an 
instrument-based belief to be justified one must first justify the belief that the instrument 
operates reliably.  However, the human eye itself is a complex, and fallible, instrument, 
and thus beliefs originating from it are subject to the same need for justification as the 
instrument in question.  Hence, eye-based beliefs cannot be assumed to be immediately 
justifiable, while instrument based beliefs need extra justification.  According to Psillos, 
there is no difference in quality between the evidence gathered by the unaided senses and 
that gathered by instruments.  Both warranted belief, and beliefs generated by the unaided 
senses are sometimes less warranted than instrument-based beliefs (1999, 199). 
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Thus, Psillos argues that van Fraassen’s distinction between observables and 
unobservables is epistemically untenable.  However, as shown in Chapter Three, van 
Fraassen now thinks that instruments create phenomena.  Assuming that the senses are 
instruments then it would seem that they too create phenomena.  If this is not the case, 
then van Fraassen will have to show how it is that biological instruments should be given 
epistemic privilege over artificial ones.  Van Fraassen’s views on instrumentation will be 
discussed in a subsequent subsection.  
 
 
4.6.5 van Fraassen and Justification 
 
 
Van Fraassen’s empirical stance seems to reject the need for justification for 
observations because observation is regarded as being immediately justifiable.  However, 
van Fraassen’s probabilism eschews justification, not just for observational claims, but all 
claims.  Thus, according to probabilism, one can hold a true belief supported by other 
beliefs whether these beliefs are true or false or with no support from other beliefs at all.  
Apparently, if one makes a lucky guess that his true and one believes their lucky guess to 
be true, then one has knowledge.  This view conflicts with the traditional intuition that 
knowledge should somehow be tethered (Cf. Plato Theaetetus 201) and not a matter of 
luck.  Furthermore, one can hold onto a belief if one has no reason to give it up and it is 
consistent, but whether or not it is true is a matter of luck (van Fraassen 2007, 352). 
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However, van Fraassen seems to contradict himself since one is supposed to know 
what is true through commonsense realism.  Yet, if Psillos’ arguments against van 
Fraassen’s notion of observability are sound, then this notion is untenable.  Moreover, 
commonsense realism will not help us to distinguish what is true from what is false since 
there are many interpretations given as to what seems evident to the senses.  For instance, 
Bishop Berkeley (2000) assumed that what we directly experience are sensations, and not 
material objects that exist independently of us.  Instead, he argued that the belief in 
material objects is something that is arrived at through inference, that the belief in 
material objects is the result of a theory and not direct experience.  Moreover, Berkeley 
argued that his theory was commonsense (2000, 74).  Presumably, we are capable of 
making vastly different starting assumptions about the nature of perception and what 
needs to be supported with a theory.  Our experience does not tell us which assumptions 
are true.   
Furthermore, starting from the presuppositions we already have falls prey to the 
mode of hypothesis.  Van Fraassen claims we assume that our senses are reliable and the 
world is independent of us because this assumption has worked well for us, but that does 
not make the assumption true.  By his standards, there are rational alternatives, such as 
indirect realism, to commonsense realism.  Indirect realism states perception is not 
directed, but mediated.  Historically, the medium of perception in Western philosophy 
has been sense-data.  Sense-data are mental objects that represent the objects putatively 
perceived.  For example, according to indirect realism, color is a mental quality.  The 
apple before is not green, the color green does not exist apart from my perception of it.  
Rather, I just perceive a particular wavelength of light this way.  Yet, van Fraassen 
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simply dismisses sense-data since it is a theory of perception, and he does not believe that 
theories provide true descriptions of the world or of ourselves.  Unless he can show why 
believing in sense-data theories is irrational, then van Fraassen will have to show how it 
cannot also count as an acceptable form of commonsense realism.  Moreover, 
Cartwright’s defense of van Fraassen’s commonsense realism seems to depart from van 
Fraassen’s claim that sensations are of a mind independent world when she notes that 
however sensations are to be understood is of no consequence for her argument.  Rather, 
what matters is that sensations “whatever they are” force themselves upon us (Cartwright 
2007, 43).   
Thus, the commonsense realism to which van Fraassen is committed leads to very 
different views about what is true.  Van Fraassen’s view of the world is very different 
from Berkeley’s in the past and Cartwright’s nowadays since he claims that the world is 
independent of us, and he explicitly states that Berkeley’s sensationalism is wrong.  
However, van Fraassen’s reliance on pragmatic success to show that his view is likely to 
be true seems untenable against these other positions because they seem to be 
pragmatically underdetermined.  For instance, if one wants to remain alive, then it seems 
to be pragmatic to step out of the bus’ way no matter if it exists independently of our 
minds, depends on a mind to exist, or if its composition is beyond our ken.  Since 
commonsense realism can support incompatible world views based on pragmatic 
considerations then pragmatic considerations do not seem to resolve the above mentioned 
underdetermination. 
Moreover, Psillos relies on the pragmatic success of theoretical virtues to argue 
that these virtues are epistemic.  Van Fraassen contends that pragmatic virtues are not 
 248 
clearly epistemic since many false but successful scientific theories contained certain 
theoretical virtues (such as the explanatory power of the phlogiston and caloric theories).  
Hence, van Fraassen appears to contradict himself when he allows for pragmatic 
considerations to support his claim that commonsense realism is an epistemic position, 
but does not allow the pragmatic success of theoretical virtues to support the claim that 
they are epistemic. 
 
 
4.6.6 The Darwinian Explanation for the Success of Science 
 
 
While van Fraassen (2007) claims that the “no miracles argument” is question 
begging because it relies on the inference to the best explanation, he attempts to give his 
own version of the “no miracles argument” by claiming that successful theories have 
latched onto actual regularities in nature.  He contends that the inference to the best 
explanation is question begging because it assumes that the truth is contained in the 
specified range of answers to the question at hand (2007, 140).60  However, this response 
is a promissory note since he cannot show that the interpretation given to regularities will 
always be the same, as we saw with the retrograde motion of Mars.  Furthermore, if he 
were true to his eschewing of explanation, then he would not attempt to account for why 
science has predictive success.  Moreover, his Darwinian account of the success of 
science, by relying on the presumption that successful scientific theories have latched on 
                                                 
60 Van Fraassen’s objection to the inference to the best explanation shall be discussed in a subsequent 
subsection.   
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to actual regularities in nature, seems at odds with his view on laws of nature.  As noted 
in Chapter Three, van Fraassen argues that “law” is a misnomer, and that what 
philosophers of science call a “law of nature”, is merely a symmetry argument.  Thus, 
van Fraassen should state that a successful theory has found a temporarily satisfactory 
solution to a problem, or set of problems, not that it has discovered a regularity in nature. 
But, van Fraassen argues we can only know what comes to us in the immediacy of 
experience, but regularities dependent on past experience.  He defends the reliance on 
past experience as a well established practice that is not in need of defense until it is 
shown not to be reliable anymore (following his probabilism).  But, as noted in a 
previous subsection, probabilism relies on the mode of hypothesis.  
Additionally, it seems that van Fraassen seemingly cannot account for why past 
theories that were seemingly empirically adequate are now seen as unsuccessful and 
remain true to his empiricist stance.  To explain why a seemingly successful theory, such 
as the Ptolemaic model of the universe, was successful, is now seen as false relies on a 
distinction between reality and appearance.  According to van Fraassen, phenomena are 
what are real and appearances are how things appear to us whether real or not.  As 
mentioned earlier, the retrograde motion of Mars is only apparent, but the reality is that 
the motion of the Earth causes the appearance of retrograde motion.  The motion of the 
Earth is not something is perceived through our five senses.  As Aristotle noted, if the 
Earth were in motion, then there would be a constant wind moving across its surface.  
Furthermore, an object thrown straight up into the air does not fall back behind the person 
throwing as happens when someone throws something up while on a moving surface.  
Hence, Ptolemaic astronomy seemed to be empirically adequate, and now is not. 
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Empirical adequacy entails the truth of what is perceived, but what is perceived 
can be false.  According to facticity, Ptolemaic astronomers did not have knowledge, 
though constructive empiricism would have conferred knowledge upon them had it 
existed in ancient times.  In this case, belief in empirical adequacy is no more risky than 
belief in truth.  Thus, just as it seems we cannot know we have truth, it appears that we 
cannot know we have empirical adequacy either.   
Moreover, van Fraassen’s scientific realist opponents may be correct in arguing 
for the epistemic value of explanation.  Their arguments may be sound, though they 
appear not to be.  Van Fraassen recognizing that explanation has pragmatic value if it has 
any value at all.  While he claims that the epistemic value of commonsense realism can 
be inferred by this views pragmatic success, he denies the epistemic value of explanatory 
power.  He does not make clear why pragmatic success suggests epistemic success for 
commonsense realism, but not for explanatory power.  Furthermore, his argument for the 
believing in the epistemic value of commonsense realism is the same as the scientific 
realists’ argument in favor of the inference to the best explanation.  Thus, van Fraassen 
seems to hold incompatible views on the relation between pragmatic success and 
epistemic success. 
  Van Fraassen’s inconsistency on the issue of the relationship between pragmatic 
value and epistemic value obfuscates his position on explanation.  It would appear that 
his rejection of the need for explanation in scientific theories relies on the mode of 
hypothesis.  While he seems to employ the pessimistic meta-induction and 
underdetermination arguments against the view that explanatory power is the most 
epistemically robust of all the theoretical virtues, he claims he does not.  Hence, it seems 
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that his eschewing of explanation stems completely from his empirical stance.  If this is 
the case, then his commitment to the rejection of explanation as epistemic relies on the 
mode of hypothesis. 
 
 
4.6.7 van Fraassen and Theory Change 
 
 
 Van Fraassen relies on a criterion of success to argue for his version of scientific 
theory change.  He claims that his version does not fall victim to the incoherence of 
scientific realist views on scientific theory change.  However, van Fraassen argues that 
the criterion of success cannot be used to support the scientific realist’s claim that 
theoretical virtues are epistemic and not merely pragmatic. 
Van Fraassen argues for his criterion of success by asserting that epistemology is 
a volitional activity where we set the parameters for what counts as success.  Yet, he 
allows that one can rationally hold onto scientific frameworks that are seen by some as 
failures due to an excess of anomalies.  Van Fraassen appears to have succumbed to an 
inconsistency himself.  On the one hand, he argues that our beliefs are rational if they are 
consistent and are not refuted by the world.  But, he also says that it is a matter of volition 
as to what counts as too many anomalies in the context of scientific frameworks.  Thus, 
one can be rational and hold onto a theory that may be considered defeated by a large 
number of experts in the field.   
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For instance, Lamarck’s notion of the inheritance of acquired characteristics was 
seen as having been refuted by Mendelian genetics.  However, in the 1920s and 1930s 
Mendelian genetics was confronted by various anomalies, such as the inability of 
geneticists to create a new species of fruit fly in the laboratory through the mutation of 
specific genes.  Rather, lapsed Mendelian geneticists such as Carl Correns, turned to the 
notion of the inheritance of acquired characteristics in the cytoplasm egg cells to account 
for the evolutionary processes leading to speciation (Sapp 2003, 112-113).  Moreover, 
Ptolemaic astronomy seemed to be rationally held because it seemed to fit the world and 
make accurate predictions.   
If theories such as Lamarck’s seem so obviously wrong but reemerge in the eyes 
of many scientists as worthy of consideration, then it seems we do not know when a 
theory does not fit world and thus irrationally held by its adherents.  Moreover, if cases 
such as Ptolemaic astronomy exist where a theory seems obviously to fit the world but 
apparently does not, then we again seem not to know when a theory fits the world and is 
rationally held.  Since Lamarck’s theory seems to have been vindicated by further 
evidence after his death, it is not clear if it was always rational to be committed to a 
Lamarckian theory or not.  Therefore, van Fraassen seems to contradict himself when he 
asserts that there is an objective from which we can measure the truth and falsity of 
statements, and that holding onto beliefs that do not fit the world is irrational, but that one 
can rationally hold onto seemingly refuted theories.   
If the world is our standard by which to judge scientific theories true or false, then 
van Fraassen should tell us how many anomalies make a theory false.  He seems to think 
that this is a matter of disposition, but if he allows for such relativity, then it is not clear 
 253 
how the world is an objective measure of truth.  If these objections are sound, then it is 
not clear why van Fraassen seems to think that we can speak of scientific theories in 
epistemic terms.  Rather, it seems that what van Fraassen is arguing for in his account of 
scientific theory change is commitment to problem solutions instead of truth.  
Furthermore, he appears to be arguing for this position on the basis of our ignorance as to 
world is.  Hence, his account of scientific theory change seems to be incoherent. 
 
 
4.6.8 Psillos’ Defense of The Inference to the Best Explanation 
  
 
 Psillos (2009) contends that van Fraassen’s description of how the inference to the 
best explanation is applied in probabilistic reasoning commits the straw person fallacy.  
Van Fraassen claims that, in the Bayesian framework, bonuses should be assigned to 
posterior probabilities of hypotheses that are seen as the best explanations of the 
phenomena in question (in Psillos 2009, 196).  Psillos agrees with van Fraassen that 
following this method of fixing posterior probabilities will lead to probabilistic 
incoherence.  However, van Fraassen’s description of how probabilities are fixed using 
the inference to the best explanation is not the only way.  Psillos argues that the 
theoretical virtues should be taken into consideration when assigning prior probabilities.  
Theoretical virtues are taken into account relative to the “background knowledge” 
supporting the theory, or in judging the likelihood of the theory.  In this way, the prior 
probabilities are not given equal probabilistic weight as van Fraassen claimed.  For him, 
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theories that are underdetermined by the observable evidence have the same likelihood of 
being true.  But, Psillos contends, the inference to the best explanation is used to break 
observational ties, and thus two or more competing hypotheses will not have the same 
prior probabilities.  Therefore, the probabilistic incoherence van Fraassen described will 
not arise. 
 Van Fraassen could reply that Psillos has not shown that theoretical virtues are 
not merely pragmatic, but epistemic as well.  Psillos’ argument above seems to be aimed 
at van Fraassen’s specific argument against the inference to the best explanation based on 
Bayesian probability.  Furthermore, van Fraassen’s seemingly likely reply would appear 
to lead to a standstill between the two positions since Psillos ultimate retort to van 
Fraassen’s objection to the inference to the best explanation is that he is an epistemic 
optimist while van Fraassen is an epistemic pessimist.  However, in the subsection below 
I shall discuss Psillos’ objections to van Fraassen’s arguments against the inference to the 
best explanation. 
 
 
4.6.9 Truth, Empirical Adequacy and Metaphysical Baggage 
 
  
     Psillos claims that van Fraassen’s rejection of the inference to the best 
explanation for observables leads him into skepticism.  As mentioned in a subsection 
above, van Fraassen maintains he escapes skepticism because skepticism for him is, by 
definition, self-refuting.  When he thinks of skepticism he assumes it to be of the 
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Cartesian variety where one cannot be sure of what one is immediately perceiving (since 
one could be dreaming, insane, deceived by an all-powerful demon, and so forth).  Thus, 
by believing in the truth of what we can see immediately in experience van Fraassen 
claims he is not a skeptic.  It is important to note that van Fraassen appears not to believe 
in the truth of past experience, and hence he is not committed to any form of induction.61  
However, Psillos argues that posits (observable or unobservable) are used to causally 
unite our immediate experiences.  He notes that van Fraassen’s position does not cover 
unobserved entities that could be observed.   
For example, the inference to the best explanation is used when we suppose that a 
book that we own still exists when we leave the room.  Furthermore, the positing of 
extinct animals through fossil remains is another instance of the inference to the best 
explanation.  Psillos contends that, while Cartesian skepticism is avoided, Humean 
skepticism looms around the corner.  Whether or not van Fraassen would accept Humean 
skepticism is unclear.  However, if van Fraassen continues to claim that his philosophy of 
science accurately depicts scientific practice, then Psillos seems to have shown this is not 
the case since biology seems to rely heavily on the fossil record as crucial evidence for 
the theory of evolution.  Moreover, it appears that the argument above could be extended 
to van Fraassen’s take on what he calls “metaphysical baggage” in scientific theories.  
Otherwise, without posits, it would seem that the regularities we see in nature 
miraculously arise anew in the immediacy of every experience we have.  
 
 
 
                                                 
61 This is why he does not believe in the pessimistic meta-induction. 
 256 
4.6.10 Empiricist Structuralism and Instrumentation 
 
 
Since his (2008), van Fraassen considers what other philosophers of science call 
“entities” and “processes” to be the products of instruments.  As shown in Chapter Three, 
he contends that “entities”, such as paramecium, are not denizens of an unobservable 
world.  Rather, they are phenomena created by a microscope.  Given his commonsense 
realism, it is not clear what metaphysical status the “entities” created by instruments 
occupy.  He seems to think that what is observable with the unaided senses is real, but 
that the phenomena in microscopes, for instance, are not ontologically on a par with the 
entities and processes that we sense without the aid of instruments.  If this is the case, he 
again has to show why our unaided senses are to be epistemically privileged above what 
we sense through instruments.   
Furthermore, if instruments (such as the microscope) operate under the same 
physical principles as the human eye, then why is it that the former create phenomena and 
the latter do not?  For instance, he claims there is a distinction between what appears to 
our senses (which may be false) and phenomena (scientific measurements which are 
taken to be true).  However, as noted earlier in this chapter, the appearance of the 
retrograde motion of Mars is false, while the phenomenon of Mars’ elliptical motion is 
true.  This distinction seems to be at odds with the empiricist assumptions that reality is 
as we perceive it.  Is there something special about organic material versus glass and 
metal that allows the former access veritable access to the world while the latter do not 
have veritable access to an unseen world?  Van Fraassen’s answer seems to be that we 
 257 
rely on our naked senses out of pragmatic considerations, but he has not shown why we 
cannot have the same trust in our instruments for the same reason.  For example, the 
apparent discovery of germs has revolutionized medicine, now cleanliness in hospitals 
(especially in operating rooms) is seen as a necessity for maintaining health and keeping 
people alive.  If the phenomena observed under microscopes have such significant 
survival value, then why are they not trusted for the same pragmatic reason as our senses? 
Moreover, if instruments, such as microscopes, do not help us to see small things 
accurately (say, the eyes of fly), then do eye glasses and magnifying glasses create 
phenomena too?  Van Fraassen does not seem to have answers to these questions. 
 
 
4.6.11 Voluntarist Reference?   
 
 
 Considering the scientific realism debate in science seems to hinge on which 
theory of reference one adopts, van Fraassen would do well to make explicit which 
theory of reference he is using.  Furthermore, he is unclear as to what it is that theoretical 
terms refer to, if they refer at all.  Perhaps that they refer to phenomena created in the 
laboratory, but he does not specify what the features are that identify a referent.  As we 
have already seen, for Psillos it is a combination of specific descriptive properties and a 
dubbing event that fixes the referent of the theoretical term.  In his (1980), he seems to be 
committed to taking scientific theories at face value.  However, in his (2008), van 
Fraassen argues that science uses structures to represent certain phenomena, and that 
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what determines which structure is used to represent which phenomena depends on the 
person employing the representation.  If van Fraassen holds that the terms used by the 
scientist are also representations, then what features of the term are essential depends on 
the user of that term.  If this is how reference works for van Fraassen, then a voluntarist 
theory of reference is in line with his view.  If he does not see reference as working in 
this way, then a voluntarist theory of reference can still be used in accordance with a 
voluntarist epistemology such as the one he employs.   
However, if van Fraassen uses a voluntarist theory of reference, then the 
objections employed against Psillos work against van Fraassen mutatis mutandis.  While 
Psillos was apparently attempting to create a theory of reference that would compel 
scientific realists to adopt it as the theory of reference for scientific realism, van Fraassen 
seems to allow for a given context to determine reference and meaning.  Yet, there 
appears to be an ambiguity in van Fraassen’s indexical characterization of reference 
between what is normative and what is descriptive.  As noted earlier, there is a tension 
between whether or not truth is only to be found within a context or if it can be found 
outside of a context, as when a scientific theory latches on to a regularity or fails to do so.  
This tension bleeds over into reference and meaning since meaning and reference are 
defined within a context, but whether or not someone correctly refers to something or not 
seems to be independent of any given context.  For instance, van Fraassen notes that if 
one were to say that phlogiston is escaping to describe combustion, then this person 
would be mistaken since phlogiston theory does not capture any regularity in nature 
(2006: 147).   
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Furthermore, it is not clear when we should dismiss a theory or abandon a term 
since, according to voluntarism, our interests, dispositions, and emotions play an 
inescapable role in our decision to regard something as true or false.  For instance, as 
shown in a previous subsection, van Fraassen’s account of theory change relies on 
voluntarist epistemology to argue that holding onto an anomaly ridden scientific theory is 
rational.  For example, epigenetics has shown that once discredited theories and their 
terms, such as “the inheritance of acquired characteristics” can be resurrected.  If this is 
the case, then it is not clear when a theory has failed to latch onto actual regularities in 
nature or not.  If this it is not clear when a theory has failed to latch onto actual 
regularities, then there are fewer clear cases for van Fraassen to point to as instances of 
irrationality and failure of reference.   
 
 
4.6.12 Facticity and van Fraassen 
 
 
While van Fraassen eschews the correspondence theory of truth and does not hold 
to the metaphysical view that there is one true story of the world, he seems to hold onto a 
view of truth that requires some kind of non-contextual common denominator of truth 
with which to judge the acceptability of a particular context.  Thus, he seems to need to 
have a notion of truth that has some kind of correspondence with the world.  If he does 
not have a way to judge the truth and falsity of contexts, then his view will fall victim to 
irenic relativism.  However, if he denies that truth has any connection to the world but 
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only to a particular context, then his view will be idealist.  Because of his commitment to 
commonsense realism it seems idealism is a view he wants to avoid.  Therefore, a notion 
of truth that corresponds with the world in some way is necessary to avoid these two 
positions.  But, as shown above, his permissive position on rationality allows for 
contradictory notions of what is true and what is false since these are decided 
contextually.  Hence, van Fraassen’s attempts to constrain irenic relativism fail since the 
cases he cites to show are unacceptable appear to be acceptable by his own standards.  
Furthermore, theories that have been refuted, presumably for failing to attach themselves 
to regularities in nature, seemingly latch onto regularities after all.  Hence, van Fraassen’s 
permissive rationality leads to an untenable view of truth that undermines his empiricist 
epistemology and philosophy of science.  Since the view of truth used in his account of 
knowledge seems to fail it appears that van Fraassen’s account of knowledge does not 
meet the facticity criterion.  
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
 
 In the preceding sections and subsections, I have sought to:  
 
(1) Instill a suspension judgment on the accounts of scientific knowledge examined in the 
previous chapters of this dissertation.   
 
 261 
(2) Show that none of the accounts of scientific knowledge examined seems to meet the 
facticity criterion of acquiring truth about the world.   
 
(3) Begin each section with a discussion of the assumptions made by the philosopher in 
question to show that they fall prey to the mode of hypothesis.  For Psillos the mode of 
hypothesis appeared in his three stances of scientific realism, for van Fraassen in his 
epistemic voluntarism and commitment to the empirical stance, and for Bird with his 
commitment to the primitivist account of knowledge.   
 
(4) If the mode of hypothesis failed applied to the above mentioned philosopher’s 
respective views did not lead to the suspension of judgment, I then attempted to instill 
this state through particular arguments that seemed to undermine particular aspects of 
these views.   
 
(5) In particular, I focused on those views that entailed the facticity criterion, such as the 
inference to the best explanation.   
 
(6) I sometimes used other philosopher’s objections to the views in questions or 
developed my own.  As noted in Chapter One, the modes are used by all sides in a debate 
to undermine the positions of their opponents.  My goal was not show that the views in 
question failed, only that they seem to have failed.  The arguments appear to have failed 
because they seem to fall prey to one or more of the modes.   
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(7) I attempted to show the reader that some of the objections to each account seem to be 
equipollent in terms of their persuasive power.   
 
(8) Thus, one of these accounts may be true, but they do not seem to be because they do 
not appear to overcome the Pyrrhonist modes or to be able to break the apparent tie with 
one or both of the other accounts examined.   
 
(9) Therefore, if all of the alternatives examined seem to be false, then the search for the 
true account of scientific knowledge continues.  However, if the accounts I have chosen 
are representative of the majority of accounts existing, then it appears that there is as yet 
no true account of scientific knowledge.62   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 In the next chapter, I shall conclude this dissertation by endeavoring to instill doubt about the possibility 
of adding a positive cognitive feature to the traditional modes of Pyrrhonism.  Specifically, I will examine 
the respective neo-Pyrrhonist positions of Robert Fogelin and Otávio Bueno.     
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Chapter Five. 
 
 
Neo-Pyrrhonism and Scientific Knowledge 
 
 
 In all of the accounts discussed throughout this dissertation, the philosophers 
presenting their particular version of scientific knowledge seem to state that they are able 
to access the truth, whether of the natural world (Bird, van Fraassen) or of abstracta 
(Psillos).  Each philosopher seems to argue that the success of a scientific theory is 
evidence for the truth of some part of that theory.  Thus, they all appear to agree that 
whether or not some part of a scientific theory is true is to be found in the relation 
between theory and practice.  While the previous chapters have endeavored to show that 
the three accounts of scientific knowledge examined fail to defeat the Pyrrhonist modes, I 
shall attempt to show that the Pyrrhonists themselves may have held an inconsistent view 
concerning the relation of theory to practice.   
As noted in Chapter One, the Methodist school of ancient medicine would 
consider various doctrines about the nature of disease to improve their practice without 
belief in the truth of those theories.  There is evidence in the writings of Sextus 
Empiricus63 that the Pyrrhonists followed the Methodists in the practice of medicine, and 
                                                 
63 No evidence appears anywhere else.  Moreover, the title “Empiricus” seems to indicate that Sextus was 
a follower of the Empiric school of medicine.  Furthermore, Sextus notes that it is commonly assumed that 
the Empirics is allied to Pyrhhonism (PH 1 236-41).  However, he rejects the association between the 
Empirics and Pyrhhonism. These apparent discrepancies in Sextus’ writings will be discussed in section 
5.1.1 of this chapter. 
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thus also considered the practical value of theories while not taking the theories under 
examination as being true of the world.  In this chapter, I shall attempt to assess whether 
or not the Pyrrhonists were consistent in considering theories as guides to better practice.  
I will employ the Pyrrhonist modes to test whether or not a connection between theory 
and practice can be assumed by the Pyrrhonist.  If this connection cannot be maintained, 
then the Pyrrhonists were inconsistent in their practice of considering theories for their 
practical value.  I shall then consider what this inconsistency means for the neo-
Pyrrhonist views of Robert Fogelin and Otávio Bueno, respectively. 
 
 
5.1 Pyrrhonism and Practice  
 
 
5.1.1 The Relation of Theory to Practice 
 
 
 In Chapter One, I summarized Frede’s (1983) description of how the Methodist 
school of medicine justified its use of theory in the practice of medicine despite its 
skeptical stance toward the truth of all theories.  Sextus Empiricus seems to have 
endorsed the Methodical school of medicine in (PH I 238-241).  Moreover, Frede 
assumes that the Methodists and Pyrrhonists took a contextualist position on knowledge 
claims.  The Methodists claimed to know much about characteristics that reappear, and 
whose manifestation and disappearance could be determined through inspection (1983, 
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3).  These characteristics they called generalities.  However, the Methodists used the term 
in a non-metaphysical way, denying that they knew whether generalities exist or do not 
exist.  Rather, they used generalities as indications for treatment (1983, 4-5).  Thus, while 
Methodists used the term in a non-metaphysical way, it they considered “generalities” to 
be a metaphysical term since it was not apparent, but had to be uncovered.  These 
generalities did not only apply to medicine but to any art at all.  An example of a 
generality in the art of medicine is pneumonia.  The Methodists did not claim that a 
natural kind called “pneumonia” exists, just that this name picks out a certain set of 
symptoms (such as coughing, fever, difficulty breathing).   
 The Methodical school was a reaction to both the Rationalist and Empiric schools 
of medicine.  The Rationalist school strove to understand diseases and their treatment 
through inferring from the symptoms of a disease to the hidden state that causes the 
malady.  They held that reasoning showed that the human body was composed of atoms 
and pores.  The Empiric school64 relied solely on experience to guide their treatments.  
They assumed that the symptoms make clear how the disease is to be treated (1983, 2).  
For instance, if suffering is caused by the constriction of some body part, then dilation is 
called for as a treatment.  The treatment is immediately apparent, thus there is no 
inference to be made.  In the following two paragraphs, I shall endeavor to show how the 
Methodists differed from the Rationalists and the Empirics, respectively. 
According to Frede, the knowledge the Methodists claimed to have is ordinary 
knowledge, or knowledge of what is appears to be the case, and not theoretical knowledge 
that makes claims about reality.  The Methodists, like the Pyrrhonists, do not assent to 
anything except for appearances.  This commitment to appearances extends to a rejection 
                                                 
64 Cf. footnote 1 of this chapter. 
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of logic since having to use inferences to arrive at a conclusion means that the conclusion 
arrived was not immediately evident.  The Methodists rejected belief in the truth of 
theories since theories are inferences to and from non-evident states to the causes of 
diseases. Thus, against the Rationalists, the Methodists did think that reason should be 
used in the construction of scientific theories.  Rather, an evident feeling makes obvious 
what course of action is needed (1983, 7). They agreed with the Pyrrhonists that we do 
not need theories to tell us to drink water when thirsty or to eat when we are hungry.  An 
instance of evident feeling in medicine is the extraction of foreign objects from a person’s 
body, as when a dog removes a thorn that was stuck in its paw (PH I 238). 
As with the Pyrrhonists, the Methodists would study all theories of medicine, 
though they did not believe in any of them, because they did not want to look like they 
were rejecting belief in them out of ignorance.  If they did so, then they would appear to 
be what Sextus called negative dogmatists, or those who claimed to know we could not 
know something.  Rejecting theories without carefully considering them would be 
negatively dogmatic since one of them may turn out to be manifestly true. Therefore, the 
Methodists disagreed with the Empirics’ sole reliance on experience.  However, Frede 
contends that there is more to the Methodist consideration of theory since they seem to 
have been heavily influenced by the physiology of Asclepiades.   
According to Asclepiades, the body was composed of atoms and invisible pores.  
All diseases arose from three generalities: the constriction of these pores, the dilation of 
these pores, or both.  Clearly, the constriction and dilation of hidden pores, and the 
existence of these pores and of atoms, were not manifest.  Moreover, Asclepiades 
claimed to have arrived at knowledge of the existence of these hidden entities and 
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processes through reasoning.  However, the Methodists did not believe in the existence or 
non-existence of these hidden entities and processes, nor did they accept the reasoning 
from observed constriction and dilation to corresponding hidden states of constriction and 
dilation.  Yet, there is some evidence that the Methodists did accept Asclepiades’ theory 
on some level (1983, 14-15). 
  If Frede’s argument is sound, then at least some Methodists thought that 
Asclepiades’ account seemed more plausible than other accounts of disease since the 
latter’s theory, while speculative, seemed to correspond to careful attention to the 
appearances.  Thus, according to the Methodists, there are certain manifest generalities 
that we may never have become aware of if it were not for Asclepiades’ theory.  Frede 
gives the following elucidation of their view: “After all, it is extremely unlikely that by 
merely looking at the phenomena without the guidance of some theory we would ever 
have realised that all diseases are forms of three generalities” (1983, 16).  However, the 
Methodists seemed to hold that it is observation which furnishes us with the knowledge 
of these generalities which were brought to our attention by speculation.  Furthermore, it 
is only what is clearly manifest that can be reliably known and hence guarantee the safety 
of a given treatment.   
Yet, as noted by the physician and philosopher, Galen, there were disagreements 
among the Methodists as to what features constituted generalities.  He further observed 
these disagreements should not have arisen since generalities are supposed to be 
manifest, and what is manifest should be clear for all to see (1983, 16).  The Methodists 
would have likely replied to Galen’s objection that he is assuming complex phenomena 
can be broken down into simpler, basic phenomenal features, and this assumption is not 
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obviously true.  Therefore, generalities still are manifest, but what features characterize 
them is not.  The disagreement as to what is manifest goes to show that something can be 
obvious without being immediately obvious to everyone.  Training is needed to be able to 
recognize certain manifest phenomena.  If medical phenomena were obvious to everyone, 
then there would be no need for doctors (1983, 17-18).    
  While Sextus Empiricus endorses them, the Methodists do not seem to have 
been skeptics.  As shown above, the Methodists claimed certain knowledge must be 
obtained in order to practice medicine safely, and that they had acquired this knowledge.  
Thus, as Frede notes, “it comes as a considerable surprise when we are told by Sextus 
Empiricus (PH I 236ff) that of all the medical sects the Methodical school is the one 
which is most attractive for a sceptic” (1983, 20).  Sextus does not claim that the 
Methodists are skeptics, but that their view is the most in line with Pyrrhonism than 
Empiricism.  He notes certain common features between them such as the undogmatic 
use of terms, their agnostic stance toward unobservable entities, and their reliance on 
manifest affections for guidance.  Hence, Sextus does not link Pyrrhonism with any 
particular group of Methodists, but only with the Methodical school in general (1983, 
21). 
Frede argues that the general view of the Methodical school is compatible with 
Pyrrhonist skepticism since the former speak of certain knowledge in an undogmatic 
manner.  He assumes that the Pyrrhonists and the Methodists were contextualists of a sort 
where the word “knowledge” is understood in an ordinary sense, including “certain 
knowledge”.  By speaking within an ordinary context they do not make any claims as to 
the existence of certain knowledge.  The Methodists claimed the Rationalists had failed to 
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acquire theoretical knowledge that was certain and had failed to obtain ordinary, manifest 
knowledge.  Since the Methodists only sought to acquire certain knowledge in an 
ordinary sense they were able to acquire at least that much.  According to Frede, the 
Methodist view of knowledge is compatible with the Pyrrhonist suspension of judgment 
on all theoretical matters and their assent to appearances.   
One may object that an ancient skeptic could not endorse the Methodical school 
since the latter allowed for theoretical speculation or for one to approve of one theory 
over others.  The Methodists did both.  Frede replies that the Academic skeptics allowed 
for these practices, therefore, Methodism was compatible with them.  Moreover, while he 
does not show how, Frede claims that Sextus was consistent in following the Methodical 
school.  Perhaps the contextualist construal of knowledge is what allows for this 
consistency.   
Furthermore, Sextus’ title “Empiricus” seems to indicate that he practiced 
following the Empirical school.65  Sextus notes that the Empirical school and Pyrhhonism 
are commonly associated with each other (PH I 236).66  However, according to Sextus, 
the Empirics appeared to hold that knowledge of non-evident matters is impossible rather 
than suspending judgment on these matters as a Pyrrhonist ought to (PH I 236).  If the 
Empirics did hold that such knowledge was impossible to acquire, then they were 
assuming to know that we could not know these matters.  Thus, they seemed to be 
negative dogmatists.  Yet, he does not say whether or not a Pyrrhonist can align 
themselves with the Empirics if the latter did suspend judgment on non-evident matters.  
                                                 
65 At least in PH I 236-41 Sextus does not explain how the title “Empiricus” was bestowed upon him. 
66 Cf. footnote 1 of this chapter. 
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Therefore, it is unclear whether or not Methodism was the only school of medicine 
compatible with Pyrrhonism. 
 
 
5.1.2 A Pyrrhonist Examination of Methodism 
 
 
In this section, I endeavor to contend that Pyrrhonism and Methodism appear to 
be incompatible.  As noted in Chapter One, it is not clear that the Pyrrhonists had the 
kind of contextualist view of knowledge that Frede and Fogelin claim they had.  
Furthermore, as I shall attempt to show in this subsection, the skeptical modes seem to be 
applicable to the Methodical school.  If the modes do undermine the Methodists’ views, 
then their theoretical speculation was inconsistent with their claim that they only assent to 
the appearances.  In particular, their latter claim seems to fail because the Methodists 
seemingly do not have a way to deal with conflicting appearances.   
The Methodists fall prey to the mode of hypothesis when they claim that training 
is necessary to recognize what is evident.  If training is necessary to recognize what is 
evident, then there does not seem to be a way to judge what is evident and what is not 
evident.  What is evident should be evident to everyone or else it is not evident by 
definition.  Hence, a contradiction arises if they claim that what is evident is supposed to 
be evident to all.  Moreover, they reject inferences because inferences are not 
immediately evident, but allow for theoretical training to lead to what is not immediately 
evident.   
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The mode of relativity seems to work against the Methodists’ claim that 
theoretical speculation leads to new phenomena because it is not evident why we should 
follow one form of training over another.  For instance, training in Eastern medicine, 
such as acupuncture, leads to very different treatments than training in contemporary 
Western medicine.  Furthermore, in contemporary Western medicine there is 
disagreement as to what is evident and what treatment should be given for a particular 
ailment.  For example, there is controversy over whether the benefits of electroconvulsive 
therapy on depressed patients outweigh the risks of the long-term effects on general 
cognition, such as memory loss.  By claiming that training is necessary to recognize what 
is evident, the Methodists seem to be in the same position as their dogmatic opponents of 
showing that what is made evident to them should be evident to all.  However, they do 
not and thus fall prey to the mode of hypothesis as well. 
It appears the Methodists would likely respond that what differentiates them from 
the other schools of medicine is that they do not make any claim to knowledge of what is 
real.  However, this response will not do.  The Methodist claim that training is required to 
recognize what is evident is analogous to the Rationalists’ use of reason to purportedly 
uncover reality.  As shown in the preceding paragraph, the same modes of hypothesis and 
relativity can be used against the claim that something evident has now been recognized 
through training as against claims that reason has revealed reality.  Yet, many claim to 
use reason to uncover reality and they disagree on the nature of reality.  The Methodists 
will claim that what their training has shown them is truly evident, but it appears to be 
evident only to them and thus there is disagreement as to what is evident and what is not.  
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Therefore, using the same modes they use against claims about reality, Sextus should 
have suspended judgment on the Methodists’ claims of what is evident through training. 
 The Pyrrhonists may have two responses to the above objection.  The first is that 
they could still follow the general Methodist stance against theory, even if it leads to 
training in different theories and different treatments, because how a particular person 
responds to any given situation seems to depend on their dispositions and upbringing.  As 
Sextus notes in PH I 23, the Pyrrhonist responds to the appearances according to their 
nature, affects, culture, and the training they received in their chosen trade.  Thus, 
different Pyrrhonists will be moved by different appearances to act in different ways 
according to their different affects, training, cultures, etc.  Therefore, when appearances 
conflict, they will seemingly be disposed to act on one appearance over another based on 
their training, acculturation, affects and so on.   
Their second response appears to be that the goal of Pyrrhonism is to attain 
ataraxia.  Their primary goal is not quality medical care for all, but their own peace of 
mind.  Thus, while there are problems with conflicting appearances within the practice of 
medicine, these conflicting appearances need not concern the Pyrrhonist doctor.  Rather, 
the Pyrrhonist doctor will simply follow their training, affections, and so forth.  If they 
are encountering a new phenomena that they have not been trained to handle (such as a 
new illness), then they will likely wait for others to try different treatments on this new 
phenomena.  Once different treatments have been tried, they will then use the one that 
seems to be the most effective.  How long a particular Pyrrhonist will wait before 
choosing a treatment will depend on the dispositions of that Pyrrhonist. 
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5.2 Fogelin and Bueno 
 
 
 While the appeal to ataraxia in the preceding subsection may work for the 
traditional Pyrrhonist, Fogelin and Bueno’s versions of neo-Pyrrhonism abandon this 
notion, and thus they cannot appeal to it.  The adoption of the epistemological side of 
Pyrrhonism, while abandoning the practical side of attaining ataraxia, leads to difficulties 
that may undermine the purely epistemological side of Pyrrhonism which can be 
remedied by appealing to the attainment of ataraxia.  As argued above in the examination 
of the Methodical school of medicine, the attempt to show Pyrrhonism is compatible with 
any kind of practice may be undermined by the Pyrrhonist modes.  In the subsections 
below, I shall endeavor to argue that the objections to the Pyrrhonist and Methodist 
attempts to explain how they can adopt certain practices over others can be applied 
mutatis mutandis to the neo-Pyrrhonist views of Fogelin and Bueno.  In particular, I will 
attempt to contend that their aim of wedding an account of cognitive success to the 
Pyrrhonist modes seems untenable.   
 
 
5.2.1 Fogelin 
 
 
As noted in Chapter One, Fogelin seems to be mistaken about how Pyrrhonists 
regard knowledge claims because Pyrrhonists do not seem to deal with levels of scrutiny.  
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However, even if I am wrong on this point and Fogelin is right, then Pyrrhonists may 
have an incoherent position on knowledge.  Fogelin seems committed to a view close to 
epistemological contextualism with his notion of levels of scrutiny.  The difference 
between his view and contextualistm lies in his claim that low levels of scrutiny allow 
one to be justified in their being said to have knowledge, not in making a claim to actual 
knowledge in a certain context.  While this is a significant difference, it seems that the 
same objections that apply to contextualism also apply to Fogelin’s levels of scrutiny.  I 
intend to deal with Fogelin’s neo-Pyrrhonism in detail in future research, but here I will 
endeavor to give a sketch of some of the difficulties his position may face.   
For instance, although Fogelin does not address scientific knowledge in particular, 
his levels of scrutiny seem to apply to all types of propositional knowledge.  Thus, I shall 
examine whether or not his notion can be applied to scientific knowledge.  If there is 
scientific knowledge, then it appears not to be a problem for levels of scrutiny since the 
levels of scrutiny seem to be well established by the centuries of scientific practice.  For 
there to be stable levels of scrutiny across the history of scientific revolutions of the kind 
Kuhn (1970) argues for cannot have occurred.  Perhaps Fogelin could rely Bird’s 
response to Kuhn’s arguments described in Chapter Two.  If Bird’s argument against 
Kuhhn’s methodological incommensurability is sound, then established levels of scrutiny 
remain stable through theory change.  As noted in Chapter Two, Bird contends that 
exemplars (in the Kuhnian sense), such as the equations Newton used to predict celestial 
orbits, can be applied to different domains, such as the measure of water, to create new 
sciences, such as hydrodynamics.  But, it is not clear that exemplars can be so easily 
applied to new domains.   
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However, levels of scrutiny may not be stable even in science that is generally 
seen as non-revolutionary.  For instance, in chapter six of his Image and Logic, Galison 
describes how two instrument traditions in physics and the epistemological assumptions 
behind them.  The image tradition relied on instruments such as cloud chambers and 
bubble chambers, while the logic tradition relied on devices such as the Geiger-Müller 
counter, spark counter, and the sonic chamber.  For the image tradition, human 
intervention was necessary for recognizing patterns, whereas for the logic tradition 
electronic counters statistical arguments lead to discovery.  The fusion of the two 
traditions occurred with the development of electronic imagery in such instruments as the 
Time Projection Machine.   
Fogelin’s epistemology does not make clear how or why one instrument tradition 
would compromise its notion of what counts as evidence to make such a machine.  It is 
not obvious which tradition has the higher level of scrutiny.  Thus, it is not clear that 
there can be established levels of scrutiny in science in one field of science (physics), 
much less in science generally.  If Fogelin’s account of ordinary knowledge relies on 
established levels of scrutiny, then established levels of scrutiny are required for 
scientific knowledge too.  However, if levels of scrutiny cannot be established even 
among subdivisions within a scientific field, then it seems Fogelin cannot give an account 
of knowledge within subdivisions of a field of science.  A fortiori, he cannot give a 
general account of scientific knowledge.  
Furthermore, if Kuhn’s (1970) arguments are sound, then during crises and 
revolutionary periods the levels of scrutiny become higher.  When levels of scrutiny 
become higher the justification one has in thinking that one knows something in this 
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context disappears.  When levels of scrutiny reach this high level it is not clear how to 
establish a paradigm that can bring the level of scrutiny back down to normal working 
levels.   
For example, Natural theology reached a crisis when it could not account for the 
recent findings in geology, such as the fossils of extinct species.  Darwin put forward his 
theory of evolution to resolve the crisis and make biology consistent with the findings of 
geology.  Yet, while the consensus of the scientific community eventually accepted 
evolution as the new paradigm, there were unresolved inconsistencies.  For instance, the 
mechanism of inheritance was left unexplained, and there were missing links in the 
evolutionary chain.  These gaps in the theory could very well be reasons to suspend 
judgment on it.  Fogelin may respond that a neo-Pyrrhonist can wait out the revolution 
until consensus is reached on a new paradigm, but this is not in keeping with scientific 
practice.  It is not clear that Pyrrhonists could take up the practice of science, since it 
requires the creation of new contexts, or paradigms, which fix the levels of scrutiny back 
to normal working levels.  Yet, even at the lower levels of scrutiny, where puzzle-solving 
takes place, creativity is necessary, and it is not clear how Pyrrhonists can be creative. 
For instance, Ignaz Semmelweis needed to be creative when he sought a cure for 
puerperal fever.  In doing so he developed antiseptic techniques for use in hospitals.  
While it is logically possible for a Pyrrhonist to have carried out the same experiments 
Semmelweis did to reduce mortality by puerperal fever, the Pyrrhonists seem to be 
passively affected by appearances.  The Pyrrhonist does not act, but seems only to react 
to appearances.  Thus it is difficult to see where the impetus for experimentation would 
come from.  If Pyrrhonists also only use the techniques taught to them in their chosen 
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trades, then there would be no Pyrrhonist scientists.  Rather, they can only be engineers 
and technicians since these trades have well established theories and methods.  Hence, no 
creativity is necessary to carry out their tasks (cf. Kuhn 1970, 30).  Therefore, it is not 
clear that Fogelin’s notion of levels of scrutiny can handle areas of putative knowledge, 
such as science, where the levels rise and fall.   
If Fogelin’s neo-Pyrrhonism leads to the same kind of passivity of the historical 
Pyrrhonists, then there are certain trades that the neo-Pyrrhonist cannot adopt.  If this is 
the case, then Fogelin should be explicit in saying so.  But, if he takes this approach, he 
will also have to accept that there may be no way of accounting for the apparent 
empirical success of science.  If he accepts such a position, then he should explicitly 
claim it.  However, if Fogelin thinks that the neo-Pyrrhonist dismissal of ataraxia allows 
the neo-Pyrrhonist to be active, then they can adopt trades with fluctuating levels of 
scrutiny.  If they can adopt such trades, then Fogelin has to show how one can actively 
find a way out of a higher level of scrutiny where there is no precedent for doing so, as in 
a scientific revolution.  If my objections are sound, then it seems that Fogelin’s levels of 
scrutiny face the same problems Pyrrhonist and Methodist doctors face when confronted 
by new phenomena.   
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5.2.2 Bueno 
 
 
 As shown in Chapter One, Bueno argues that neo-Pyrrhonism is consistent with 
scientific practice.  The same arguments lodged against Fogelin’s neo-Pyrrhonist scientist 
seem to apply to Bueno’s view as well.  There appears to be no motivation for the neo-
Pyrrhonist to engage in the creative activity that appears to be integral to science.  Yet, 
Bueno claims it is possible to add a positive feature to the epistemological side of 
traditional Pyrrhonism.  Bueno seems to think that knowledge is possible for Pyrrhonism 
and neo-Pyrrhonism “in a non-dogmatic way” (forthcoming, 13).  Such a claim seems to 
be close to Fogelin’s account of knowledge where one is said to have knowledge, but it is 
not known whether one has knowledge or not.  Bueno appears to go beyond Fogelin’s 
account of knowledge by apparently allowing for know-how (or at least apparent know-
how).  He states that “Knowledge is something that emerges from a certain practice of 
investigation (the skeptical practice), in a non-dogmatic way” (Bueno forthcoming, 13).  
Moreover, since he seems not to be committed to the traditional Pyrrhonist goal of 
ataraxia he seems to hold that the neo-Pyrrhonist does not passively react to appearances: 
“Clearly the skeptic is concerned with the practical outcomes of such knowledge, by 
being able to control relevant phenomena, and explore technological applications that can 
be developed from them” (Bueno forthcoming, 13). Yet, know-how is not the only 
cognitive goal that seems to be acquired through scientific practice.  As noted in Chapter 
One, this additional epistemic feature is van Fraassen’s notion of understanding.   
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However, this notion of understanding allows for too much.  If understanding is 
merely putting forth different interpretations of how the world could be, then there are 
many ways (some that seem scientific and some that seem not to be) that the world could 
be.  Thus, it is unclear why a neo-Pyrrhonist would look to scientific theories and not to 
science fiction, or Scientology, or astrology, and so on for understanding.  Bueno may 
respond that these interpretations appear not to be empirically successful.  If he gave such 
a response, then he will have to show why we should adopt the scientific theory of 
success over, say, the astrological one.  The adherents of astrology seem to think that 
astrology has reliable predictive power.  If Bueno chooses to argue as the Methodists to 
justify their commitment to some theories over others, then it seems Bueno will fall prey 
to the modes of hypothesis and relativity as well.   
Putting aside what counts as empirical success (or perhaps the appearance of it), 
the challenge from the pessimistic meta-induction seems to have show that scientific 
theories can be empirically successful and yet false in their descriptions of the world.  
Thus, there does not seem to be anything special about the empirical success of science 
that makes it more successful at giving true, or approximately true, interpretations of the 
world.  Therefore, the world may be understood in any way that does not share the 
features of theories that are considered scientific, such as empirical testability, simplicity, 
and coherence with other findings in science.   
Moreover, if increasing understanding simply means accumulating interpretations 
of how the world could be, then understanding would be increased by studying religious 
texts, New Age philosophies, alchemical manuals, graphic novels, and fairytales.  Some 
of these examples may be consistent with certain appearances, or create other 
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appearances, but appearances may be very different from reality.  If Bueno wants to 
exclude these examples as examples of understanding67 and claim that science has some 
special purchase on how the world could be, then he has to show why this appears to be 
the case.  Hence, he seems to encounter the same modes that the Pyrrhonists, Methodists, 
and Fogelin face when attempting to show why we should take some theories more 
seriously than others.   
 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
 
 
Of the accounts of scientific knowledge that have been examined, none of them 
seem to have been able to establish an account that met the facticity criterion.  These 
accounts appear to be representative of many of the implicit accounts of scientific 
knowledge given in contemporary literature in the philosophy of science.  However, there 
are other accounts of scientific knowledge, such as that put forth by the Barry Barnes and 
David Bloor that claim truth and scientific knowledge are socially constructed.  The 
Pyrrhonist examination of this account of scientific knowledge shall be pursued in future 
research.  Returning to the accounts examined, including the neo-Pyrrhonist attempts to 
develop a positive epistemology, it seems that the Pyrrhonist modes are too corrosive to 
allow for any positive epistemology, whether for science or in general.  Following 
Pyrrhonist agnosticism, this conclusion is not a claim about whether or not the accounts 
                                                 
67 Or perhaps he would just say that they seem to be inferior examples. 
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have really failed, or whether or not a facticity account of scientific knowledge that does 
not fall prey to the Pyrrhonist modes will not be come about in the future.  
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